**United States General Accounting Office** 

**GAO** 

Report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

September 1991

# OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

# Problems Encountered by Activated Reservists





GAO/NSIAD-91-290

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United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and International Affairs Division

B-245121

**September 27, 1991** 

The Honorable Stephen M. Duncan 'Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We conducted a survey of the impact of the reserve mobilization in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm on selected reservists. Our objective was to determine whether reservists encountered any problems when called up for service and what impact their experiences might have on the decision to stay in the reserves.

To avoid duplication, we are discontinuing our effort after our preliminary inquiry because of efforts underway in the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct a large, statistical survey of reservists. We are providing you the results of our survey for consideration in your review. Our results are based primarily on in-depth interviews with 40 reservists from 18 different Reserve and National Guard units from all three services, and their views cannot be considered representative of the entire population of reservists.

#### Results in Brief

Reservists cited a broad range of problems associated with their activation. The problems they cited stemmed more from what they perceived as inequities in service call-up and assignment policies, coupled with what they saw as inadequate conditions at the installations where they were assigned, rather than from losses in income. However, half the reservists we interviewed experienced a drop in income, with the remainder either earning more or about the same after they were mobilized. About three-quarters of the 40 reservists said the problems they encountered lowered their morale, and one-quarter said they would not reenlist.

#### Background

Three weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the President began to call up U.S. reserves to support active-duty forces in Operation Desert Shield and later Operation Desert Storm. Between August 1990 and March 1991, about 227,800 reservists and guardsmen were called up, and as many as 10,700 more volunteered, according to DOD. About 106,000, or 46 percent, of the activated reservists were deployed overseas—primarily to the Persian Gulf area—and the remainder were

assigned to various duty stations in the United States. About 17,200 activated reservists were either federal or postal service employees.

#### Reservists Cited Inequities in Call-Up and Assignment Policies

Among the areas of concern to reservists we interviewed were what they perceived to be inequities in the way the activation and assignment processes were carried out. More specifically, they indicated dissatisfaction with (1) the short amount of advance notice received before activation, (2) the uncertainty of their call-up period, (3) the fact that not all members of their units had been activated, (4) the breakup of their unit and dispersal of members to other locations after activation, and (5) their assignment to jobs for which they had not been trained prior to arrival at their mobilization stations.

DOD officials stated that some of these problems, such as short notice, the uncertainty of the call-up period, and the breakup and dispersal of units, were known problems considered inherent to the mobilization of reserve forces. The officials stressed that little can probably be done about such problems other than to educate the reservists regarding the unavoidable nature of these uncertainties.

# Little Advance Notice of Activation

Eleven of 40 reservists complained of hardships associated with winding up personal affairs as a result of short notification times before reporting for duty. At Dover Air Force Base, Concord Naval Weapons Station, and Fort Bliss, the average notification times for the reservists interviewed were 4.1 days, 8.4 days, and 1.9 days, respectively. DOD officials noted that reservists have a statutory responsibility to be able to mobilize and deploy within 72 hours and that requirement should have been common knowledge among reservists.

Particularly difficult in the short time allotted was making arrangements for the care of children and other dependents, the reservists said. According to a unit commander, many reservists, particularly those who were single parents, did not have up-to-date family care plans describing how their dependents would be cared for during their absence. This commander said subordinate unit commanders did not enforce the requirement that enlisted reservists update their plans annually. While most of these family care problems were resolved, a few resulted in hardship discharges for reservists.

#### Uncertainty of Call-Up Period

The uncertain length of the activation period was also cited as a problem by some reservists. The Secretary of Defense extended the initial 90-day activation period for reservists to 180 days in November under the authority of Executive Order No. 12727, signed by the President in August 1990. In January, the President invoked his broader authority under 10 U.S.C. 673 allowing activation of up to 1 million reservists for up to 24 months, although the Secretary of Defense administratively limited the activation period to 12 months.

A physician in the 3297th U.S. Army Hospital, which had more than 600 members activated at the time of our review, told us that he and other unit members were led to believe that they would be activated for 90 days. Accordingly, many of the physicians told their patients that they would return to their practices at the end of that period. He complained that the call-up period was extended with only 1 week advance notice. Two activated reserve chaplains believed that it would have been better if they had initially been given a longer activation period—for example, 1 year—and been assured that the activation period would not be extended.

