

096058

096058

74-0376



REPORT TO THE CONGRESS



LM096058

Financial Status Of
Selected Major Weapon Systems

B-163058

Department of Defense

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES

OCT. 2, 1973

701732 - 096058

BLANK



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-163058

To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This is our first semiannual report to the Congress on the financial status of selected major weapon systems being acquired by the Department of Defense (DOD). Previously, we reported the status of major systems annually as of June 30.

This report details the financial status of the 45 systems on the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) at December 31, 1972. This is the only data available quarterly or semiannually, and it shows that the estimated costs for these 45 systems increased \$585.7 million between June 30, 1972, and December 31, 1972.

The tracking and analyzing of major weapon systems are extremely important not only to learn from the experiences of the past but also to maintain a constant surveillance over current events. Since weapon systems are dynamic and the universe is small (45 systems), a substantial change in the cost of one system can distort total costs. Thus total cost comparisons are not necessarily compatible and realistic analyses should be made on an individual system basis. For example, the costs shown on the A-10 SAR before December 31, 1972, were \$84.5 million to cover the competitive prototype phase only by agreement between DOD and the Department of the Air Force. The December 31, 1972, SAR cost estimate was revised and increased by \$2,405.2 million to reflect the total program cost of the A-10. As a result, the estimated costs of 45 systems on SAR showed a net cost increase of \$585.7 million between June 30, 1972, and December 31, 1972. However, if the added cost for the A-10 system is eliminated from the totals, the remaining 44 systems show a net decrease of \$1,819.5 million.

For comparison purposes, we have included data showing that:

--At June 30, 1972, DOD reported it was acquiring 116 major systems with estimated costs totaling \$153 billion. Of that amount, the Congress had already approved \$64 billion. The estimated \$89 billion required to complete those systems was understated because the procurement costs for many systems in the early phases of the acquisition process were not included, as in the case of the A-10 mentioned above.

B-163058

--The estimated costs for 67 of these systems that we analyzed had increased by \$31 billion from the time the initial estimates were made through June 30, 1972. From June 30, 1971, to June 30, 1972, the estimated costs for the 67 systems had increased about \$5.4 billion. The increases were due to a number of causes, including revised estimates, quantity changes, engineering changes, schedule revisions, and provisions for increased costs due to inflation.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.



Comptroller General
of the United States

C o n t e n t s

	<u>Page</u>
STATUS OF SELECTED MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS	1
Status at December 31, 1972	1
Status at June 30, 1972	1
APPENDIX	
I Estimated cost data comparison from June 30, 1972, to September 30, 1972	7
II Schedule of program cost data appearing on September 30, 1972, SAR	15
III Estimated cost data comparison from September 30, 1972, to December 31, 1972	17
IV Schedule of program cost data appearing on December 31, 1972, SAR	26
V Schedule of program cost data as of June 30, 1972	28

ABBREVIATIONS

DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCP	development concept paper
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
RDT&E	research, development, test, and evaluation
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SAR	selected acquisition reports

BLANK

STATUS OF SELECTED MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS

Beginning in 1969 the Congress asked GAO to report periodically on the progress and status of various acquisition systems and to provide its committees and members with reliable information on which to base judgments concerning issues involving its legislative functions.

This is our fourth report on the status of major weapon systems being acquired by the Department of Defense (DOD) and our first semiannual report as of December 31. Our reviews each year are directed toward those systems on the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) and selected other major acquisition systems which are in the early phases of the acquisition process or in which there has been congressional interest.

Status at December 31, 1972

The only data available on other than a fiscal-year basis is for those systems on SAR. At December 31, 1972, 45 systems were reported on SAR and we have analyzed the changes in the cost estimates for those systems for the 6 months ended December 31, 1972.

Appendixes I through IV provide details on the changes that occurred between June 30 and September 30, 1972, and between September 30 and December 31, 1972. For the 6 months there was a net increase of \$585.7 million, as follows:

Cost decrease 6-30 to 9-30-72 (app. I)	\$-379.0
Cost increase 9-30 to 12-31-72 (app. III)	<u>964.7</u>
Net increase 6-30 to 12-31-72	<u>\$ 585.7</u>

Status at June 30, 1972

For comparison purposes, we have included data in this report on the financial status of selected systems as of June 30, 1972, and some analyses of the changes that occurred during fiscal year 1972. At our request DOD prepared an inventory of 116 major acquisitions it was acquiring at June 30, 1972. This is smaller than the number on the inventory prepared at June 30, 1971 (141 systems), primarily because of a reduction in reported Navy systems from 90 to 60. The reasons for this decrease were (1) systems were not reported

BEST DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

May 1973

where total program funds were more than 90 percent obligated and (2) systems were not reported when they did not meet the criteria of a major acquisition, i.e., \$50 million for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and/or \$200 million for procurement.

The following summary shows the cost estimates for the 116 major acquisitions DOD approved and the amount of funds the Congress appropriated and will be required to appropriate for these systems reported in DOD's inventory at June 30, 1972.

Service	Number of systems	Estimates for 6-30-72	Programed funds		Additional funds required	
			Amount	Percentage	Amount	Percentage
			(millions)		(millions)	
Army	34	\$ 25,296.3	\$10,710.7	46	\$12,585.6	54
Navy	60	78,065.2	28,110.5	36	49,954.7	64
Air Force	22	51,961.8	25,625.9	49	26,335.9	51
Total	116	\$155,323.3	\$64,447.1	42	\$88,876.2	58

Note: Percentages are computed on the basis of the estimates for 6-30-72.

The estimate of \$89 billion in future appropriations may be understated because it does not include any amount for production quantities of numerous systems in the early phases of the acquisition cycle, such as the Heavy Lift Helicopter, Aegis Advanced Surface Missile System, and the A-X Close Air Support Aircraft. Further, changes in technology and the military threat may require the initiation and funding of additional new systems and/or the cancellation or cutback in currently approved systems.

Of the 116 systems, we analyzed the status of 68 systems reported on the DOD inventory as of June 30, 1972. One of the systems, SAFEGUARD, is not included in the detailed cost analysis in this report because the Army was reevaluating the program as a result of the SALT agreements and a cost estimate of the program at June 30, 1972, was not available. The estimated costs of the remaining 67 systems have increased \$14.8 billion from the cost anticipated in the development estimate to current estimate through completion.

