December 1991

DRUG CONTROL

Communications Network Funding and Requirements Uncertain

RESTRICTED--Not to be released outside the General Accounting Office unless specifically approved by the Office of Congressional Relations.
This report responds to a request from the Chairman, House Committee on Government Operations, and requirements of section 1007 of the fiscal year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 101-510). In it, we describe information about what the Department of Defense has accomplished toward integrating the command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the United States used for drug interdiction into an effective communications network. The addressees for this report are listed at the end of this letter.

We plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date unless you publicly announce its contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Director of National Drug Control Policy; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 275-4841 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

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The Honorable John P. Murtha
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The Honorable Charles B. Rangel
Chairman, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control
House of Representatives

The Honorable Lawrence Coughlin
Ranking Minority Member
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control
House of Representatives
Executive Summary

Purpose

A marked increase in federal drug interdiction activity during the 1980s precipitated a need for improved communications among drug enforcement agencies. Consequently, Congress enacted legislation in the late 1980s requiring the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Drug Control Policy, to integrate U.S. command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets used for drug interdiction into an effective communications network. At the request of the Chairman, House Committee on Government Operations, and in response to requirements in the fiscal year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to integrate the assets into an effective communications network.

Background

In July 1988, the National Drug Policy Board—assisted by DOD, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and other drug law enforcement agencies—completed a National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Enforcement. The plan defined the interagency secure telephone, radio, and satellite communications networks needed among key federal agencies engaged in drug law enforcement activities. These activities include interdiction; intelligence collection; international drug control; investigation and prosecution; and regulation and control of drugs and the chemicals used to produce them.

Subsequent to the plan’s completion, the fiscal years 1989 and 1990 National Defense Authorization Acts gave the Secretary of Defense the responsibility to integrate the U.S. drug interdiction assets into an effective communications network. Since the master plan included interdiction communications needs, DOD decided that it could best fulfill this requirement by providing technical and financial assistance to the law enforcement community in implementing the master plan.

In addition, DOD developed the “Anti-Drug Network,” a data communications system that links computer workstations among interdiction and intelligence organizations for exchanging radar contact data and electronic mail messages. The workstations visually display radar tracks and other tactical information concerning drug smuggling suspects on computerized maps.

The Office of National Drug Control Policy assumed overall responsibility for the master plan in 1989 and, assisted by DOD and other agencies, completed a companion implementation plan in March 1990. That
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plan identified about 89,000 secure telephones, radios, satellite terminals, and other communications equipment items to be procured by 21 agencies, including DOD.

Results in Brief

DOD has contributed significant technical and financial support toward implementing the master plan and, by doing so, has made progress toward integrating an effective interdiction communications network. However, it is not clear when the network will be completed because

- neither the master plan nor implementation plan specify a schedule or time goal for acquiring network equipment,
- most of the equipment required by the plans has not been procured,
- budget constraints leave future funding for equipment uncertain, and
- equipment requirements have not been fully determined.

GAO calculated that at current equipment funding rates, it will take until fiscal year 2000 to complete the network. Furthermore, the budget constraints and additional requirements could extend the completion time.

DOD'S Anti-Drug Network has enhanced communications among interdiction and intelligence organizations. Planned system improvements should further enhance the communications.

Principal Findings

DOD Has Supported Master Plan Implementation

DOD has provided significant technical support to implementing the master plan by providing technical advice to the Office of National Drug Control Policy and participating agencies and by helping them identify and validate communications equipment requirements. In addition, DOD agreed to purchase $141 million worth of the plan’s higher-priority equipment for loan to the agencies. As of October 1, 1991, DOD had expended or obligated $130 million for the purchases.

Network Completion Is Uncertain

The implementation plan requires the 20 non-DOD participating agencies to fund the remaining network equipment. Based on information in the plan, GAO calculated that the total cost of the planned equipment purchases is about $617 million. Thus, subtracting DOD’s contribution, the non-DOD agencies need to fund about $476 million in equipment purchases.
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purchases. However, the master and implementation plans leave scheduling and completion of the plan to individual participating agencies in accordance with their year-to-year budget priorities.

The non-DOD participating agencies planned to purchase about $86 million worth of implementation plan equipment through fiscal year 1991. Therefore, about $390 million worth of equipment remains to be purchased by the agencies in fiscal year 1992 and beyond. However, because of anticipated budget constraints, agency officials were not sure how much equipment could be funded in future years. GAO calculated that it will take until fiscal year 2000 for the agencies to fund the remaining equipment at current funding rates of $47 million a year. Moreover, some officials were pessimistic that current spending rates for equipment could be sustained in future years, so network completion could take longer.

In addition, the implementation plan does not include equipment requirements for a satellite communications system called for by the master plan. Requirements and plans for this system are still being developed and could add as much as $86 million or more to the cost of the network as soon as fiscal year 1994.

Furthermore, the planned satellite system has the potential to duplicate the need for some of the radio equipment requirements delineated in the implementation plan. For example, the plan calls for an estimated $90 million investment in high-frequency radios for long-distance voice communications, a function also served by satellite communications.

As of October 1, 1991, the Anti-Drug Network linked 88 DOD and law enforcement workstations at various locations in the western hemisphere and Europe. It may eventually link over 200 stations. GAO interviewed 22 key network users to determine the system's contribution to interdiction communications. All but one said that it improved communications, and more than half said it improved them greatly. In addition, about half of the users sent or received a significant amount of their intelligence information over the network. DOD is implementing system improvements that should further improve these communications.

DOD plans to measure the master plan communications network's effectiveness during a series of field-level operational evaluations in fiscal
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Recommendations

GAO recommends that the Director of National Drug Control Policy finalize satellite communications system plans and requirements and advise relevant agency heads to purchase only the most critically needed equipment until the satellite plan is completed and potentially overlapping requirements are identified.

GAO also recommends that once requirements are resolved, the Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other relevant agency heads, establish schedules for completing the interdiction network and obtain firm funding commitments from the agency heads to meet them. It further recommends that the Director advise Congress of the total funding required and schedules for completing the communications networks.