DOD officials said that legitimate arguments can be made on both sides of this issue—giving reservists a "best guess" as to how long they will be activated or telling them the maximum length. For example, DOD officials noted that during the reserve call-up that accompanied the Berlin crisis in 1961, many reservists assumed they would be on active duty for a full year. They said farmers sold standing crops, livestock, supplies, and equipment; some self-employed reservists closed businesses; and some quit jobs and moved their families close to bases—only to find themselves deactivated in 30 days.

#### Not All Members of Activated Units Were Called Up

At Dover and Concord not all members of the activated units were called up. For example, at Dover, only 230 of more than 1,000 maintenance personnel and 24 of 150 fire fighters assigned to the 512th Military Airlift Wing were activated. The wing commander said that only needed personnel were activated. Similarly, at Concord, 167 activated reservists from 30 different reserve units were assigned to that duty station at the time of our visit. In none of the 30 units, however, had all assigned personnel been activated. For example, the unit command structure and the support staffs of these Naval Reserve units were excluded because the Navy believed that the command and support activities already in place at the installation were sufficient to provide the needed administrative support.

Reservists told us that they had expected their entire unit to be activated and that, because of the partial activation, they were being supervised by active-duty personnel or DOD civilians permanently stationed at the installation rather than by their own command structure. They said they felt these local supervisors sometimes discriminated against them in their working hours and assignments. Further, since their unit support staff had not been activated, they had no one specifically charged to assist them with administrative or personnel problems that arose. Many of the reservists told us that they spent much of their off-duty time trying to resolve their administrative problems, especially those relating to compensation due them.

The legislative authority (10 U.S.C. 673[b]) cited for the call-up indicates that all members of an organized reserve unit would be activated when that unit is called up. An action officer in the Mobilization Plans Branch. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, told us that under the Office's interpretation of "unit," two or more individuals assigned to an organized reserve unit could be activated apart from the remainder of that unit if those individuals functioned as a "team" for a specific purpose. Such a team would be considered an augmentation unit whose mission is to be trained in peacetime as a unit and to be absorbed in an active unit upon activation. The official told us that the reservists we interviewed at Concord and Dover fell in this category. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel Division) confirmed this information. However, this rationale seems inconsistent with what occurred at Concord, where many of the reservists told us they were not functioning as a team or even working in a job for which they had been previously trained.

This issue is a concern of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, which stated the following in its fiscal year 1990 Annual Report:

"It is the position of the Board that, to the extent practicable, Reserve component units should be called to active duty, under Title 10 U.S.C. 673b, as complete units, to maintain their unit integrity and readiness .... [T]he Board is concerned that a recent trend toward calling unit cells, rather than units, is a departure from an understanding that Reserve component units would be called to serve only as units."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>By statute (10 U.S.C. 175[c]), the Board is the principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components. The Board is required by law to submit an annual, independent evaluation of National Guard and Reserve programs.

Dispersal of Members to Installations Other Than Their Planned Mobilization Station Another assignment practice perceived by reservists as inequitable involved splitting up a unit after it arrived at its mobilization station and scattering most of its members to a variety of geographically dispersed installations. For example, the Eisenhower Army Medical Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia, had been predesignated as the mobilization station for the 3297th Army Reserve Hospital unit, headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. Unit members we spoke with said unit personnel had always been told that if they were activated, they would serve as a unit at the Eisenhower Center. On August 6, 1990, 611 personnel of the 3297th were activated and sent to Eisenhower Center. We were told by the unit commander that shortly after their arrival, however, about 81 percent of the 611 personnel were unexpectedly transferred to 42 other Army installations across the United States.