A summary of program cost estimates for these 67 systems is shown in the table below and in detail in appendix V.

	Number of systems	Planning estimates (note a)	Development estimates (note a)	Cost changes		Estimates for 6-30-72 through program completion	Total costs (note c)
				Quantity (note b)	Other (note b)		
(millions)							
Army	15	\$ 10,556.9	\$ 11,802.2	\$ -940.3	\$ 1,506.3	\$ 12,368.2	\$ 12,456.6
Navy	37	53,742.5	62,290.1	721.0	7,423.8	70,434.9	72,478.4
Air Force	14	36,026.5	42,510.9	-3,767.7	9,848.5	48,591.7	50,682.5
Defense Communications Agency (DCA)	<u>1</u>	<u>d251.8</u>	<u>261.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>15.4</u>	<u>276.4</u>	<u>278.3</u>
Total	<u>67</u>	<u>\$100,677.7</u>	<u>\$116,864.2</u>	<u>-\$3,987.0</u>	<u>\$18,794.0</u>	<u>\$131,671.2</u>	<u>\$135,695.6</u>

^aFor those programs with only a development or a planning estimate, we have made both estimates the same to prevent distortion between the totals of these columns.

^bThe cost changes shown represent the difference between the development estimates and the reported costs through program completion.

^cIncludes additional procurement costs defined as modification and component improvement costs.

^dThe original development concept paper (DCP) estimate dated July 26, 1968, was \$259 million and included costs for 30 new terminals. This estimate is based on a May 1970 re-assessment of the program, which eliminated the 30 new terminals. This estimate does not include costs for interim shipborne terminals which are included in the development estimate of \$261 million.

Our review as of June 30, 1971, covered 77 major acquisitions. At June 30, 1972, we deleted 14 systems on the basis that they had substantially completed the acquisition process and transitioned to the operational forces and 1 system (SAFEGUARD) was deleted (see p. 2), leaving 62 systems. These 62 systems show net cost changes (increases) of about \$5.4 billion in fiscal year 1972. In addition, we included five Navy systems in our review for the first time and no cost changes are shown for these new programs.

The tracking and analyzing of major weapon systems are extremely important not only to learn from the experiences of the past but also to maintain a constant surveillance over current events. However, the systems are dynamic with new systems starting each year and some systems completing the acquisition process each year. Therefore annual totals are not necessarily compatible.

An analysis of the cost changes in the 67 major weapon systems between June 30, 1971, and June 30, 1972, is shown below.

Analysis of Cost Changes in

Fiscal Year 1972 (note a)

<u>Type of change</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DCA</u>	<u>Change during fiscal year 1972</u>
	(millions)				
Systems on SAR (47):					
Total quantity increase--net	\$ 350.2	\$1,229.6	\$ 61.2	\$ -	\$1,641.0
Other changes:					
Engineering	395.8	341.7	289.5	9.5	1,036.5
Support	52.4	271.6	33.2	.3	357.5
Schedule	117.5	172.1	66.6	-	356.2
Economic	1,489.3	1,001.3	33.9	-	2,524.5
Estimating	-425.9	-573.7	30.2	5.1	-764.3
Sundry	4.6	-590.9	137.8	1.9	-446.6
Total	<u>1,633.7</u>	<u>822.1</u>	<u>591.2</u>	<u>16.8</u>	<u>3,065.8</u>
Total	<u>1,983.9</u>	<u>2,051.7</u>	<u>652.4</u>	<u>16.8</u>	<u>4,704.8</u>
Systems not on SAR (15):					
Other changes	<u>115.4</u>	<u>535.3</u>	<u>35.2</u>	-	<u>685.9</u>
New systems (5)	-	-	-	-	-
Total change in fiscal year 1972 (67)	<u>\$2,099.3</u>	<u>\$2,587.0</u>	<u>\$687.6</u>	<u>\$16.8</u>	<u>\$5,390.7</u>
Number of systems	15	37	14	1	67

^aAnalysis is based on comparison of current estimates as of June 30, 1971, and June 30, 1972.

^bIncluded in the Navy net decrease of \$590.9 million is a decrease of \$232.7 million related to the Sparrow E program. This decrease is due to deleting the Air Force portion of the Sparrow E program from SAR in September 1971.

As shown above our analysis of major systems on SAR and for which detailed cost variance data was available indicated that 47 systems had increased costs about \$4.7 billion in fiscal year 1972. In addition, 15 systems, which were not on SAR, increased about \$0.7 billion. We did not identify the specific reasons for the cost variances on these 15 systems; however, most of this cost increase--about \$0.5 billion--is related to the Navy's LAMPS program. This increase in LAMPS reflects a refinement of the preliminary cost estimate of June 30, 1971, to more clearly define the modification and

new development segments of the program and an increase in the quantity of MARK III aircraft. The remaining five systems in our review were new this year and thus no cost changes were shown for fiscal year 1972. These systems had current estimates of about \$18 billion, or 11.7 percent of the current estimated cost of the 116 major acquisitions included in DOD's inventory as of June 30, 1972.

BEST DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

BLANK

APPENDIX I

ESTIMATED COST DATA COMPARISON FROM
JUNE 30, 1972, TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1972

Number of Systems	Planning estimate	Development estimate	Cost change		Current estimate
			Quantity decrease (-)	Other	
(millions)					
Army (10)	\$13,528.9	\$14,590.8	\$ -962.9	\$ 3,380.5	\$ 17,008.4
Navy (note a) (23)	29,146.4	37,459.7	875.2	6,523.3	44,858.2
Air Force (12)	<u>34,897.7</u>	<u>41,482.1</u>	<u>- 3,669.1</u>	<u>9,864.2</u>	<u>47,677.2</u>
Total at 9-30-72 (45)	<u>\$77,673.0</u>	<u>\$93,532.6</u>	<u>-\$3,736.8</u>	<u>\$19,768.0</u>	<u>\$109,543.8</u>
Total at 6-30-72 (45)	<u>\$76,700.0</u>	<u>\$92,559.6</u>	<u>-\$1,847.1</u>	<u>\$19,210.3</u>	<u>\$109,022.8</u>
Difference	<u>\$ 973.0</u>	<u>\$ 973.0</u>	<u>-\$1,909.7</u>	<u>\$ 557.7</u>	<u>\$ -379.0</u>

^aThe Navy estimates do not include any costs for the TRIDENT because they have been classified.

