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# *REPORT TO THE CONGRESS*

*BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL  
OF THE UNITED STATES*

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## **Relationships Between U.S. And NATO Military Command Structures-- Need For Closer Integration**

This report is the unclassified version of GAU's Secret report LCD-77-419, dated August 26, 1977. It discusses U.S. participation in two command structures in Europe--its own and NATO's Allied Command, Europe. These command structures are similarly organized and have basically the same overall mission--to provide a combat ready force to deter aggression from the Warsaw Pact.

The report describes problems with transitioning from a peacetime to a wartime posture, and management layering within and between U.S. and NATO commands areas where there are potentials for reorganizing, eliminating, or substantially reducing the size of the U.S. command structure and thereby making it more responsive to its prime purpose for being in Europe. Alternatives for achieving closer integration between the U.S. and NATO command structures are identified.

LCD-77-447

OCTOBER 26, 1977



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-156439

To the President of the Senate and the  
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This is an unclassified version of our report describing the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization military organizations and the need for closer integration between them. A war in Europe most likely will be a NATO war; therefore NATO countries must plan for and be prepared to execute the war as a coalition rather than as individual nations.

Our classified report was issued without Department of Defense comments because they did not respond in time. Subsequently, however, the Department of Defense furnished us comments and supported our general conclusion that closer integration between the U.S. and NATO command structures is needed. An unclassified version of the Department's comments is included as appendix V to this report.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James B. Starks".

Comptroller General  
of the United States

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S  
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN U.S. AND NATO  
MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURES--NEED  
FOR CLOSER INTEGRATION  
Department of Defense

D I G E S T

The United States participates in two commands in Europe--its own and NATO's Allied Command, Europe. The United States has a unified command; headquarters commands for the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and numerous subordinate command headquarters. (See p. 4.)

The U.S. and NATO command structures are similarly organized and have basically the same overall mission--to provide a combat-ready force to deter aggression from the Warsaw Pact nations. The close relationship of the two commands is best illustrated by (1) several U.S. commanders being also NATO commanders, (2) NATO assuming operational command of U.S. combat forces in a NATO war, and (3) NATO being heavily staffed with U.S. personnel in peacetime. (See p. 4.)

Over the years, the U.S. command structure has been studied and debated, both in the Congress and the executive branch; efforts have been made to identify, classify, reorganize, and streamline headquarters activities throughout the Department of Defense. These efforts were all intended to make more efficient use of resources by reducing the number, size, layering, and duplication of headquarters and by updating and streamlining command relationships. Prior efforts have resulted in reorganizations and consolidations of headquarters and headquarters functions. Several of these efforts and personnel cuts were initiated by the European commands. Therefore these commands themselves share the credit for the actions taken to date. (See p. 18.)

Tear Sheet. Upon removal, the report cover date should be noted hereon.

LCD-77-447

The increasing interdependence of NATO members underscores the need for a NATO command that can respond quickly in the event of an attack by the Warsaw Pact forces, particularly an attack with little or no advance warning. Transition from a peacetime to a wartime structure should require minimal change. The only practical way to accomplish this is through the close integration of the command structures of the NATO members' forces with the NATO command structure. (See p. 43.)

The NATO and member nation commands should be integrated at least to the extent that the NATO command is fully knowledgeable, in peacetime, of the important military activities of member nations, such as the details of arrangements for logistics support--arrangements that could affect NATO wartime activities. (See p. 27.)

The U.S. command structure needs to be reexamined with these objectives in mind. Although the current Department of Defense position is that the most likely conflict in Europe will be a NATO war, the United States still maintains functions basically parallel to those of NATO. (See p. 28.)

The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, has emphasized the need for concerted multinational efforts in such areas as equipment commonality; force interoperability; integration of command, control, and communications; and mutual logistical support as military imperatives in Europe. For these reasons, the United States should determine how its command functions can best be integrated with those of NATO. (See p. 28.)

This report discusses unilateral war and crisis management activities (see p. 28); problems of changing from a peacetime to a wartime posture (see p. 30); and the need for a functional analysis of the U.S. command structure (see p. 32)--areas where there are potentials for realigning or reducing the U.S. command structure and

more fully integrating it with the NATO command structure.