The commander of the 3297th told us that the dispersal of members of his unit after arrival at the Eisenhower Center had caused a considerable number of hardships. Most of the unit members resided in the Atlanta area, which is about 140 miles from the Eisenhower Center, and many members had family care plans that were based on the assumption that the member would be able to return home for frequent short visits. He added that many others, such as physicians with medical practices, had made plans on the same assumption and the sudden change in mobilization stations negated many of these plans

Reservists Assigned to Jobs Outside Their Military Specialty Activated reservists we interviewed said they were often assigned to jobs that did not correspond to their military specialty and experience. For example, 14 of the 30 reservists interviewed at Concord and Fort Bliss told us they were working in jobs other than those for which they were qualified. Of the 14 reservists interviewed at Concord, only 5 said they were working in positions related to those they had been primarily trained for. In some instances, reservists had one job for which they had been trained, performed a different job in their home unit prior to mobilization, and were performing a third unrelated job at their mobilization sites. For example, one reservist was trained and qualified as a senior cook (which his pay was based on), worked in an administrative position in his home unit, and worked as a cargo inspector at his mobilization station. Reservists at Concord told us they had received 1 to 2 weeks of training to perform those jobs after arrival at Concord.

#### Reservists Said They Encountered Poor Conditions at Duty Stations

The reservists we interviewed said conditions at their duty stations were often poor. Among their specific concerns were (1) inadequate living quarters, (2) lack of necessary equipment and special clothing, (3) failure of installations to adjust the hours of operations of key support offices and facilities to accommodate the reservists' work schedules, and (4) lack of timeliness in receiving pay and travel reimbursements.

# Inadequate Living Quarters

At two of the installations we visited, the Eisenhower Center and Fort Stewart, many reservists, including senior officers, complained about the conditions of the on-base living quarters. At one installation, senior medical officers told us they were initially housed four to a room in National Guard training barracks. At the other installation, nurses were initially housed four to a room in training barracks intended for use by enlisted personnel. At the other three installations we visited, where all or most reservists lived in off-base housing (either in hotels or motels) and drew full per diem benefits, the reservists felt their housing was adequate.

Some of these housing problems appeared to result from varying implementation of DOD guidance. For example, DOD policy states that moves by reservists to mobilization sites within the United States away from their home station should be considered temporary changes of station, but some site commanders treated them as if they were permanent changes of station. While in a temporary duty status, reservists would be entitled to off-base housing and per diem benefits if suitable on-base housing were not available. If the reservists' arrival at a duty station is considered to be a permanent change of station, off-base housing and associated per diem benefits are not normally available to them under DOD policy.

At one mobilization station, officials told us that the commanding general, just prior to deploying to the Gulf region himself, directed that no reservists assigned to his installation would be housed off-post. Furthermore, at this particular installation, for several months, all reservists were treated the same with regard to housing. That is, reservists who were assigned to the installation for the duration of their activation were classified the same as those who were just passing through the installation for a few days before going on to the Gulf region. This resulted in reservists who were not just in transit being assigned housing that they considered to be inadequate.

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DOD officials told us that the quarters problem has been known for many years. These officials acknowledged that quarters facilities for reservists vary in condition and, in some places, border on unacceptability. They said that faced with funding constraints, military installations have had difficulty maintaining the adequacy of permanent living quarters for their full-time active duty personnel and it has not been economically feasible to maintain suitable quarters to provide for a surge in reservists.

### Lack of Special Clothing and Tools

Reservists at Concord told us they were not issued proper clothing and tools in a timely manner and had to purchase some of those items themselves. They said they had to buy wool sweaters for working in cold weather, as well as tape measures, pouches, tool belts, and hammers. They did not anticipate receiving any reimbursement for these items. Active and reserve component officials told us that each expected the other to provide these items.

#### Access to Needed Services

Some reservists told us that their installations did not adjust periods of access to base facilities and needed support services. For example, we were told that facilities such as the base exchange, dining hall, and library did not deviate from their normal hours to accommodate reservists who often worked nights, weekends, long, and odd hours because of the increased activity associated with the war. At Concord reservists told us that dining halls sometimes ran out of hot food before all the reservists were fed.

#### Lack of Timely Payment

Reservists at all five installations we visited complained of not receiving timely pay and travel reimbursement, especially during the first few weeks at their duty station. A primary cause of this condition was that many installations' finance and transportation offices were not sufficiently staffed to handle the increased workload brought on by the arrival of the reservists. In addition, the reserve units' support personnel, who normally provide these services for the reservists, were not activated.