Note:

The amounts indicated above for current estimate show a net decrease of \$379 million compared to the current estimate as of June 30, 1972. This net decrease is the result of an increase in development estimate baseline of \$973 million due to adding the CVAN-70 to the existing CVAN-68/69 SAR, a net quantity decrease of \$1,909.7 million, and an increase for other changes of \$557.7 million. The net change of \$379 million consists of a decrease of \$1,966.9 million for the Army, an increase of \$1,442.4 million for the Navy, and an increase of \$145.5 million for the Air Force.

ARMY NET DECREASE OF \$1,966.9 MILLION:

DRAGON:

Increase of \$99.8 million:

Primarily due to a quantity increase in equipment, future escalation, and an unresolved difference between the current estimate and the Sept. 21, 1972, Program Decision Memorandum.

TOW:

Increase of \$195 million:

Due to a quantity increase in equipment, future escalation, engineering services, and an unresolved difference between the current estimate and the Sept. 21, 1972, Program Decision Memorandum.

DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

APPENDIX I

LANCE:

Increase of \$151.1 million:

Result of a quantity increase for equipment which was offset by deleting nonnuclear effort and a fiscal year 1971-73 adjustment to actuals.

Improved HAWK:

Decrease of \$5.4 million:

Primarily the result of deleting certain Government support equipment which was attributable to the Basic Hawk Program, applying new inflation indexes, and increasing spares for nontactical use.

M60A2:

Decrease of \$1.2 million:

Due to a reduction in the current estimate for initial spares. The original Government estimate was higher than the current contractor's estimate.

HLH:

Decrease of \$0.1 million:

Due to a prior-year funding realignment for training.

TACFIRE:

Increase of \$18.9 million:

Primarily due to quantity increases for equipment and additional engineering and support costs.

SAFEGUARD:

Decrease of \$2,425 million:

The June 30, 1972, SAR for the SAFEGUARD program did not include estimated program costs because the Army was reevaluating the program as a result of the SALT agreements. The above decrease of \$2,425 million is the reduction in costs between the Mar. 31, 1972, and Sept. 30, 1972, SARs. This decrease reflects the reduction from four sites to one site in accordance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems ratified by the Senate on Oct. 3, 1972.

NAVY NET INCREASE OF \$1,442.4 MILLION:

DLGN-38:

Increase of \$15.8 million:

Adjustment in escalation costs to reflect actual experience through fiscal year 1972 and the projections in the Navy fiscal year 1974 budget submission to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

SSN-688:

Increase of \$42.3 million:

Adjustment in escalation costs to reflect actual experience through fiscal year 1972 and the projections in the Navy fiscal year 1974 budget submission to OSD.

CVAN-68 class:

Increase of \$995.3 million:

Primarily the result of adding the CVAN-70 to the CVAN-68/69 SAR for reporting purposes (\$973 million) and adjusting escalation costs of

APPENDIX I

the CVAN-68/69 to reflect actual experience through fiscal year 1972 and the projections in the Navy fiscal year 1974 budget submission to OSD (\$22.3 million).

DD-963:

Increase of \$44.4 million:

Result of an adjustment in escalation costs to reflect actual experience through fiscal year 1972 and the projections in the Navy fiscal year 1974 budget submission to OSD.

LHA:

Increase of \$194.8 million:

Primarily the result of revised estimates to reflect the difference between initial target price and ceiling price and to reflect the revised escalation forecast on the basis of new Bureau of Labor statistics indexes.

F-14:

Increase of \$30.9 million:

Result of a slippage in the advanced engineering program and development fund changes due to development cost increases for F401/F100 engines, installation engineering, and procurement of additional test engines.

A-7E:

Increase of \$10.1 million:

Due to the addition to the program of nonrecurring and peculiar ground support equipment for the target recognition attack multisensors (TRAM)

APPENDIX I

and an increase in engine costs caused by a reduction of engine leadtime.

HARRIER:

Decrease of \$4.6 million:

Due primarily to an exchange-rate adjustment of the British pound.

E-2C:

Increase of \$5.1 million:

Result of an engineering change to the radar and an increase in Aviation Supply Office estimates of maintenance requirements.

P-3C:

Increase of \$21.1 million:

Attributed to engineering improvements, contract adjustments, support requirements to date, spare part adjustments, and revised planning data for investment spares requirements.

EA-6B:

Increase of \$104.8 million:

Result of an increase in quantity of aircraft and their related support costs offset by decreases for estimating and engineering changes.

MARK-48:

Increase of \$4.8 million:

Result of additional funding required to complete development of increased telemetry system with improvements to torpedo acoustic system and refined estimates for procurement.

APPENDIX I

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

CONDOR:

Increase of \$1 million:

Result of additions to the contract for bombardier/navigator training course, plant manuals, technical services, and other changes.

HARPOON:

Increase of \$6.7 million:

Result of a cost of living increase, development of a canister-launcher system for the PHM ships, and fleet support equipment.

POSEIDON:

Increase of \$57.5 million:

Result of procuring additional missiles and other related equipment, offsetting a reduction associated with the closing of prior contracts, and decreasing shipbuilding and conversion funding due to recent cost experience.

SPARROW E:

Decrease of \$0.8 million:

Result of reducing fleet support funds.

SPARROW F:

Decrease of \$88.9 million:

Result of decreasing the quantity of Air Force missiles and related support costs and offsetting an increase in engineering costs for the development of a monopulse seeker and active radio frequency fuse for increased performance and reduced fabrication costs.

VAST:

Increase of \$2.1 million:

Result of adding an unfunded RDT&E requirement and filling related support and spare requirements.

AIR FORCE NET INCREASE OF \$145.5 MILLION:

B-1:

Increase of \$164 million:

Attributed to a change in the production decision date to incorporate the allowance for early flight test of the avionics subsystem in the B-1 air vehicle before the production decision.

F-111:

Decrease of \$1.5 million:

Reduction in the fiscal year 1973 RDT&E program.