There are at least two alternatives that should be considered in analyzing the U.S. command structure in Europe--alternatives that could improve U.S. participation in NATO and reduce the management layering that now exists. These alternatives are:

--Integrate the U.S. unified command with NATO's Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe. (See p. 45.)

--Integrate component commands and the United States European Command. (See p. 45.)

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense reexamine the U.S. command structure in Europe and make changes as necessary to insure that the structure is optimally organized to perform its primary wartime mission. The examination should include evaluation of the potential benefits--both to U.S. staffing and a strengthened NATO--of taking the leadership in giving NATO greater authority and control over peacetime logistics support in order to facilitate the transition to and effectiveness of wartime activities. (See p. 46.)

GAO further recommends that the Secretary of Defense also take a leadership role in encouraging a multilateral study to identify ways in which closer integration of the command structures of all the NATO member forces with the NATO command structure can be achieved. (See p. 46.)

The Secretary of Defense was given an opportunity to comment on GAO's classified report. However, the classified report was issued without Defense's comments because they did not respond in time. Subsequently, however, Defense furnished GAO comments and supported GAO's general conclusion that closer integration between the U.S. and NATO command structures is needed. (See p. 46.)

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACE	Allied Command Europe
DOD	Department of Defense
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces in Europe
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USAREUR	U.S. Army, Europe
USNAVEUR	U.S. Naval Forces, Europe

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a sizable military force in Western Europe, initially in occupation of a defeated Germany and later in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Various administrations have affirmed the importance of NATO as the cornerstone of United States foreign policy and have stated that a continuing commitment to the defense of Western Europe is vital to U.S. interests.

The political and military situation in Europe and the economic condition of the NATO member nations have changed considerably since NATO's inception in 1949. At that time, the United States was the bulwark of the alliance because of both its military preeminence among members and its monopoly of nuclear weapons.

Since then, however, a number of things have occurred to change the relationships of the member nations and to alter the perception of the role of the United States. For one thing, Western Europe has regained its wealth. For another, the Soviet Union now is on equal footing with the United States with respect to nuclear weapons. Also, various steps have been taken to normalize relations between East and West Europe and to reduce the threat of military confrontation.

These changes, however, have not altered the American commitment to Europe through NATO--it continues to be strong. It has been evident for some time though that the United States could no longer "go it alone" in any major conflict with the Soviet Union in Europe. There is a need for the NATO organization to function as an entity, with the member nations recognizing their interdependence, if aggression in Western Europe is to be deterred and a balance of military power maintained.

The purpose of this report is to explore alternatives to the present relationships between the military command structures of the NATO member nations and the NATO organization military command structure that would recognize and build on this interdependence.

### U.S. COMMITMENT TO NATO

The U.S. commitment to NATO includes both stationing forces in Europe and committing additional forces stationed in the United States and elsewhere to NATO's defense. It also includes providing or arranging for logistics support of these forces, undertaking its normal share of the burden of maintaining the security of all NATO members, and keeping each fully informed. Presently, 4-2/3 Army divisions with combat support elements, 28 Air Force squadrons, and a Navy fleet of about 50 ships and 200 aircraft are stationed in Europe in support of the U.S. commitment to NATO. Additional forces stationed in the United States and elsewhere are available to support a NATO conflict and some of these forces have equipment prepositioned in Europe for such a contingency. The annual cost of the U.S. commitment to NATO amounts to about \$30 billion--more than one-third of the total U.S. defense outlay.

### U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE

The U.S. military presence in Europe as of June 30, 1975, involves about 696,000 people, over half of whom are civilians, foreign national employees, and dependents, as shown below.