Agency Comments

As requested, GAO did not obtain formal agency comments but discussed information contained in the report with DOD and Office of National Drug Control Policy officials and included their comments where appropriate.
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Abbreviations

ADNET Anti-Drug Network
C3I Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DOD Department of Defense
GAO General Accounting Office
LEA law enforcement agency
ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy
Chapter 1

Introduction

There are hundreds of federal, state, and local agencies that conduct or support drug smuggling interdiction. To improve communications among them, Congress passed legislation requiring the Secretary of Defense to integrate U.S. command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets used for drug interdiction into an effective communications network. The Department of Defense's (DOD) strategy for addressing this requirement was to provide technical and financial assistance to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and other federal agencies in implementing a National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Enforcement. DOD also developed and implemented a data communications system, called the "Anti-Drug Network" (ADNET).

Interdiction Organizations

Drug smuggling interdiction and border control—referred to in this report simply as "interdiction"—is one of several activities of ONDCP's National Drug Control Strategy to reduce the supply of illegal drugs in the United States. Interdiction encompasses the detection, monitoring, interception, and apprehension of aircraft, ocean vessels, land vehicles, cargo containers, and people illegally transporting drugs into the United States. Intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination is another activity of the supply reduction strategy and is an important support activity to interdiction. Other activities to reduce drug supplies include international drug control programs, such as drug crop control in source countries; investigation and prosecution of traffickers; and regulation and control of drugs and the chemicals used to produce them.

The principal federal agencies conducting drug smuggling interdiction are the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service's Border Patrol, and the Department of Defense. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (P.L. 100-456) made DOD the lead agency for detecting and monitoring air and maritime drug smuggling. DOD also provides intelligence and other resource support for interdiction activities.

Interdiction Communications Needs

The 1980s witnessed a marked increase in federal drug interdiction to counteract a rapidly growing drug smuggling trade. Commensurate with this activity was a need for increased coordination among interdiction agencies.

However, drug law enforcement agencies had problems communicating with each other, particularly during joint operations, and this made
coordination difficult. For example, agents from one agency often could not talk to agents from another agency by radio because their radios could not operate on the same frequencies. In addition, drug smugglers were defeating interdiction operations by listening to nonsecure law enforcement communications. Further, agencies often had incompatible encryption devices for secure communications, and the devices they had were easily compromised when radios equipped with them were lost or stolen. Consequently, agencies needed communications equipment that is interoperable with other agencies and secure against interception or compromise.

The communications networks needed for agencies to coordinate operations are complicated. For example, in the southeastern United States, air interdiction operations require communication connections among 18 federal drug operations and intelligence centers and a variety of law enforcement and DOD aircraft and radar stations. These connections are made via telephone, radio, satellite, and computer networks. Similar connections are required for maritime and land interdiction operations, for operations in each region of the country, and for communications among intelligence and other support organizations.

DOD Responsibility for Interdiction Communications

In September 1988, Congress gave DOD specific drug interdiction communications responsibility in the fiscal year 1989 National Defense Authorization Act. In recognition of the need to improve interdiction communications, the act required the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to integrate the “command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs” into an effective communications network. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (P.L. 101-189), enacted in November 1989, assigned this responsibility directly to the Secretary and required him to consult with the Director of National Drug Control Policy in carrying it out. Neither act specified a time goal or schedule for establishing the network.

DOD’s primary strategy for integrating U.S. assets into an effective communications network was to provide technical and financial assistance to ONDCP and other federal agencies in implementing ONDCP’s National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Enforcement. The master plan had just been completed in July 1988, and one of its primary

1Secure communications refers to the use of encryption devices to allow transmission and receipt of coded communications, which prevents unauthorized receptions of the transmissions.
emphases was on establishing effective interoperable and secure interdiction and intelligence communications among the participating drug law enforcement and supporting agencies. Because of this, DOD concluded that helping the master plan to be implemented would serve as a primary means to accomplish the integration.

The Secretary of Defense delegated responsibility for the network integration to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I). He assigned responsibility for carrying out the master plan implementation assistance to the Director, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA—formerly called the Defense Communications Agency).

In addition, DOD's Joint Chiefs of Staff organization developed and implemented a data communications system, called the Anti-Drug Network, to facilitate the sharing of operations and intelligence information among interdiction organizations. This system links a network of high-resolution, graphics-capable computer workstations that can display near real-time radar data on drug smuggling suspects and transmit it and electronic mail text messages to other workstations on the net.

The National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Enforcement

In April 1986, the President's National Security Directive 221 directed the Secretary of Defense to ensure that a secure, interoperable interagency telecommunications capability is available to support drug enforcement activities. In response, DOD's National Security Agency—the agency responsible for managing national telecommunications security—established and chaired an interagency working group known as the "Interagency Working Group for Drug Enforcement Communications." The group, consisting of communications officials from DOD, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and other drug law enforcement agencies, was formed to develop a National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Enforcement. It completed the plan in July 1988 under the overall direction of the National Drug Policy Board.

The master plan outlines near and far-term communications requirements, procedures, standards, and actions to achieve secure and interoperable communications among participating agencies for all drug law enforcement activities. The plan emphasizes interdiction and intelligence communications as the highest priority but also recognizes that the functions and communications networks for all of the drug enforcement activities are interdependent.
The requirements delineated in the plan are the communication connections needed for each participating agency and the types of communications equipment needed for the connections. For example, the types of equipment include fixed telephone and facsimile networks; high-frequency, very high-frequency, and ultrahigh-frequency radios; and satellite communications terminals.

The standards included in the plan call for participating agencies to acquire equipment that can be programmed to use the same frequencies and security codes and that will be compatible with DOD equipment. For example, the master plan calls for agencies to eventually convert to the same high-frequency radio encryption standards that DOD is converting to for its high-frequency radios, thereby assuring that all interdiction mobile forces will have compatible encryption devices for their radios.

The recommended actions in the plan were for addressing identified issues, such as interim solutions to attaining high-frequency radio interoperability, and for attaining longer-term goals (defined by the plan as after fiscal year 1992), such as establishing a federal drug enforcement satellite communications system.