A-7D:

Increase of \$80.3 million:

Attributed to the procurement of 24 additional aircraft (\$84.1 million), offset by reducing the estimate to current funding requirements in airframe and in initial spares (\$3.8 million).

F-5E:

Decrease of \$2.2 million:

Attributed to additional foreign military sales increasing total fiscal year 1973 procurement to 145 aircraft while the military assistance service funded program remained unchanged. This decrease is offset, in part, due to an added aircraft structural integrity program, reprogramming of initial spares, refined estimates primarily for data acquisition, and AGE provisioning and documentation.

APPENDIX I

MAVERICK:

Increase of \$96.7 million:

Primarily attributed to an increase in the quantity of missiles and related spares and support equipment.

SRAM:

Decrease of \$128.4 million:

Primarily the result of reducing the quantity of missiles to be produced and to reducing spares and other related support costs.

MINUTEMAN II:

Decrease of \$58.1 million:

Attributed primarily to deleting the dust and debris program, reducing initial spares and training, adjusting prior-year funds, and offsetting increases in the force modernization program.

MINUTEMAN III:

Decrease of \$5.3 million:

Result of refinement of estimates, program adjustments and reassessments, and vendor requalification.

BEST DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

APPENDIX II

SCHEDULE OF PROGRAM COST DATA APPEARING ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1972, SAR

System	Planning estimate	Development estimate	Cost change		Current estimate
			Quantity decrease (-)	Other	
(millions)					
Army (10):					
SAFEGUARD (note a, b)	\$ 4,185.0	\$ 4,185.0	\$ -739.0	\$ 2,104.0	\$ 5,550.0
DRAGON	382.2	404.2	-57.3	237.6	584.5
SAM-D	4,916.8	5,240.5	-	-	5,240.5
TOW	410.4	727.3	-174.6	293.9	846.6
LANCER	586.7	652.9	144.6	130.2	927.7
IMPROVED HAWK	335.5	588.2	-120.8	285.5	752.9
M60A2	162.1	205.6	-45.3	241.3	401.6
HLH (note b)	119.3	119.3	-	3.7	123.0
UTTAS (note b)	2,307.3	2,307.3	-0.7	37.9	2,344.5
TACFIRE	123.6	160.5	30.2	46.4	237.1
Total	\$13,528.9	\$14,590.8	\$ -962.9	\$3,380.5	\$17,008.4
Navy (23):					
DLGN-38 (note c)	\$ 769.2	\$ 820.4	\$ -	\$ 15.8	\$ 836.2
SSN-688	1,658.0	5,747.5	1,986.5	404.4	8,138.4
CVAN-68 class (note d)	1,919.5	2,036.2	-	275.3	2,311.5
DD-963	1,784.4	2,581.2	-	213.5	2,794.7
LHA (note b)	1,380.3	1,380.3	-480.6	265.1	1,164.8
TRIBENT (note e)	CLASSIFIED				
F-14 (note b)	6,166.0	6,166.0	-1,116.5	253.0	5,302.5
A-7E (note b)	1,465.6	1,465.6	240.7	1,079.8	2,786.1
HARRIER (note b)	503.6	503.6	-	17.3	520.9
E-2C (note b)	586.2	586.2	-	292.7	878.9
P-3C (note b)	1,294.2	1,294.2	1,028.4	185.5	2,508.1
S-3A	1,763.8	2,891.1	-	260.7	3,151.8
EA-6B	689.7	817.7	166.4	696.3	1,680.4
MARK-48	720.5	1,753.8	-20.8	229.7	1,962.7
PHOENIX	370.8	536.4	15.3	562.0	1,113.7
CONDOR	356.3	441.0	-146.6	231.4	525.8
HARPOON (note b)	1,071.4	1,071.4	-	22.6	1,094.0
POSEIDON (note b)	4,568.7	4,568.7	-134.2	374.0	4,808.5
SPARROW E	687.2	740.7	-527.6	125.6	338.7
SPARROW F (note f)	151.5	707.7	-74.9	555.2	1,188.0
AEGIS	388.0	427.6	-	56.5	484.1
VAST	241.1	312.0	-186.9	312.4	437.5
BQQ-5 (note b)	610.4	610.4	126.0	94.5	830.9
Total	\$29,146.4	\$37,459.7	\$ -875.2	\$6,523.3	\$44,858.2
Air Force (12):					
B-1	\$ 8,954.5	\$11,218.8	\$ -33.8	\$ 91.6	\$11,276.6
F-15	6,039.1	7,355.2	-	446.8	7,802.0
C-5A	3,423.0	3,413.2	-710.3	1,823.5	4,526.4
F-111	4,686.6	5,505.5	-2,628.0	4,115.6	6,993.1
A-7D (note b)	1,379.1	1,379.1	-237.3	263.3	1,405.1
F-5E (note g)	698.6	315.5	-5.2	-15.1	295.2
A-X (note h)	1,025.5	84.5	-	-	84.5
AWACS	2,656.7	2,661.6	-	-0.3	2,661.3
MAVERICK	257.9	383.4	-	98.6	482.0
SRAM	167.1	236.6	96.8	864.1	1,197.5
MINUTEMAN II	3,014.1	4,254.9	4.0	589.4	4,848.3
MINUTEMAN III	2,695.5	4,673.8	-155.3	1,586.7	6,105.2
Total	\$34,997.7	\$41,482.1	\$-3,669.1	\$9,864.2	\$47,677.2

APPENDIX II

^aThe original planning estimate of \$4,185 million was for two sites. Subsequently the program was increased to a four-site program with a current estimate at Mar. 31, 1972, of \$7,975 million. SAR at June 30, 1972, did not include any estimate of program costs because the Army was reevaluating the program as a result of the SALT agreements. The current estimate of \$5,550 million at Sept. 30, 1972, covers one site in accordance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems ratified by the Senate on Oct. 3, 1972.

^bFor programs where SAR shows only a development or a planning estimate, we have made both estimates the same to prevent distortion between the totals of these columns.

^cBefore issuing the present contract, the Navy long-range program included 23 ships of this class for a planning estimate of \$3,980 million in fiscal year 1970 dollars. In May 1971 DOD suspended the program for ships of this class beyond the first three. The present contract is for three ships with options for two more.