<u>U.S. military presence in Europe</u>	<u>Numbers</u>
Military	309,756
Civilian	31,959
Dependents	271,286
Foreign nationals	82,998
Total	<u>695,999</u>

Since 1950 the number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Europe has ranged from 145,000 to 427,000, with the force remaining at about 300,000 since 1969. As shown below, the current military force of about 310,000 is broken down as follows:

Summary of U.S. Military  
Personnel in the U.S. European Command Area

<u>Organization</u>	<u>U.S. European Command (note a)</u>	<u>Non-U.S. European Command (note b)</u>	<u>Total</u>
Headquarters, U.S. European Command	869	-	869
Army	184,740	13,550	198,290
Navy	28,694	10,230	38,924
Air Force	47,587	19,650	67,237
Military assistance advisory groups	726	-	726
Allied headquarters	<u>-</u>	<u>3,710</u>	<u>3,710</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b><u>262,616</u></b>	<b><u>47,140</u></b>	<b><u>309,756</u></b>

a/The personnel in this category are assigned to the U.S. European Command and its component commands, U.S. Army, Europe; U.S. Air Forces in Europe; and U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, and other U.S. European Command agencies and activities.

b/The personnel in this category are assigned to (1) headquarters, (2) functions, such as intelligence and communications, under the direct control of organizations located in the United States, and (3) U.S. Attache Service and Marine Guards.

## CHAPTER 2

### RELATIONSHIP OF U.S. AND NATO

#### COMMAND STRUCTURES

The United States participates in two command structures in Europe--its own and NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE).

The U.S. and ACE command structures are similarly organized and have basically the same overall mission--to provide a combat-ready force to deter aggression from the Warsaw Pact nations. In addition to deterrence, ACE has the mission to plan for and employ the forces in combat; whereas, the U.S. mission is to provide combat forces to ACE and to support or arrange for the support of those forces should they be employed.

The United States also must provide or arrange for logistic support of its forces in peacetime. Peacetime support includes those functions that also must be provided in wartime, such as supply and maintenance and transportation, and functions, such as dependent support activities, that are unique to peacetime. The close relationship of the two commands is best illustrated by (1) several U.S. commanders being dual-hatted as ACE commanders, (2) ACE assuming operational command of U.S. combat forces at various stages of alert, and (3) ACE being heavily staffed with U.S. personnel in peacetime.

#### U.S. COMMAND STRUCTURE

The U.S. command in Europe consists of a unified command headquarters; Headquarters, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM); headquarters of the three service component commands, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), and U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (USNAVEUR); subordinate commands within the component commands; and other service headquarters outside the component command structure.

The U.S. forces stationed in Europe operate through two U.S. command chains--one for operational command and another for purposes other than operational direction (logistics and administrative support). Operational command is defined as those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.

The U.S. operational command chain for the U.S. forces in Europe runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command. It extends further from USEUCOM to the three European service component commands--USAREUR, USAFE, AND USNAVEUR.

For purposes other than operational direction, the U.S. command chain runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the military departments. The chain extends from the military services to the European service components. The commands in this chain are responsible for organizing, training, equipping, providing, administering, and supporting forces to fulfill combat functions under the direction of the operational command and for accomplishing peacetime support functions. The dual U.S. chain of command is shown on page 6.


Each service also has units in Europe which operate outside the dual chain of command described above. Most of these units are under the operational command of the respective component commander, but some are not. For example, the Army's 5th Signal Command and the Air Force's European Communications Area have parent commands in the United States but are under the operational command of the Army and Air Force component commanders. The same is true for theater airlift forces. On the other hand, many of the intelligence units respond to directions from the United States and are not under either the component or unified commands in Europe. The three European component command organizations are shown on pages 11 to 13.

#### Headquarters, U.S. European Command

Headquarters, USEUCOM, is a unified command operating under the direction of JCS. Headquarters, USEUCOM, in turn, exercises operational control over the three service component commands; it is located in Vaihingen, Germany, near Stuttgart. About [deleted] personnel are authorized for the peacetime operations of Headquarters, USEUCOM. This includes [deleted] authorized positions for the headquarters itself and [deleted] positions for direct support of headquarters activities.