DISA—the agency responsible for planning, developing, and supporting national command, control, communications, and information systems—provided technical assistance to the working group by analyzing and validating law enforcement and DOD drug enforcement communications requirements. The requirements were reviewed and approved by each of the participating agencies, the working group, and the National Drug Policy Board.

The National Security Agency provided technical guidance in developing secure communications standards and technology. For example, it advised the participating agencies about adapting over-the-air rekeying technology to law enforcement communications equipment so that it would meet national encryption standards. Over-the-air rekeying is an important concept in improving both equipment interoperability and communications security. It permits a central computerized control center to electronically authenticate the identity of any radio being used on a network and electronically update, or “rekey,” its encryption codes. Similarly, groups of radios from various agencies can be easily outfitted with compatible codes to facilitate interagency operations.
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Implementation Plan

Following the completion of the master plan, the Board formed another interagency working group, called the “Communications Interoperability Working Group,” to oversee the plan’s implementation. The working group, composed of representatives from agencies participating in the master plan and chaired by the Coast Guard, came under the overall direction of ONDCP in 1989 when ONDCP was created to replace the Board.

In March 1990, the new working group completed an implementation plan for the master plan, entitled the Drug Enforcement Telecommunications Implementation Plan. In March 1991, the group updated the master and implementation plans. As of November 12, 1991, ONDCP officials had reviewed the updated plans and were processing them within ONDCP for final approval. They expected to issue the new plans in December 1991.

The implementation plan contains equipment acquisition strategies for achieving the master plan’s requirements. For example, it identifies each piece of equipment to be acquired to meet master plan objectives, the agencies responsible for acquiring the equipment, cost estimates, and the agencies’ planned schedules for acquiring equipment through fiscal year 1992, including equipment that DOD planned to purchase for loan to other agencies. Appendix I lists the agencies participating in implementing the master plan and the estimated cost of equipment they plan to acquire under the master plan.

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

On June 12, 1991, we delivered the first in a series of reports to the Chairman, House Government Operations Committee, on DOD’s implementation of its new counternarcotics missions.

The report provided an overview of DOD’s organization, budgeting and funding, and intelligence and communications support for counternarcotics activities. Based on the audit work that led to this report, the Chairman asked us to perform detailed reviews of each of these areas.

Subsequently, section 1007 of the fiscal year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 101-510) required us to review defense spending for counternarcotics activities and report the results to the congressional defense committees, the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, and the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. Because the legislative requirement closely paralleled the

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Chairman's request, this report and other follow-on reports are being addressed to the Chairman, the Caucus, and the cognizant select and defense committees.

This report addresses DOD’s efforts to integrate C3I assets into an effective communications network for drug interdiction. Our objective for this review was to determine what DOD had accomplished toward integrating the assets into an effective communications network. We also determined what DOD was doing to evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts.

We reviewed applicable files and documents and interviewed appropriate officials at the Washington, D.C., headquarters offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I; DISA; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the National Security Agency; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the Drug Enforcement Agency; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Internal Revenue Service; ONDCP; the U.S. Attorneys; the U.S. Coast Guard; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; and the U.S. Marshals Service.

To determine what DOD had accomplished, we evaluated its contributions to the development and implementation of the National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Enforcement. This included reviewing the process that ONDCP and DOD used to establish the master plan and communications requirements for implementing the plan, but did not include an independent validation of the requirements. We also evaluated what DOD had accomplished in establishing the Anti-Drug Network by conducting telephone interviews with operations and intelligence officials at 22 key network user locations. Appendix II explains our methodology for this latter work.

As requested, we did not obtain written agency comments on this report. However, we did discuss the contents of the report with responsible DOD and ONDCP officials and incorporated their comments where appropriate.

We conducted our work from November 1990 through August 1991 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
DOD has contributed significant technical and financial support to the implementation of the National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Enforcement. By doing so, it has made progress toward integrating U.S. command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets into an effective drug interdiction communications network. However, due to funding uncertainties and other reasons, it is not clear when an effective interdiction communications network will be established—it may take until the year 2000 or longer to acquire all of the equipment required by the master plan.

The master plan was completed with DOD’s help, and its implementation begun in 1988, before Congress required DOD to integrate drug interdiction communications. Since the master plan included interdiction communications needs, DOD decided that it could best fulfill this integration responsibility by providing technical and financial assistance to the law enforcement community in developing and carrying out an implementation plan for the master plan.

After Congress gave DOD the communications integration mission, DISA and the National Security Agency continued their technical support to the Communications Interoperability Working Group, which was overseeing master plan implementation and developing the implementation plan. For example, DISA conducted additional data gathering and analysis to revalidate general communications requirements, including DOD activities, and to help participating law enforcement agencies (LEA) identify the specific equipment they needed to fulfill those requirements. The National Security Agency continued to provide advice on technical standards and technology development for secure communications.

DOD also continued its participation in the interagency planning activities. Representatives from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence; DISA; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Joint Chiefs of Staff communications directorate; the National Security Agency; and other DOD organizations involved in interdiction attended working group meetings and participated in decisions, offered technical advice, and provided input on DOD interoperability requirements.

1The term “LEA” refers to all non-DOD agencies participating in the master and implementation plans.
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DOD Funded High-Priority Communications Equipment

In 1989, as the communications equipment requirements needed to implement the master plan were being developed, DOD and ONDCP officials estimated that it could cost as much as a billion dollars to fully implement the plan. The communications working group realized the participating agencies would not have enough funds available or programmed to acquire this amount of equipment, and, according to the communications working group's chairman, they were concerned about whether some of the agencies would maintain commitments to implementing the plan because of budget constraints.

To mitigate some of the equipment expense and get participating agencies committed to modernizing their communications systems to meet master plan standards, DOD agreed to purchase, for indefinite loan to the agencies, some of the plan's high-priority, interdiction-related communications equipment. The Secretary of Defense assigned DISA the responsibility for management and oversight of these acquisitions.