^dBeginning Sept. 30, 1972, the CVAN-68/69 SAR became the CVAN-68 class SAR and now covers three carriers, CVAN-68, 69, and 70. The planning estimate, development estimate, and current estimate as of Sept. 30, 1972, were increased by \$973 million (the program cost estimate for CVAN-70).

^eNavy estimates do not include any TRIDENT costs because they are classified.

^fCost estimates include Air Force estimates for the Air Force portion of the Sparrow F program.

^gThe \$383.1 million decrease in the development estimate compared to the planning estimate is the result of erroneously including military assistance program aircraft in the SAR planning estimate.

^hSAR for the A-X reflects costs of \$84.5 million to cover the competitive prototype phase only by agreement between DOD and the Department of the Air Force. The A-X planning estimate of \$1,025.5 million represents the total program cost estimate as cited in DCP. This planning estimate is stated in constant year 1970 dollars, based on a 600 aircraft program, and considered a turboprop configuration.

ESTIMATED COST DATA COMPARISON FROM
SEPTEMBER 30, 1972, TO DECEMBER 31, 1972

Number of systems	Planning estimate	Development estimate	Cost change		Current estimate
			Quantity decrease(-)	Other	
(millions)					
Army	(10) \$13,599.5	\$14,661.4	-\$1,378.4	\$ 2,874.8	\$ 16,157.8
Navy (note a)	(23) 29,146.4	37,459.7	205.0	6,751.1	44,415.8
Air Force	(12) <u>34,997.7</u>	<u>43,887.3</u>	<u>-3,569.7</u>	<u>9,617.3</u>	<u>49,934.9</u>
Total at 12-31-72	(45) <u>\$77,743.6</u>	<u>\$96,008.4</u>	<u>-\$4,743.1</u>	<u>\$19,243.2</u>	<u>\$110,508.5</u>
Total at 9-30-72	(45) <u>\$77,673.0</u>	<u>\$93,532.6</u>	<u>-\$3,756.8</u>	<u>\$19,758.0</u>	<u>\$109,543.8</u>
Difference	\$ <u>70.6</u>	\$ <u>2,475.8</u>	\$ <u>-986.3</u>	\$ <u>-524.8</u>	\$ <u>^b964.7</u>

^aNavy estimates do not include any TRIDENT costs because they are classified.

^bTotal cost comparisons are not necessarily compatible. For example, the estimated costs shown on the A-10 SAR before December 31, 1972, were \$84.5 million to cover the competitive prototype phase only. The December 31, 1972, SAR cost estimate was revised and increased by \$2,405.2 million to reflect the total program cost of the A-10. If the increase in the estimated cost of the A-10 system is eliminated from the totals, the remaining 44 systems show a net decrease of \$1,440.5 million.

Note:

The amounts indicated above for current estimate show a net increase of \$964.7 million compared to the current estimate as of Sept. 30, 1972. The planning estimate increase of \$70.6 million is due to adding a prototype and an engine development effort to the Army's HLH program. The net increase of \$964.7 million in the current estimate is the result of (1) a net increase in the development estimate baseline of \$2,475.8 million due to increasing the Air Force's A-10 estimate by \$2,405.2 million to reflect total program costs opposed to the estimated cost of the competitive prototype phase shown on prior SAR and an increase of \$70.6 million due to adding a prototype and an engine development effort to the Army's HLH program, (2) a net quantity decrease of \$986.3 million, and (3) a net decrease for other change of \$524.8 million. The net change of \$964.7 million consists of a decrease of \$850.6 million for the Army, a decrease of \$442.4 million for the Navy, and an increase of \$2,257.7 million for the Air Force.

ARMY NET DECREASE OF \$850.6 MILLION:

DRAGON:

Decrease of \$15.4 million:

Due to a decrease in escalation and to the refinement of hardware cost to procure quantities reflected in the Sept. 21, 1972, Program Decision Memorandum.

APPENDIX III

TOW:

Decrease of \$22.2 million:

Primarily due to a refinement of the hardware cost reflected in the Sept. 21, 1972, Program Decision Memorandum.

LANCE:

Decrease of \$3 million:

Due to decreasing cost estimates for the procurement of ground support equipment because a break in production was prevented which was partially offset by an increase for nonnuclear development continuation.

Improved HAWK:

Increase of \$19.6 million:

Primarily the result of program stretchout and an increase in approved estimates for initial spares.

HLH:

Increase of \$66.9 million:

Primarily the result of providing a prototype with engines during advance development.

SAM-D:

Decrease of \$863.4 million:

Primarily the result of a quantity decrease and other related changes due to reducing fire control groups, reducing missiles, deleting adaption kit requirements, and substituting high explosive warheads for those missiles previously programed to be armed with nuclear warheads.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

APPENDIX III

SAFEGUARD:

Decrease of \$34 million:

Primarily due to eliminating system-test effort, adjusting repair parts requirements and quantity adjustments, and revising estimates resulting from terminating work caused by the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

UTTAS:

Increase of \$0.9 million:

Primarily the result of revising prototype support estimates to include engine and avionics representatives at airframe contractor sites.

NAVY NET DECREASE OF \$442.4 MILLION:

DLGN-38:

Decrease of \$1.8 million:

Decrease in escalation estimate.

SSN-688:

Increase of \$160.3 million:

Result of an economic cost adjustment to reflect actual experience through fiscal year 1972 and fiscal year 1974 budget decisions and the establishment of SSN-688 class MILCON requirements at SUBASE, New London, channel dredging and pier construction.

CVAN-68 Class:

Decrease of \$1.7 million:

Decreases in estimated escalation costs for the three ships.

DD-963:

Increase of \$10.4 million:

Result of an adjustment in escalation costs to reflect actual experience through fiscal year 1972 and the projections OSD approved in a budget decision.

LHA:

Decrease of \$2.8 million:

Result of an adjustment in escalation costs to reflect agreement with indexes from budget decisions.

A-7E:

Increase of \$9.5 million:

Primarily the result of adding 12 aircraft for fiscal year 1974, offset by transferring contractor engineering technical services costs from the procurement to the operations and maintenance appropriation, and making other minor pricing adjustments throughout the total program.

HARRIER:

Decrease of \$1.1 million:

Result of an increase for cost of stencil ejection seat, offset by cost decreases in aircraft repricing, spares repricing, and the exchange rate.