USEUCOM's mission is to serve U.S. objectives by maintaining effective military forces in its area. To do this, USEUCOM is charged with planning, commanding, and supervising the support of U.S. forces and, if necessary, conducting

## U.S. MILITARY AND COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR EUROPE



\_\_\_\_\_ OTHER THAN OPERATION COMMAND (SEE PAGE 5 FOR DEFINITION)  
 - - - - - OPERATIONAL COMMAND (SEE PAGE 4 FOR DEFINITION)

operations to accomplish its primary objective--the support of ACE. USEUCOM is also responsible for supervising military assistance advisory groups and Defense missions to allied countries in its area of operations.

In the event of a NATO war, personnel occupying USEUCOM positions remain with the U.S. chain of command. Operational command of U.S. NATO-committed forces, however, passes from the United States to ACE. USEUCOM sees its wartime role as being primarily a monitor of resources, making decisions on their allocation when necessary. Also USEUCOM continues to maintain control over the use of nuclear devices and providing all source intelligence to ACE commands.

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From a practical standpoint, it appears that USEUCOM's role as a monitor of resources would be very limited. It could only make decisions on the allocation of U.S.-owned resources not committed to NATO either separately or as part of committed forces. Moreover, in a NATO war, decisions on the allocation of all resources, whether NATO committed or not, would have to be made by the NATO commander who is responsible for actually prosecuting the war.

The cost of Headquarters, USEUCOM, operations was about \$22,650,000 in fiscal year 1975. This included salaries of military and civilian personnel, as well as operations and maintenance costs. It excluded certain support costs, such as utilities, family housing, and communications.

#### U.S. Army command structure in Europe

The Army component command is USAREUR. Its commander, when operational control of U.S. forces is transferred to NATO, will direct the Central Army Group in ACE. The Army's command structure in Europe consists of USAREUR Headquarters, two corps headquarters, and 59 subordinate units through brigade level. Over 17,000 personnel are authorized to these headquarters. The headquarters subordinate to the corps are part of the normal peacetime as well as wartime structure of a corps.

With the exception of one unit in Italy and another in Belgium, the major Army headquarters in Europe are located in Germany. The Army's command structure, consisting of management, operation, and support headquarters, and the sizes of these headquarters are shown in appendix I.

The Army headquarters and staffing levels shown below are classified by DCD as management headquarters. The Army command structure in Europe is shown in the chart on page 11.

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Authorized personnel</u>
U.S. Army, Europe Southern European Task Force 5th Signal Command	deleted
Total	

Most Army personnel shift to ACE in a NATO war. The remaining personnel are then responsible for logistics support of U.S. Army troops assigned to NATO and for transportation of all U.S. forces in Europe because the Army has been designated the single manager for all U.S. ground transportation resources in central Europe. The Army also is responsible for providing logistics support to the Air Force and Navy shore activities for such items as food and petroleum products. In addition, USAREUR is responsible in peace and war for intelligence information peculiar to the Army.

The estimated fiscal year 1975 cost of Headquarters, USAREUR, operations was over \$25 million. This included salaries of military and civilian personnel, as well as operations and maintenance costs of the headquarters and support elements. It excluded certain support costs, such as utilities, family housing, and communications.

U.S. Air Force command structure in Europe

The USAFE commander is also the commander of Allied Air Forces Central Europe in ACE's chain of command. The Air Force command structure in Europe consists of Headquarters, USAFE; 3 numbered Air Forces; 16 USAFE Wings and groups; 1 separate tactical fighter squadron; a Military Airlift Command Wing; and Headquarters, European Communications Area. Of these 23 organizations, 10 are located in Germany, 6 in England, 1 in the Netherlands, 3 in Spain, 1 in Italy, 1 in Greece, and 1 in Turkey.

The Air Force headquarters and staffing levels shown below are classified as management headquarters. The Air

Force command structure in Europe is shown in the chart on page 12.

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Authorized personnel</u>
Headquarters, USAFE	1,591
3d Air Force	51
16th Air Force	47
17th Air Force	43
Headquarters, European Communications Area	<u>360</u>
Total	<u>2,092</u>

The Air Force like the Army will shift most of its personnel to ACE in a NATO war. Remaining Air Force personnel will manage the support of Air Force troops, as well as Air Force-related intelligence.