A March 1991 draft update to the implementation plan listed a total of 88,557 equipment items to be procured by participating agencies, including DOD. Based on price estimates, funding plans, and expenditure information described in the plan for these items, we estimated the cost of the equipment to be about $617 million. However, this estimate does not include significant additional costs that may be incurred for additional satellite communications requirements still under development, which are described later in this chapter. In addition, the plan contained a number of notes indicating that additional equipment items could be added to the list and that some equipment price estimates may increase.

DOD allocated a total of $134.4 million of fiscal year 1989, 1990, and 1991 funds to DISA to purchase implementation plan equipment for loan to the participating agencies. In addition, the National Security Agency purchased communications security equipment for loan to the agencies with $6.2 million of its fiscal year 1988 funds. Thus, DOD's total procurement commitments to the agencies was $140.6 million. DOD also allocated $8.5 million in fiscal year 1989 through 1991 operations and maintenance funds to DISA to support the acquisition process and other activities related to supporting the communications working group and developing the implementation plan. Table 2.1 summarizes DOD's funding contributions to master plan implementation.
Table 2.1: DOD Funding Support to Master Plan Implementation

Dollars in millions

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<td>Equipment procurements for loan to LEAs</td>
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<td>$6.2</td>
<td>$58.0</td>
<td>$25.1</td>
<td>$51.3</td>
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<td>Operations and maintenance</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>$6.2</td>
<td>$59.8</td>
<td>$27.0</td>
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Source: DOD.

DOD agreed with the participating agencies and ONDCP that the participating agencies would fund the remaining implementation plan equipment purchases. DOD planned to cease its equipment funding assistance to the agencies with its fiscal year 1991 commitment.

DISA and the working group jointly decided the equipment types and quantities DISA would procure for each agency. They set priorities for the DOD equipment purchases based on mission importance and need. For example, the highest priority was for equipment that would be used to fill needs having a severe impact on interdiction missions in high-threat areas. Accordingly, most of the highest-priority procurements were for interdiction and border control support in the high-threat southeast, Caribbean, and southwest regions. In total, with its $140.6 million, DOD committed to purchase 31,365 equipment items.

The equipment DOD planned to acquire included secure telephone and facsimile equipment; ultrahigh-frequency, very high-frequency, and high-frequency radio equipment; satellite communications terminals; and other equipment such as mobile communications and command centers. According to memorandums of understanding between DISA and the participating agencies, DOD retains ownership of the equipment purchased for the agencies, but the receiving agencies are responsible for equipment upkeep and maintenance. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show DISA's distribution of funds by equipment type and agency.

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2DISA is maintaining ownership to accommodate requirements of the Economy Act (31 U.S.C. 1535) that generally prohibit federal agencies from purchasing equipment for other agencies without reimbursement.
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Figure 2.1: DOD Communications Equipment Acquisitions

- High-frequency radio equipment - $19.7 million (14%)
- Satellite terminals - $4.2 million (3%)
- Secure telephone and facsimile equipment - $32.4 million (23%)
- Other equipment (e.g., command and control vehicles) - $3.4 million (2.4%)
- Very high and ultrahigh frequency radio equipment - $81.0 million (57.6%)

Note: Total = $140.6 million. (Total does not add because of rounding.)
Source: DOD.
The Master Plan Provides a Foundation for Interdiction Communications

We reviewed the master plan and the procedures that the working group and DISA used to establish drug enforcement communications requirements. After considering these procedures and the contents of the plan, we believe the plan establishes a reasonable foundation for building a drug enforcement communications network that encompasses the needs of the key interdiction agencies. For example, it sets forth:

- Connectivity and equipment requirements based on detailed analysis by DISA, with close participation and validation by communications officials from the participating agencies.
- Near-term and long-term objectives and requirements for participating agencies to build networks of interoperable, secure communications devices that meet applicable national encryption standards.
- Specific issues and problems needing to be addressed and recommendations on how to address them.
In addition, the plan's requirements included those of the key interdiction agencies and were reviewed and validated by the interagency working group, ONDCP, and the heads of participating agencies. Also, the communications working group plans to update the plan's requirements periodically—annually or biannually as required—to accommodate the dynamic nature of drug interdiction.

Interdiction Communications Network Completion Is Uncertain

Although we believe the master plan provides a foundation for establishing an effective interdiction communications network, a number of factors cause uncertainty about when an effective network will be established. For example, even though DOD has almost completed its equipment purchases in support of master plan implementation, its contribution is only a fraction of the total equipment needed: nearly two-thirds of the equipment remains to be procured. In addition,

- the participating agencies' ability to fund the remaining equipment acquisitions delineated in the implementation plan is uncertain;
- neither ONDCP, DOD, the master plan, nor the implementation plan has established time goals or schedules for acquiring a majority of the network equipment;
- neither ONDCP, DOD, the master plan, nor the implementation plan has identified the portion of drug enforcement communications equipment needed to establish effective interdiction communications; and
- ONDCP is planning to add more satellite requirements to the master plan that could significantly increase funding requirements for drug enforcement communications.

DOD's Funding Commitments Are Nearing Completion

DISA began acquiring equipment in October 1989. As of October 1, 1991, DOD had expended or obligated $130 million on interdiction-related communications equipment items for other agencies. DOD expected to obligate the remaining $11 million for equipment items in fiscal year 1992 and that all but about $2 million dollars of equipment it is buying will be delivered to users by the end of fiscal year 1992.

Almost Two-Thirds of Equipment Remains to Be Procured

As we noted, the implementation plan delineated about $617.2 million worth of communications equipment for purchase, and DOD is funding $140.6 million of the total. This leaves $476.6 million for the non-DOD participating agencies to fund. Of this amount, the non-DOD agencies planned to have funded about $86 million through fiscal year 1991, leaving about $391 million, or nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of the
$617.2 million worth of equipment, to be funded in future years. Table 2.2 summarizes participating agency funding plans for implementing the master plan as of July 1991.