#### Economic Impact Can Be Great, but Not All Reservists Suffered Economically

Twenty of the 40 reservists reported experiencing some loss of income (the average income drop was 35 percent), whereas the military income of 11 reservists exceeded their civilian income, and the income for the other 9 remained about the same. Although no reservist who we talked to lost a car or a home as a result of being activated, one reservist said he had to sell an airplane that he flew for personal enjoyment.

Some reservists whose civilian occupations were in a professional field or who were self-employed appeared to have incurred the greatest reductions in income. An airline pilot, for example, said he experienced a 60-percent decrease in income. In addition, the director of operations at one unit told us that the annualized income of one of his reservists, an airline pilot, dropped from \$144,000 to \$45,000. A physician assigned to a medical unit told us that more than half the mobilized physicians in his unit, including himself, had applied for release from active duty on the grounds of financial hardship. However, he knew of no such releases having been granted. He said he knew one physician in the unit who had to dissolve his practice and another who was about to file for bankruptcy. He named three others who he said were experiencing "severe" financial hardship.

None of the 40 reservists we interviewed were concerned about employment security with their civilian employers. That is, those who were employed at the time of their activation had been told by their employers that the same or a similar job would be available to them upon deactivation.

Employer Practices May Have Blunted the Economic Impact on Some Reservists For some reservists, financial hardship was alleviated by the policies of their civilian employers. We found, however, that the amount of assistance employers provided to their reservist employees, in terms of pay, health and life insurance, and other benefits, varied widely. Table 1 shows, for the 40 reservists we interviewed, the varied benefits offered by different types of employers.

Table 1: Benefits Provided by Type of Employer

		Number of employers providing benefits				
Type employer	Reservists employed	Salary	Health insurance	Life insurance	Use of leave	
Private	12	2	5	4	5	
Federal government	10	0	10	10	10	
State/local government	10	2	5	4	9	
Self employed, unemployed or part-time	8	b	b	b		
Total	40	4	20	18	24	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Allowing leave or vacation time to be used in order to continue to receive pay.

In addition, a survey of large U.S. industrial and service companies conducted by the Reserve Officers Association showed that many of these firms reported having various programs aimed at blunting the economic hardship of the call-up on their reservist employees.<sup>2</sup> Thirty-three companies reported providing full salary for a period of time: 1 for the duration of mobilization, 2 for 180 days, 1 for 13 to 26 weeks, 4 for 3 months, 5 for 2 months, 11 for 1 month, and 9 for periods of 1 to 8 weeks.

Another key benefit provided by many of these companies was pay differentials to make up the difference between the reservists' pay prior to mobilization and their military pay. Of the 136 firms addressing this issue, only 22 (about 16 percent) reported providing no pay differential. There was considerable variation in the duration of the pay differential, with 25 firms providing it for 7 days to 2 months, 42 for 3 to 5 months, 26 for 6 months, 7 for 1 year, 1 for 11 months (following 1 month of full salary), and 3 for the duration of the mobilization.

The Reserve Officers Association study indicated that, during the Persian Gulf war, many employers were reevaluating their policies on benefits to reservists and, as a result, many of the benefits were being improved. The study noted that in almost all cases, the policies reported were "ad hoc" policies, implemented specially for and in effect only during the Persian Gulf crisis.

The firms surveyed by the Reserve Officers Association were all large. It is likely that smaller firms were not able to provide such financial support for their reservist employees.

bNot applicable.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>"Corporate policies: Top firms go 'on record'," The Officer, February 1991, pp. 107-121.

#### Benefits for Reservists Who Were Federal and Postal Service Employees

Ten of the 40 reservists we interviewed were federal employees, and three worked for the U.S. Postal Service. In memoranda to agency heads in August 1990, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management described the benefits due activated reservists who were federal employees. Included among these were continuation of health insurance for 12 months, continuation of life insurance for 12 months, and a liberal leave policy. Even though employees are normally required to contribute their share of the health insurance premium for the 12-month period, the Director strongly encouraged agencies to pay the full premium during the employee's period of activation. No pay differential is provided by the federal government.

The Chief of the Human Resources Division in the Atlanta Division of the U.S. Postal Service told us that the Postal Service offered similar benefits to its activated employees. Our interviews with reservists indicated, however, that some Postal Service employees were not familiar with their benefits. For example, one of the three Postal Service employees told us his agency provided health and life insurance for only 6 months, and another said these benefits were provided for only 3 months.