The fiscal year 1975 cost of Headquarters, USAFE, operations was about \$31.7 million. This cost included military and civilian personnel salaries, as well as operations and maintenance costs of the headquarters and support elements. It excluded certain support costs, such as utilities, family housing, and communications.

#### U.S. Navy command structure in Europe

USNAVEUR exercises command over the U.S. 6th Fleet, the Baltic Operations, and the Mid East Force. Its commander does not occupy a position in the NATO chain of command.

The U.S. Navy command structure in Europe consists of Headquarters, USNAVEUR, and four major subordinate organizations. These subordinate organizations are in two categories: land-based units with primarily a support mission and sea-based units with primarily a combat mission. Appendix II lists these Navy headquarters and their sizes.

The Navy headquarters and staffing levels shown below are classified as management headquarters. The U.S. Navy command structure in Europe is shown in the chart on page 13.

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Authorized personnel</u>
Headquarters, USNAVEUR	344
6th Fleet	<u>142</u>
Total	<u>486</u>

The Navy will shift the 6th Fleet Headquarters, along with all but one of its subordinate task force's, to ACE in a NATO war. Remaining naval units will stay under U.S. operational control for activities outside the NATO area.

The estimated fiscal year 1975 cost of Headquarters, USNAVEUR, operations was about \$2.7 million. This cost included military and civilian personnel salaries, as well as operations and maintenance costs of headquarters and support elements. It excluded certain support costs, such as utilities, family housing, and communications.

Peacetime versus wartime U.S. command structures

In peacetime, the U.S. command structure commands the assigned U.S. forces in Europe. The only exceptions are certain air defense forces and other forces specifically designated to respond to the operational command of ACE in emergencies. The U.S. command structure in peacetime is organized to conduct the full range of military operations-- from providing housing and support for military personnel and dependents to conducting combat operations.


As noted on page 7, however, at various stages of alert, operational command of U.S. NATO-committed combat forces passes from the United States to ACE. This change in operational command is known as "chop." Since support of combat forces is a national responsibility, U.S. support forces do not chop but remain under U.S. command. The forces which chop to ACE and those that remain under U.S. command are shown in the series of charts for each service on pages 11 to 13.

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
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**U.S. ARMY,  
PEACETIME COMM  
AND WARTH**




- OPERATIONAL AND OTHER THAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND
- - - OPERATIONAL COMMAND ONLY
-  UNDER PEACETIME AND WARTIME OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF NATO
-  FULLY AND PARTIALLY SHADED BLOCKS DENOTE THOSE UNITS WHICH "CHOP" IN WHOLE OR IN PART TO NATO IN WARTIME.

RE




**AIR FORCES, EUROPE  
PEACETIME COMMANDS  
AND WARTIME IMP**

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. AIR FORCE, EUROPE



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
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 ETIME AND WARTIME.

COMMITTED TO A NATO AIR DEFENSE ROLE IN PEACETIME. THE MOBILE  
 NATO IN WAR. THE REMAINDER (E.G. HEADQUARTER AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT)  
 S. AIR FORCE, EUROPE COMMAND.

7 "CHOP" TO NATO.

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**U.S. NAVAL FORCES, EUROPE  
PEACETIME COMMAND STRUCTURE  
AND WARTIME IMPACT**



———— OPERATIONAL AND OTHER THAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND

✓ 1 FOR SOME SHORE ACTIVITIES, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. NAVY, EUROPE HAS OPERATIONAL COMMAND OR RESPONSIBILITY FOR AREA COORDINATION ONLY. FOR THESE ACTIVITIES, COMMAND IS EXERCISED ELSEWHERE, MOSTLY IN THE UNITED STATES.

✓ INDICATES THOSE UNITS WHICH "CHOP" TO NATO IN WARTIME.

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The peacetime versus wartime staffing of the senior U.S. commands in Europe is shown below. The wartime staffing of Headquarters, USAFE, is under study and at the time of our review had not been determined.