**Table 2.2: Planned Funding Schedule for Master Plan Implementation (as of July 1991)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>$6.2</td>
<td>$58.0</td>
<td>$25.1</td>
<td>$51.3</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$140.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEAS</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>390.7</td>
<td>476.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$37.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>$64.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>$31.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>$94.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>$390.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>$617.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Fiscal years 1988 through 1990 are actual expenditures.

Source: ONDCP and participating agencies.

**LEA Funding Is Uncertain**

We reviewed the budget plans of nine of the agencies participating in the implementation plan that were scheduled to fund about $449 million, or 94 percent, of the $477 million in LEA equipment acquisitions (see app. I). As of July 1991, the nine agencies had planned to fund a total of $81.7 million in acquisitions for fiscal years 1991 and 1992—about $32.5 million less than they had planned in March 1991. Officials at these agencies told us that the cutbacks occurred because of budget constraints and that further cuts were still possible for these 2 years.

Officials at the nine agencies also told us they were uncertain how much could be funded beyond fiscal year 1992 because of anticipated budget constraints. Officials at four of these agencies—the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; and the U.S. Marshals Service—said they were pessimistic that their current funding rates could be sustained in future years. Two of these agencies—the Customs and Immigration Services—are key interdiction agencies and are scheduled to acquire about $140 million, or 36 percent, of the $390.7 million in equipment remaining to be procured after fiscal year 1991.

**Equipment Acquisition Time Frames Not Established**

The implementation plan contains planned equipment acquisition schedules submitted to the working group by the participating agencies for fiscal years 1991 and 1992. However, it does not specify equipment acquisition schedules beyond fiscal year 1992. In addition, the master and implementation plans do not specify a time goal for completing
planned equipment acquisitions, and DOD has not established a time goal for establishing an effective interdiction network.

According to the master plan, the working group chairman, and ONDCP officials, further acquisition schedules will be determined year by year as each agency purchases its own equipment within its budget priorities. Each agency is supposed to coordinate these decisions with the working group to synchronize network development as much as possible.

Interdiction Equipment Not Identified

The implementation plan identifies the specific equipment needed for establishing a drug enforcement-wide communications network. In developing the plan, the communications working group recognized that the various law enforcement functions to be supported by the equipment are interdependent and that some of the equipment will be used for multiple law enforcement purposes. For example, a U.S. Customs officer may use a radio assigned to him for drug enforcement as well as other customs functions he may carry out. Consequently, the working group intentionally did not identify the specific law enforcement activities for which the equipment delineated in the plan should be used. In addition, for similar reasons, neither ONDCP nor DOD have separately identified how much of the network equipment is needed for interdiction purposes. An exception was that they identified equipment being purchased by DOD to be used primarily for interdiction activities.

Nevertheless, establishing an effective communications network for drug interdiction command, control, and intelligence information was Congress' intention in giving DOD the integration responsibility. And, because the scope of the interdiction portion of the drug enforcement communications network equipment to be acquired under the master plan has not been defined, it is not clear how much progress is being made toward establishing an effective interdiction communications network. In the absence of this information and clear equipment acquisition time goals and schedules, the best estimate of when the interdiction network will be established is a projection of when all of the master plan requirements can be fulfilled.

We projected a date for this completion based on the most recent planned equipment funding rates by LEAS participating in the master plan, which are responsible for procuring the remaining equipment. As we noted, the LEAS' planned equipment procurement spending for fiscal years 1991 was about $42.7 million. According to funding plans provided to us and ONDCP, the LEAS plan to fund about $51.4 million for
implementation plan equipment in fiscal year 1992, or a total of $94.1 million for the current and most recent fiscal year—an average of about $47 million a year. At this rate, it will take until fiscal year 2000 to acquire the $339.3-million worth of implementation plan equipment remaining to be acquired after fiscal year 1992.

Since some agency officials were pessimistic about sustaining current spending rates, it could take longer. Further, the need to replace failed and worn equipment could also affect funding availability for network completion. Finally, a pending ONDCP plan to establish a satellite communications system for drug enforcement, which could add as much as $86-million worth or more of equipment requirements to the network, could also extend the time required to fund all network requirements.

Satellite Requirements Not Completed

One of the longer-term requirements of the master plan was to build a drug enforcement satellite communications system. The communications working group established this objective because the planned near-term military and commercial satellite communications acquisitions were intended to be only an interim solution for immediate LEA needs. Plans to use military satellite communications were considered inadequate for the long term because military demand for them is high and DOD could not guarantee the LEAS access to them. According to DOD officials, this situation actually occurred during Operation Desert Storm when DOD could not make the satellites available on a consistent basis to both LEA and DOD drug interdiction forces.

The communications working group, with funding support from DOD, developed a draft satellite system plan in January 1991 that laid out three options to fulfill long-term satellite communications requirements. The options were (1) to use existing military satellites, (2) to use a combination of military and commercial satellites, and (3) to launch a system of 21 dedicated law enforcement satellites in low, 400-nautical mile orbits.

The draft plan recommended implementing the third option for initial operations beginning in calendar year 1994 and estimated its initial acquisition costs at $86 million. However, the estimates did not include other life-cycle costs such as satellite system control and satellite replenishment, which could add significant costs to the system. In addition, DISA and DOD Joint Staff officials considered the cost estimates to be optimistic. Figure 2.3 depicts the satellite system under consideration in the third option and how the satellite communications would be used.
Figure 2.3: Proposed Drug Enforcement Satellite System

Satellites:

- 3 orbits at 60° angles, at 400 nautical miles altitude
- 7 satellites each orbit

Users:

Mobile-to-mobile
Mobile-to-fixed facility
Fixed facility-to-fixed facility

Source: ONDCP.
After reviewing the plan, the communications working group decided more work was needed to better define requirements, review more options, and develop more accurate cost estimates. DOD also was interested in including its counternarcotics-related satellite communications requirements, which had not been considered in the plan. According to ONDCP officials, the working group currently intends to continue efforts to finalize plans and has identified two additional satellite system options that it will consider: (1) exclusive use of commercial satellite systems and (2) a combination of commercial satellite systems and the government-owned system considered in the third option.