E-2C:

Decrease of \$6.8 million:

Due to reducing the estimated cost of a radar change, transferring contractor engineering

APPENDIX III

PHOENIX:

Decrease of \$0.3 million:

Primarily the result of revising requirements computations for spare missile sections and transferring contractor technical engineering services costs to the operations and maintenance appropriation, offset by a schedule change associated with the reduction of missiles in fiscal years 1975-74 and rescheduling procurement for later years.

CONDOR:

Decrease of \$2.4 million:

Result of transferring contractor technical engineering services costs from the procurement to the operations and maintenance appropriation and reducing initial spares costs by a fiscal year 1974 budget decision.

POSEIDON:

Decrease of \$61.8 million:

Result of transferring estimates for engineering operational support for fiscal year 1974 and fiscal year 1975 from the procurement to the operations and maintenance appropriation by OSD direction and also reducing prior years' funding made available for recoupment.

SPARROW E:

Decrease of \$5.8 million:

Primarily the result of congressional action deleting the procurement of missiles in fiscal year 1973 and related support and initial spare requirements.

SPARROW F:

Decrease of \$96.7 million:

Primarily the result of reducing missiles for the total program and their related support and spares costs.

VAST:

Decrease of \$22.3 million:

Primarily reflects the program budget decision to reduce VAST procurement.

BQQ-5:

Increase of \$18.2 million:

Result of applying escalation costs through fiscal year 1980.

AIR FORCE NET INCREASE OF \$2,257.7 million:

A-10:

Increase of \$2,405.2 million:

The A-10 was formerly known as the A-X aircraft. SAR before Dec. 31, 1972, reflected costs of \$84.5 million to cover the competitive prototype phase only by agreement between DOD and the Department of the Air Force. Beginning with the Dec. 31, 1972, SAR, the program was redesignated the A-10 and the SAR estimates were revised and increased by \$2,405.2 million to reflect the total program cost estimate for the A-10 program.

F-15:

Increase of \$33.2 million:

Transferring a portion of fiscal year 1974 component improvement program from additional procurement costs to the development program.

APPENDIX III

PIE

C-5A:

Decrease of \$17.5 million:

Represents a decrease in initial spares funds as a result of the cost estimating team analysis initiated in July 1972.

F-111:

Decrease of \$55.2 million:

Result of refined estimates for contracts approaching completion and negotiation reductions, for refined engine estimates, for refined peculiar support estimates, and for reduction in initial spares.

A-7D:

Increase of \$8.2 million:

Due to an increase in spare engines and other support costs and a decrease due to a refinement of estimate.

F-5E:

Increase of \$121.6 million:

Primarily the result of increased procurement cost due to the addition of 71 military assistance service funded aircraft to the program and related engineering, support, schedule, and estimating changes.

AWACS:

Decrease of \$276.3 million:

Results from a Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council decision to change the airplane configuration from eight TF-34 engines to four TF-33 engines and supply all engines and UHF radios as Government-furnished equipment. Initial spares were reduced for the restructured program, test schedules were extended, and the cost estimates were reduced because of the reassessment of risk/engineering change order factors on the basis of brassboard experience.

BEST DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

MAVERICK:

Decrease of \$1.4 million:

Due to reducing initial spares costs in fiscal years 1973 and 1975.

SRAM:

Decrease of \$15.9 million:

Result of reducing the procurement and initial spares estimates and the Government's share of the fiscal years 1970-71 and the fiscal year 1972 production contracts' underruns.

MINUTEMAN II:

Increase of \$12.1 million:

Result of a force modernization stretchout, offset by a decrease for initial spares, and a prior-year fund adjustment.

MINUTEMAN III:

Increase of \$43.7 million:

Primarily the result of a force modernization stretchout and an increase in advanced ICBM technology, offset by reducing costs for the improved digital computer unit due to terminating development effort and reducing fiscal year 1972 procurement and refining estimates.

APPENDIX IV

SCHEDULE OF PROGRAM COST DATA APPEARING ON

DECEMBER 31, 1972, SAR

System	Planning estimate	Development estimate	Cost change		Current estimate
			Quantity decrease (-)	Other	
(millions)					
Army (10):					
SAFEGUARD (note a, b)	\$ 4,185.0	\$ 4,185.0	\$ -722.0	\$ 2,053.0	\$ 5,516.0
DRAGON	382.2	404.2	-57.3	222.2	569.1
SAM-D	4,916.8	5,240.5	-432.5	-430.9	4,377.1
TOW	410.4	727.3	-174.6	271.7	824.4
LANCE	586.7	652.9	144.6	127.2	924.7
IMPROVED HAWK	355.5	588.2	-120.8	305.1	772.5
M60A2	162.1	205.6	-45.3	241.3	401.6
HLH (note b, c)	189.9	189.9	-	-	189.9
UTIAS (note b)	2,307.3	2,307.3	-0.7	38.8	2,345.4
TACFIRE (note d)	123.6	160.5	30.2	46.4	237.1
Total	\$13,599.5	\$14,661.4	-\$1,378.4	\$2,874.8	\$16,157.8
Navy (23):					
DLGN-38 (note e)	\$ 769.2	\$ 820.4	\$ -	\$ 14.0	\$ 834.4
SSN-688	1,658.0	5,747.5	1,986.5	564.7	8,298.7
CVAN-68 class (note f)	1,919.5	2,056.2	-	273.6	2,309.8
DD-963	1,784.4	2,581.2	-	223.9	2,805.1
LHA (note b)	1,380.3	1,380.3	-480.6	262.3	1,162.0
TRIDENT (note g)	CLASSIFIED				
F-14 (note b, d)	6,166.0	6,166.0	-1,116.5	253.0	5,302.5
A-7F (note b)	1,465.6	1,465.6	270.0	1,060.0	2,795.6
MARKARRIER (note b)	503.6	503.6	2.5	13.7	519.8
E-2C (note b)	586.2	586.2	-	285.9	872.1
P-3C (note b)	1,294.2	1,294.2	1,028.4	228.6	2,551.2
S-3A	1,763.8	2,891.1	-38.8	442.1	3,294.4
EA-6B	689.7	817.7	166.4	533.3	1,517.4
MARK-48	720.5	1,753.8	-470.0	218.9	1,502.7
PHOENIX	370.8	536.4	15.3	561.7	1,113.4
CONDOR	356.3	441.0	-146.6	229.0	523.4
HARPOON (note b)	1,071.4	1,071.4	-	22.6	1,094.0
POSEIDON (note b)	4,568.7	4,568.7	-134.2	312.2	4,746.7
SPARROW E	687.2	740.7	-533.1	125.3	332.9
SPARROW F (note h)	151.5	707.7	-270.7	654.3	1,091.3
AEGLIS	388.0	427.6	-	56.5	484.1
VAST	241.1	312.0	-199.6	302.8	415.2
BQQ-5 (note b)	610.4	610.4	126.0	112.7	849.1
Total	\$29,145.4	\$37,459.7	\$ 205.0	\$6,751.1	\$44,415.8
Air Force (12):					
B-1	\$ 8,954.5	\$11,218.8	\$ -33.8	\$ 91.6	\$11,276.6
F-15	6,039.1	7,355.2	-	480.0	7,855.2
C-5A	3,423.0	3,413.2	-710.3	1,806.0	4,508.9
F-111	4,685.6	5,595.5	-2,628.0	4,060.4	6,937.9
A-7D (note b)	1,379.1	1,379.1	-237.3	271.5	1,413.3
F-5E (note i)	698.6	315.5	94.2	7.1	416.8
A-10 (note j)	1,025.5	2,489.7	-	-	2,489.7
AWACS	2,656.7	2,661.6	-	-276.6	2,385.0
MAVERICK	257.9	383.4	-	97.2	480.6
SRAM	167.1	236.6	96.8	848.2	1,181.6
MINUTEMAN II	3,014.1	4,254.9	4.0	601.5	4,860.4
MINUTEMAN III	2,695.5	4,673.8	-155.3	1,630.4	6,148.9
Total	\$34,997.7	\$43,887.3	-\$3,569.7	\$9,617.3	\$49,934.9