#### Reservists' Benefits Enhanced by Recent Legislation

The Congress has enacted over the past year or is considering legislation aimed at enhancing reservists' compensation, benefits, civil relief, and employment security (see app. I). One area where there may be a need for additional assistance concerns those reservists who own their own businesses. Several reservists told us that they saw a need for low-interest or no-interest loan funds for reservists who own small businesses to assist them in restarting their businesses after they are released from active duty.

#### Some Reservists Have Decided Not to Reenlist

Eleven of the 40 reservists told us they would not reenlist, including at least 2 who expected to retire. Of the others, 26 said they would remain in the reserves, and 3 were undecided.

Unit officials said that losses could be higher, especially among some professional groups. For example, unit commanders predicted loss rates among physicians, nurses, and pilots ranging from 25 to 50 percent.

Thirty-one of the 40 reservists interviewed indicated that the problems they encountered had a detrimental effect on their morale. For example, reservists who had expected their entire unit to be activated said that

the partial activation had lowered their morale. Low morale was also cited by several unit commanders. The commander of the 3297th, for example, told us that the dispersal of members of his unit after arrival at the Eisenhower Center had had a significant adverse impact on morale.

# DOD Is Studying the Problems of Reservists

The Persian Gulf Conflict Supplementation Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 requires DOD to submit to the Congress by January 15, 1992, a comprehensive report on the conduct of the Persian Gulf war. Among the topics to be covered in the report are the effectiveness of the reserve forces, both inside and outside the theater of operations, and the integration of the reserve forces into the active duty forces. DOD is planning to include some assessment of the problems encountered by activated reservists in the statutorily required report. In addition, DOD officials told us they were conducting a large-scale statistical survey of reservists aimed at providing a thorough review of reservists' experiences.

Our scope and methodology are discussed in appendix II.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

If you need further information, please call me on (202) 275-3990. Major contributors to this report were William E. Beusse, Assistant Director, Roderic W. Worth, Evaluator-in-Charge, and Bobby L. Cooper, Senior Evaluator.

Sincerely yours,

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Paul L. Jones Director.

**Defense Force Management Issues** 

# Legislative Changes Affecting Reservists

The call-up of reserve forces in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm prompted numerous assessments of whether existing laws provided sufficient protection for reservists. Many of the existing laws were found to be outdated in terms of compensation, benefits, and coverage provided and, in general, were not considered suitable for the current situation. In response, dozens of new laws or amendments to existing laws have been enacted or proposed since August 1990. Table I.1 shows some of these changes.

Compensation or benefit	Legislated change	Implementing legislation	
Imminent danger pay <sup>a</sup>	Raised from \$110 to \$150 a month; retroactive to 8/1/90.	Persian Gulf Benefits Act	
Family separation allowance <sup>a</sup>	Raised from \$60 to \$75 a month; retroactive to 1/15/91.	Persian Gulf Benefits Act	
Special pay for medical personnel	Eligibility extended to reserve medical personnel.	Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act	
Variable housing allowance	Reserves became eligible upon activation, rather than after 140 days.	Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act	
Basic allowance for quarters	Eligibility extended to reservists with no dependents; retroactive to 8/2/90.	Persian Gulf Benefits Act	
Life insurance <sup>a</sup>	Raised from \$50,000 to \$100,000 as of date of enactment.	Persian Gulf Benefits Act	
Health care provisions <sup>a</sup>	Increase in deductible delayed from 4/1/91 to 10/1/91.	Persian Gulf Benefits Act	
Malpractice insurance	Physicians not required to maintain coverage while serving active duty.	Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendment of 1991	
Educational assistance	For eligible reservists, benefits were raised from \$140 to \$170 a month if used between 10/1/91 and 10/1/93.	Persian Gulf Benefits Act	
Postal service <sup>a</sup>	Free service initiated.	Public Law 101-384	
Home loan guarantees	Reduced reserves' eligibility requirement from 180 days active duty to 90.	Persian Gulf Benefits Act.	
Death gratuity <sup>a</sup>	Raised from \$3,000 to \$6,000; retroactive to 8/1/90.	Persian Gulf Benefits Act	
Renters' protection <sup>a</sup>	Renters protected from eviction if rent is \$1,200 or less a month, up from \$150 a month.	Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendment of 1991	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Legislation applies to both reserve and active-duty personnel.