Other than funding the initial requirements evaluation, DOD was not active in developing the satellite system requirements and formulating the plan. DOD officials told us that, in retrospect, the communications integration responsibilities given them by Congress and their interest in including DOD requirements require them to be more involved in plan development and implementation. Accordingly, they told us they planned to become more actively involved and provide DOD satellite communications system expertise to assist in the plan's development.

Potential for Overlapping Other Systems

According to the master plan, satellite systems can potentially serve some of the same long-distance functions as high frequency radios. Because of this potential duplication, we were concerned whether some of the planned spending on radios is justified in view of the plan to acquire a satellite system. For example, the implementation plan calls for an estimated $90-million investment in high-frequency radios to satisfy long-distance communications requirements, $29 million of which has already been spent by DOD and LEAS in fiscal years 1988 through 1991.

We asked key working group, ONDCP, and DOD officials what impact a future satellite program would have on high-frequency and other radio systems being acquired. The chairman of the group, the project manager for the plan, ONDCP and DISA officials, and the Joint Staff's director for counternarcotics communications agreed that it was not clear how much the proposed satellite system would duplicate other communications equipment already being acquired. They also agreed that it is an issue that needs to be resolved.

Measures of Effectiveness

DISA plans to measure the master plan communications network's effectiveness through a series of field-level operational evaluations to be conducted in fiscal year 1992. It plans to determine how well
Communications interoperability and security has improved as a result of the new equipment it has distributed and whether the equipment is being used effectively for interdiction.

As of October 1991, DISA had established preliminary effectiveness measures that it intends to use in its evaluations. These measures include data collection and analyses of the extent secure or interoperable communications devices are available and used when needed.

Conclusions

DOD's fiscal and technical support to the drug enforcement telecommunications master plan has contributed significantly to establishing a foundation for an effective communications network for all drug enforcement activities, including interdiction. Because of this contribution, DOD has made progress in establishing an effective interdiction communications network.

However, it is not clear when an effective interdiction network will be established since (1) funding commitments to the network are uncertain, (2) a network completion goal and acquisition schedules have not been established, and (3) the portion of the implementation plan equipment needed for interdiction communications has not been identified. If current funding levels by LEAS continue, it will take until fiscal year 2000 to acquire all of the equipment currently listed in the implementation plan. It could also take longer, depending on the effect potential budget constraints and added satellite requirements would have on equipment acquisition rates.

DOD's plans to evaluate the use of equipment it loaned to the agencies are appropriate. We believe DOD or ONDCP should conduct such evaluations periodically and the results used to update the master plan.

Recommendations

Because the planned satellite communications network may eliminate the need for some of the communications equipment currently scheduled to be bought under the master plan, we recommend that the Director of National Drug Control Policy (1) finalize satellite communications system plans and requirements as soon as practicable and (2) advise relevant agency heads to proceed with only the most critically needed high-frequency and other radio equipment acquisitions until the satellite plan is completed and potentially overlapping requirements are identified.
To facilitate oversight of drug interdiction communications network implementation and gauge its progress, we recommend that once master plan equipment requirements are fully resolved, the Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other relevant agency heads, establish a time goal and funding schedules for completing the network and obtain firm commitments from the agency heads to meet them. We further recommend that in his annual National Drug Control Policy reports to Congress the Director detail the funding and acquisition schedules required for completing the network and the progress made toward achieving them.
Chapter 3

The Anti-Drug Network
Improves Communications

DOD developed ADNET to facilitate information sharing among key interdiction and intelligence organizations. According to system users, ADNET has improved communications for interdiction operations and intelligence. Also, DOD is making system improvements that should improve the network’s intelligence exchange capability.

ADNET Designed for Exchanging Interdiction Information

DOD’s Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, the Joint Staff, developed ADNET in April 1989 to support its new drug smuggling detection and monitoring responsibilities. The network was established to link DOD and LEA drug interdiction operations and intelligence centers for the sharing of interdiction-related information, such as radar data on suspect aircraft and marine vessels. As of October 1, 1991, the network had 88 DOD and LEA workstations at various locations in the western hemisphere and Europe, including on seven Coast Guard cutters (see fig. 3.1). DOD plans for the network eventually to expand to more than 200 workstations, including 31 cutters.

ADNET consists of a network of high-resolution, graphics-capable computer workstations. The workstations can (1) plot aircraft and ship movement tracks and record related information on area maps displayed on their video screens, (2) distribute this information to other sites for display on their workstation screens, and (3) distribute electronic-mail text messages to other workstations. The workstations can also distribute textual information to or from less expensive, non-graphics-capable personal computers, which may be used in the future by mobile activities. Figure 3.2 shows an example ADNET screen display.
Figure 3.1: ADNET Workstation Sites (as of October 1, 1991)

Legend

1. U.S. European Command
2. 22nd Royal Canadian Air Force Wing, East
3. 22nd Royal Canadian Air Force Wing, West
4. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, North Bay
5. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Headquarters
7. Northeast Sector Operations Control Center
8. U.S. Coast Guard Command, Atlantic Area
9. Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center
10. Defense Intelligence Analysis Center
11. DOD site number one
12. Joint Staff test workstation
13. Army Operations Center, Counternarcotics Section
14. National Military Intelligence Center
15. Joint Staff Counternarcotics Operations Division
16. Navy Command Center
17. U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center
18. Naval Oceanographic Intelligence Center
19. Drug Enforcement Administration Headquarters
20. Commander in Chief, Atlantic
21. Navy/Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center
22. Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Command
23. DOD site number eight
24. U.S. Coast Guard Marine Intelligence Center
25. U.S. Coast Guard District Seven Headquarters
26. Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Center, East
27. DOD site number nine
28. U.S. Coast Guard subsector, Greater Antilles
29. Joint Task Force Four
30. Caribbean Regional Operations Control Center
31. Southeast Sector Operations Control Center
32. Continental U.S. NORAD Region, 1st Air Force
33. U.S. Coast Guard District Eight Headquarters
34. U.S. Customs site
35. U.S. Customs National Aviation Center
36. 12th Air Force
37. DOD site number seven
38. U.S. Customs Service Surveillance Support Center
39. El Paso Intelligence Center
40. Joint Task Force Six
41. Tactical Analysis Team, U.S. Embassy, Mexico
42. Presidential Intelligence Center
43. Southern Regional Operations Center
44. Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
45. Coast Guard Cutters
46. U.S. Coast Guard District Eleven Headquarters
47. Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Center, West
48. Southwest Sector Operations Control Center
49. U.S. Coast Guard Command, Pacific Area
50. Joint Task Force Five
51. Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)
52. NORAD Counternarcotics Operations and Intelligence Center
53. NORAD Tactical Intelligence Center
54. Northwest Sector Operations Control Center
55. U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Defense Zone Sector, Alaska
56. Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific
57. Commander in Chief, Pacific
58. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
59. U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Defense Zone Sector, Hawaii