- ^aThe original planning estimate of \$4,185 million was for two sites. Subsequently the program was increased to a four-site program with a current estimate at Mar. 31, 1972, of \$7,975 million. The current estimate of \$5,516 million at Dec. 31, 1972, covers one site in accordance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems ratified by the Senate on Oct. 3, 1972.
- ^bFor programs where SAR shows only a development or a planning estimate, we have made both estimates the same to prevent distortion between the totals of these columns.
- ^cThe original planning estimate of \$119.3 million included costs for the advanced technology component (ATC) program only. Beginning with the Dec. 31, 1972, SAR, the planning estimate was increased to \$189.9 million. This increase of \$70.6 million was for adding a prototype and an engine development effort to the program.
- ^dThe requirement for the December SAR was waived pending the restructuring of the program. Cost data shown reflects Sept. 30, 1972, SAR.
- ^eBefore issuing the present contract, the Navy's long-range program included 23 ships of this class for a planning estimate of \$3,980 million in fiscal year 1970 dollars. In May 1971 DOD suspended the program for ships of this class beyond the first three. The present contract is for three ships with options for two more.
- ^fBeginning Sept. 30, 1972, the CVAN-68/69 SAR became the CVAN-68 class SAR and now covers three carriers, CVAN-68, 69, and 70.
- ^gNavy estimates do not include any TRIDENT costs because they are classified.
- ^hCost estimates include Air Force estimates for the Air Force portion of the Sparrow F program.
- ⁱThe \$383.1 million decrease in development estimate compared to planning estimate is the result of erroneously including military assistance program aircraft in the SAR planning estimate.
- ^jThe A-10 was formerly known as the A-X aircraft. The September SAR reflected costs of \$84.5 million to cover the competitive prototype phase only by agreement between DOD and the Department of the Air Force. The cost estimates on the Dec. 31, 1972, SAR, were revised and increased to \$2,489.7 million to reflect the total program cost estimate of the A-10 program. The planning estimate of \$1,025.5 million represents the total program cost estimate as cited in DCP. This planning estimate is stated in constant year 1970 dollars, based on a 600 aircraft program, and considered a turboprop configuration.