In addition to these changes, the Congress has approved several measures aimed at further guaranteeing reservists' reemployment rights, including a guarantee of reemployment of reservists called to duty for less than 90 days and assurance of full health insurance coverage for reservists returning to their jobs. At the time we concluded our review, Congress was still considering the Uniformed Services Employment

	Appendix I Legislative Changes Affecting Reservists
	Rights Act of 1991, which is designed to further enhance the reemployment rights of reservists.
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### Scope and Methodology

To identify any anticipated problems reservists were experiencing during mobilization, we interviewed active duty and reserve officials in the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; the Office of General Counsel, Legislative Reference Service Division; the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; the Office of Chief, Army Reserve; and the National Guard Bureau; and at U.S. Forces Command.

In consultation with DOD officials, we selected five installations where activated reservists were assigned—Concord Naval Weapons Station, California; Dover Air Force Base, Delaware; Eisenhower Army Medical Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia; Fort Bliss, Texas; and Fort Stewart, Georgia. At Fort Gordon and the Eisenhower Army Medical Center, we interviewed command officials to develop an understanding of the issues and questions to address in subsequent structured interviews conducted with a total of 40 activated reservists assigned to 18 Reserve and National Guard units at the other three installations (see table II.1). The reservists we interviewed were selected on a command- and self-referral basis in response to our request to interview reservists who had encountered some problems as a result of the call-up. These reservists were not chosen on a statistical or random basis and cannot be considered representative of the entire population of reservists.

Table II.1: Reservists With Whom GAO Conducted Structured Interviews

Installation	Home unit	Number interviewed	Reserve component	
Concord Naval Weapon Station, California	Concord NWS 2513 Evansville, Indiana	1	Naval Reserve	
	Concord NWS 2320 Salt Lake City, Utah	1	Naval Reserve	
	Concord NWS 1910 Austin, Texas	2	Naval Reserve	
	Concord NWS 1520 Fresno, California	1	Naval Reserve	
	Concord NWS 1210 San Antonio, Texas	3	Naval Reserve	
	Concord NWS 1010 Corpus Christi, Texas	1	Naval Reserve	
	Concord NWS 0913 Terre Haute, Indiana	1	Naval Reserve	
	Concord NWS 522 Bremerton, Washington	1	Naval Reserve	
	Concord NWS 420 Stockton, California	1	Naval Reserve	
- Palakan An - Palaman - An -	2622 Weapons Detachment Medford, Oregon	1	Naval Reserve	
	220 NWS Detachment San Jose, California	1	Naval Reserve	
Dover Air Force Base, Delaware	92nd Aerial Port Squadron Wyoming, Pennsylvania	4	Air Force Reserve	
	130th Mobile Aerial Port Squadron Charleston, West Virginia	3	Air National Guard	
	135th Mobile Aerial Port Flight Baltimore, Maryland	3	Air National Guard	
Fort Bliss, Texas	126th Air Ambulance Co. Sacramento, California	11	Army Reserve and National Guard	
	720th Transportation Co. Las Vegas, Nevada	2	Army Reserve and National Guard	
	281st Transportation Co. Las Cruces, New Mexico	2	Army Reserve	
	4151st USAR Forces School Houston, Texas	1	Army Reserve	

Because most of the activated reservists were still deployed overseas at the time of our field work, our scope was limited to reservists who remained in the United States during their activation period and whose duty stations generally were at least 100 miles from their home stations. Our review did not include units and members of the Marine Corps and

Appendix II Scope and Methodology

Coast Guard Reserve because most of the stateside activated reservists in these services were assigned either to their home station or to installations within 100 miles of their home station.

We also reviewed DOD guidance and related documents, applicable laws, and proposed legislation. We did not verify the accuracy of the data DOD provided on the number of reservists activated by the various services.

We did not obtain written agency comments on this report. However, we discussed the information in this report with agency officials and incorporated their comments where appropriate.

We conducted our work between December 1990 and June 1991 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

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