NOTES

1. [Notes on specific locations and facilities mentioned in the figure.]

Note: [ ] Indicates the number of workstations if more than one.
The system uses software modified from an existing Navy battle-management and command-and-control system. It transmits information through the existing secure Defense Data Network message-switching system and uses regular secure telephone systems as a backup.
Although the Joint Staff's Counternarcotics Communications Division manages the ADNET program, DISA is responsible for systems installation and maintenance and has provided the funding for the development of ADNET, including program software; the majority of procurement costs for the hardware; and operations and maintenance costs associated with system development, management, and maintenance. However, users are responsible for certain operating costs such as Defense Data Network access fees and line usage charges. After fiscal year 1991, users also will be responsible for funding their own workstation procurement and maintenance costs. The Joint Staff and DISA will continue responsibility for software maintenance and development and will provide training to users.

According to DOD officials, the cost of installing a workstation has averaged about $65,000—about $43,000 for hardware and $22,000 for installation. In addition, they estimate that annual operations and maintenance costs for each workstation location—a location may have more than one workstation—range from $45,000 to $80,000. These latter costs include a $40,000 Defense Data Network access fee, about $5,000 for system maintenance, and up to $35,000 in line usage charges, which are similar to long distance telephone charges.

Figure 3.3 shows DOD's past and programmed future expenditures on ADNET through fiscal year 1997 as of October 1, 1991. The ADNET program manager anticipated that his office may receive an additional $5 million to $6 million in DOD fiscal year 1992 appropriations for supporting LEA drug law enforcement activities. He said that if they are received, the funds would be used to subsidize the LEA's ADNET costs. In addition to the DOD expenditures, the program manager estimated that LEAS spent a total of $1.1 million in procurement and operations and maintenance funds for ADNET through fiscal year 1991. His office was unsure of how much the LEAS are planning to spend in fiscal year 1992 and beyond.
ADNET Improves Communications

We interviewed responsible officials at 22 key network user centers (see app. II) to determine how useful ADNET is to their communications and mission accomplishment. These users included a mix of drug interdiction operations and intelligence centers that were among the earliest network users, and therefore, in our judgment, had the most experience and would have the best perspective on the system's usefulness.

Generally, both DOD and LEA ADNET users were enthusiastic about the system. All but one of the users said it improved the effectiveness of communications important to accomplishing their counternarcotics missions, and a little more than half (13) said it improved them greatly. Nineteen of the 22 users also said that ADNET improved their ability to conduct their drug-interdiction-related missions, and officials at five key interdiction operations centers—the American Embassy in Mexico, DOD’s Joint Task Forces Four and Five, and DOD’s Caribbean and Southern
Regional Operations Centers—said that the system was critical to improving their interdiction missions.

According to the users, ADNET provides advantages over alternative communications systems that are available to them, such as secure telephones and DOD's secure message distribution system. Most of the users said that the graphics display, multiple-station distribution of target track information, and the electronic text message capability saved time and effort, gave a common operations picture to all sites involved in an interdiction, permitted a clearer visual understanding of interdiction operations, and facilitated record keeping of operations for briefings and later analysis.

Most users also considered ADNET's capability to send information simultaneously to all interested sites superior to the telephone and DOD's message distribution system. Some said that multiple-site addressing saved time over point-to-point telephone communications. Some also said that the instantaneous distribution of the electronic mail was superior to the regular DOD message network because message distribution delays often occur with that system. However, because ADNET relies on manual keyboard entry of information, the LEAS' CBI East and CBI West Centers preferred to use secure telephones for point-to-point communications in time-critical situations.

Users had mixed responses about whether use of ADNET had increased the numbers of drug seizures and arrests. Nine DOD users judged that its use had increased the number of seizures and arrests but had no statistical evidence on which to base their judgments. However, a DOD official at the American Embassy in Mexico, which coordinates interdiction activities with Mexican authorities, said that since ADNET was installed in May 1990, Mexican authorities have seized 33,000 kilograms of cocaine worth $1 billion, 25 aircraft, 30 land vehicles, and 25 traffickers as a direct result of coordination provided by ADNET. In contrast, two DOD and four LEA users said that ADNET had no impact on arrests and seizures, and the same number of users said they had no basis for judging its impact.

ADNET users also had mixed responses concerning the system's usefulness for exchanging intelligence information. About half of them said that they used ADNET to receive and send anywhere from 25 to 100 percent of the intelligence information they considered important to their counternarcotics missions, while the other half said they used ADNET to
ADNET System Improvements Should Further Improve Communications

**ADNET System Improvements Should Further Improve Communications**

DOD is expanding system capabilities for intelligence applications by integrating access to a number of DOD and LEA drug intelligence databases. Included in this expansion is a drug interdiction data base and analysis system being developed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. It should permit users to cross-reference and link information among data bases or other applications, such as target tracking, that can be accessed through ADNET. Fourteen of the users we interviewed believed that these system improvements would increase their use of ADNET for intelligence communications a moderate to great amount, and two thought their use for it would increase some. Three of the users said their use of the system for exchanging intelligence would not increase as a result of the changes, and three did not know how their use of it would be affected.