APPENDIX V

UNCLASSIFIED

SCHEDULE OF PROGRAM COST DATA AS OF JUNE 30, 1972

Acquisition phases and military services	Planning estimate	Development estimate	Cost change		Current estimate	Additional procurement costs	Total costs
			Quantity	Other			
(millions)							
DEVELOPMENT (30):							
Army							
CHEYENNE (notes a, b)	\$ 125.9	\$ 125.9	\$ 15.4	\$ 190.3	\$ 331.6	\$ -	\$ 331.6
UTP45 (note b)	2,307.3	2,307.3	-0.7	37.9	2,344.5	62.5	2,407.0
HLH (note b)	119.3	119.3	-	3.8	123.1	-	123.1
SAM-D	4,916.8	5,240.5	-	-	5,240.5	-	5,240.5
SCOUT	202.0	204.8	-	40.1	244.9	-	244.9
MICV	209.4	196.3	-	49.1	245.4	-	245.4
HCWITZER AM198	129.5	128.4	-	-3.1	125.3	-	125.3
BUSMASTER (note b)	577.1	577.1	-381.1	39.8	235.8	-	235.8
TRUCK	123.6	100.5	24.4	33.3	218.2	-	218.2
Navy							
Sea Control Ship (note b)	840.2	840.2	-	-	840.2	-	840.2
Surface Effects Ship (note b)	708.0	708.0	-	-	708.0	-	708.0
Patrol Frigate (note b)	3,134.1	3,134.1	-	-	3,134.1	-	3,134.1
Patrol Hydrofoil (note b)	604.0	604.0	-	-	604.0	-	604.0
LAMPS (note b)	811.1	811.1	-	269.7	1,080.8	-	1,080.8
F-33	1,763.3	2,891.1	-	269.7	3,151.8	124.0	3,275.8
F-14 (note b)	6,166.0	6,166.0	-1,110.5	222.1	5,271.6	65.0	5,336.6
COMUSP	356.3	441.0	-146.6	230.4	524.8	71.3	596.1
SPARROW F (note c)	151.5	707.7	28.0	541.2	1,276.9	29.1	1,306.0
CH-53E	640.6	652.4	-	-	652.4	-	652.4
HARPOON	CLASSIFIED						
TRIDENT	CLASSIFIED						
AN/BQQ-5	CLASSIFIED						
REGIS	388.0	427.6	-	56.5	484.1	-	484.1
SIDEWINDER AIM9-L (note b)	234.5	234.5	-	47.8	282.3	-	282.3
Air Force							
AX (note d)	1,025.5	84.5	-	-	84.5	-	84.5
F-15	6,039.1	7,355.2	-	446.8	7,802.0	345.1	8,147.1
B-1	8,954.5	11,218.8	-33.8	-72.4	11,112.6	250.1	11,362.7
AWACS	2,656.7	2,661.6	-	-0.3	2,661.3	21.7	2,683.0
SCAD (note b)	908.7	908.7	-	20.0	928.7	109.5	1,038.2
OTH B (note b)	120.1	120.1	-	11.2	131.3	-	131.3
PRODUCTION OPERATIONAL (37):							
Army							
Improved HAWK	335.5	588.2	-114.1	284.2	758.3	12.3	770.6
LANCE	580.7	652.9	5.9	117.8	776.6	13.6	790.2
TOW	410.4	727.3	-307.4	231.7	651.6	-	651.6
DRAGON	382.2	404.2	-132.9	212.4	484.7	-	484.7
M90A2	162.1	205.6	-45.3	242.5	402.8	-	402.8
GAMA GOAT	69.1	163.9	-5.5	26.5	184.9	-	184.9
Navy							
LHA (note b)	1,380.3	1,380.3	-480.6	70.3	970.0	-	970.0
DESN-38 (note e)	769.2	820.4	-	-	820.4	-	820.4
DD-963	1,784.4	2,581.2	-	169.1	2,750.3	-	2,750.3
CYAN-68/69	946.5	1,063.2	-	253.0	1,316.2	-	1,316.2
SSN-688	1,658.0	5,747.5	1,986.5	562.1	8,096.1	-	8,096.1
DLG Modernization (note b)	698.8	638.8	-	307.8	1,006.6	-	1,006.6
P-3C (note b)	1,294.2	1,294.2	1,028.2	164.6	2,487.0	40.3	2,527.3
HARRIER (note b)	503.6	503.0	-	21.9	525.5	16.8	542.3
F-2C (note b)	586.2	586.2	-	287.6	873.8	-	873.8
EA-7B (note b)	1,465.4	1,465.6	240.7	1,069.7	2,776.0	155.2	2,931.2
EA-6B	689.7	817.7	101.6	650.3	1,275.6	83.8	1,659.4
SPARROW E (note f)	687.2	740.7	-527.6	126.4	339.5	24.7	364.2
PHOENIX	370.8	536.4	15.3	562.0	1,113.7	12.5	1,126.2
VAST 247	241.1	312.0	-186.9	310.3	435.4	-	435.4
STANDARD (MR) AND (ER) (notes b, g)	822.6	822.6	-	51.9	874.5	-	874.5
PIPER	178.5	408.9	-	95.5	504.4	-	504.4
POLEIDON (note b)	4,568.7	4,568.7	-243.6	425.9	4,751.0	1,202.9	5,953.9
MAK-43	720.5	1,753.8	-20.8	234.9	1,957.9	2.3	1,960.2
AN/SQ-23	157.1	170.5	-82.7	84.0	171.8	-	171.8
DE-1052	1,285.1	1,259.7	-	170.8	1,430.5	-	1,430.5
SSN-637 (note b)	2,515.8	2,515.8	-	413.3	2,929.1	-	2,929.1
AMTRAC	324.4	328.5	-	-142.4	186.1	-	186.1
Air Force							
C-5A (note h)	3,423.0	3,413.2	-710.3	1,823.5	4,526.4	105.8	4,632.2
F-111	4,686.6	5,505.5	-2,628.0	4,117.1	6,994.6	511.4	7,506.0
F-5E (note i)	698.6	315.5	-5.2	-12.9	297.4	4.6	302.0
A-7D (note b)	1,379.1	1,379.1	-282.6	228.3	1,324.8	62.4	1,387.2
MINUTEMAN II	3,014.1	4,254.9	-4.0	647.5	4,906.4	491.3	5,397.7
MINUTEMAN III	2,695.5	4,673.8	-155.3	1,592.0	6,110.5	178.1	6,288.6
MAJRIK	257.9	383.4	-82.1	84.0	385.3	7.7	393.0
SRAM	167.1	236.6	125.6	963.7	1,325.9	3.1	1,329.0
DCS							
DCS phase II	251.8	261.0	-	15.4	276.4	1.9	278.3
Total (note j)	\$100,677.7	\$116,864.2	-53,987.0	\$18,794.0	\$131,671.2	\$4,224.6	\$135,895.8

^aThe Cheyenne current estimate represented costs to complete the research and development program as of June 30, 1972. The program was terminated before completion on Aug. 9, 1972, with estimated total costs of \$262.9 million, including termination charges.

^bFor those programs where there is only a development or a planning estimate available, we have made both estimates the same to prevent distortion between the totals of the columns.

^cEstimates include Air Force cost for research, development, and procurement.

^dSAR for the A-X reflects costs of \$84.5 million to cover the competitive prototype phase only. The A-X planning estimate of \$1,025.5 million represents the total program estimate as cited in DCP. The estimate in DCP was stated in 1970 dollars, based on a 600 aircraft program, and considered a turboprop configuration.

^eBefore issuing the present contract, the Navy's long-range program included 23 ships of this class for a planning estimate of \$3,980 million in fiscal year 1970 dollars. In May 1971 DOD suspended the program for ships of this class beyond the first three. The present contract is for three ships with options for two more.

^fCost estimates for the Air Force portion of this program were deleted from SAR in December 1971.

^gCost changes between development and current estimates were not identified as to quantity or other changes.

^hEstimated costs to correct defects are not included.

ⁱThe \$383.1 million decrease in the development estimate compared to the planning estimate is the result of eliminating military assistance program (MAP) cost estimates from SAR.

^jTotals include costs of Trident, AN/BQQ5, and Harpoon, whose individual cost estimates were classified as of June 30, 1972.