Measures of Effectiveness

**Measures of Effectiveness**

In July 1991, the Joint Staff began a series of field-level, 1-day operational assessments of ADNET sites that include a review of system effectiveness. The staff expects to complete these site visits in fiscal year 1992. Because the operational assessments were initiated about the time we had completed our fieldwork, we did not review the results of the assessments. However, we did review DOD's evaluation guidelines for the assessments.

The effectiveness reviews consist of (1) site interviews with key site personnel about the system's technical and operational effectiveness and (2) data collection on the numbers of radar contacts tracked on the ADNET system and the extent the tracking contributed to drug seizures and arrests. However, as we noted in our discussion of the results of our telephone interviews with ADNET sites, very little data of this nature is maintained by the sites. In addition, the review methodology did not include specific assessments or data collection about the system's effectiveness for exchanging intelligence information.

According to the ADNET program manager, his office plans to continue developing and expanding the effectiveness measures based on experiences gained during the initial evaluations, including developing measures for intelligence exchange. In addition to the site evaluations, his office has conducted two users' meetings since ADNET was established to
receive user feedback on system effectiveness. It plans to conduct similar meetings annually. The feedback from the user meetings has been used as input to system planning and development.

Conclusions

ADNET improves coordination and communications of interdiction operations and intelligence, and users generally view it as a highly desirable, valuable coordination tool. In addition, planned system improvements, if successfully implemented, should further enhance intelligence communications.

Since the ADNET sites keep very little data attributing successful drug smuggling interdictions to the use of ADNET, it is unlikely that the Joint Staff's initial system assessments will produce meaningful objective measures of ADNET's effectiveness. However, this issue should be addressed as the Joint Staff continues to refine its measures based on evaluation experience and develops a data base for these measures.

Since major system improvements for intelligence exchange are still being developed, it may be premature to attempt effectiveness measures for the intelligence exchange aspect of the system. However, this issue should also be addressed by the Joint Staff as it continues to refine and develop effectiveness measures for ADNET.
Appendix I

Master Plan Participating Agencies and Their Equipment Funding Responsibilities

Table I.1 below lists the agencies scheduled to acquire telecommunications equipment under the implementation plan for the National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Enforcement. It also shows the amount of equipment funding provided by the Department of Defense for equipment loans to them and our estimates of the funding they would require to complete equipment purchases specified in the implementation plan. Our calculations are based on the equipment quantities, price estimates, funding plans, and expenditure information contained in the implementation plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Amount (in thousands)</th>
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<td>1. Bureau of Prisons</td>
<td>$1,100</td>
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<td>2. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms</td>
<td>5,299</td>
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<td>386</td>
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<td>4. Department of Defense</td>
<td>140,606</td>
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<td>5. Department of State</td>
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<td>6. Department of the Treasury</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Drug Enforcement Agency</td>
<td>88,409</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys</td>
<td>3,925</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Federal Aviation Administration</td>
<td>400</td>
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<td>10. Federal Communications Commission</td>
<td>843</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
<td>65,747</td>
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<td>12. Financial Crime Enforcement Network</td>
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<td>13. Immigration and Naturalization Service</td>
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<td>14. Internal Revenue Service</td>
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<td>15. International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)</td>
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<td>16. National Park Service</td>
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<td>17. Office of National Drug Control Policy</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>18. United States Secret Service</td>
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<td>19. United States Marshals Service</td>
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<td>20. United States Customs Service</td>
<td>30,170</td>
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<td>21. United States Coast Guard</td>
<td>102,486</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$617,215</strong></td>
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</table>

*These agencies are the nine we contacted for further equipment funding information, as discussed in chapter 2. Their funding responsibilities total $448.9 million, or 94 percent of the $476.6 million total for non-DOD agencies.

bThese agencies are receiving all of the equipment scheduled for them in the implementation plan through DOD equipment loans.

cThe total does not add because of rounding.

Source: GAO calculations based on UNDCP data.
Our objective in interviewing Anti-Drug Network (ADNET) users was to determine how useful ADNET had become to interdiction communications. We selected interviews over written questionnaires because we believed that some responses would require a dialogue for completeness and clarity. However, we determined that the number of ADNET users was too large to contact all users. Consequently, in consultation with the ADNET program manager, we selected 14 original network users and 8 other key users to interview by telephone. We conducted telephone interviews because they were more economical than site visits and would give us sufficient information to meet our objective.

For the interviews, we selected those workstation sites that had more than 6 months of experience using ADNET, and, in agreement with the program manager, were key players in the command, control, and intelligence support of interdiction activities. We believed that by interviewing these key network users we would obtain a reasonable perspective on the network’s usefulness to DOD and law enforcement agencies. We contacted operations and intelligence officials at user sites who could provide a management perspective on how well the network enhanced their operations and intelligence communications. Following are the user sites we contacted for interviews.

**U.S. Coast Guard**
- Intelligence Coordination Center, Washington, D.C.
- Area Command, Atlantic, Governor’s Island, New York
- District 7, Miami, Florida
- District 8, New Orleans, Louisiana
- Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Center, Miami, Florida (joint center with the Customs Service)

**U.S. Customs Service**
- C3I West Center, Riverside, California
- Customs Site, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi

**Drug Enforcement Agency**
- El Paso Intelligence Center, El Paso, Texas (multi-agency center)

**Department of Defense**
- Caribbean Regional Operations Center, Key West, Florida
- Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.
- Headquarters, Commander in Chief, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
Appendix II
Anti-Drug Network Interview Methodology

- Headquarters, Commander in Chief, Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii
- Headquarters, Commander in Chief, Southern Command, Panama
- Headquarters, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Atlanta, Georgia
- Joint Task Force Four, Key West, Florida
- Joint Task Force Five, Alameda, California
- Joint Task Force Six, El Paso, Texas
- National Military Intelligence Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.
- Northwest Sector Operations Control Center, Tacoma, Washington
- Southwest Sector Operations Control Center, Riverside, California
- Tactical Analysis Team, American Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico
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