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Peacetime staffing</u>	deleted			
USEUCOM (note a)		deleted			
USAREUR (note a)					
USAFE (note b)	1591	U/A	U/A	U/A	U/A
USNAVEUR (note a)	228	648	660	565	541

a/Staffing level includes headquarters element only; does not include support activities.

b/Staffing level includes support activities.

U/A - Unavailable.

NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE


ACE, one of the three senior NATO commands, includes 27 major commands with authorized staffing of 16,678. Most of the ACE commands are multinationally staffed, and U.S. personnel assigned to 22 of these comprise about deleted deleted of the staffing.

Appendix III lists the major ACE headquarters and their sizes. The ACE organizational structure is shown on page 15.

The U.S. staffing of ACE headquarters is greatest in areas where U.S. forces are stationed. In addition, most of these ACE commands are also commanded by U.S. personnel. The chart on page 16 illustrates this point.

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U.S. FORCES UNDER



— OPERATIONAL AND OTHER THAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND  
 - - - OPERATIONAL COMMAND




UNDER PEACETIME AND WARTIME COMMAND OF NATO



ONE SQUADRON FROM EACH OF THESE BINGS IS UNDER THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF NATO AS AIR DEFENSE FORCES IN PEACETIME AND WARTIME. THE REMAINING SQUADRONS COME UNDER NATO IN WARTIME.

NO STRUCTURE



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ACE Command Headquarters Heavily  
Staffed With U.S. Personnel

<u>Command</u>	<u>Positions (note a)</u>	<u>U.S. positions (note a)</u>	<u>Percent U.S.</u>
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (note b)	deleted		
Allied Forces Central Europe Central Army Group (note b)	deleted		
Allied Air Forces Central Europe (note b)	224	56	25
Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force	501	237	47
Allied Forces Southern Europe (note b)	deleted		
Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (note b)	264	124	47
Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (note b)	66	59	89
Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe (note b)	deleted		
Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force (note b)	495	103	21
Allied land forces, Southeastern Europe/Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force Joint Signal Support Group	deleted		

a/Includes support positions.

b/Has a U.S. commander.

The ACE chain of command

ACE is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, whose headquarters is known as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). The Supreme Allied Commander is dual-hatted as the Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command thereby having command over both the U.S. European and ACE command structures. The peacetime relationship between the two command structures is illustrated by several U.S. commanders being dual-hatted as ACE commanders, as shown on the following page.

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U.S. position

Commander in Chief,  
U.S. European Command  
Commander in Chief,  
U.S. Army, Europe  
Commander in Chief,  
U.S. Air Forces in Europe  
Commander, 17th Air Force  
  
Commander, 6th Fleet

ACE position

Supreme Allied Commander,  
Europe  
Commander, Central Army  
Group  
Commander, Allied Air Forces,  
Central Europe  
Commander, Allied Air Forces,  
Southern Europe  
Commander, Naval Striking and  
Support Forces, Southern  
Europe

Commanders of major subordinate U.S. commands also have an ACE command role.

The U.S. and NATO command structures in Europe are large and involve many interrelationships. The remainder of this report discusses prior efforts made to reduce and streamline the U.S. command structure in Europe and the need to reexamine this structure.

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## CHAPTER 3

### PRIOR EFFORTS TO REDUCE AND STREAMLINE

#### THE U.S. COMMAND STRUCTURE

Over the years, the U.S. command structure has been studied and debated, both in the Congress and the executive branch, and efforts have been made to identify, classify, reorganize, and streamline headquarters activities throughout the Department of Defense (DOD). The objective was to make more efficient use of resources by reducing the number, size, layering, and duplication of headquarters and by updating and streamlining command relationships. Major benefits were to be improvements in the combat-to-support ratio and in the management of resources.

Reorganizations and consolidations of headquarters and headquarters functions have been carried out. In this chapter we discuss some of the earlier efforts and personnel cuts, several of which were initiated by the European commands themselves. These commands themselves share the credit for the actions taken to date.

#### STREAMLINING THE UNIFIED COMMANDS

Unified commands, because of their peculiar role as operational commands without full control over missions and the resources to accomplish them, have been a source of controversy. Their roles, sizes, and capabilities have been questioned periodically. Their primary purpose is to provide unity in carrying out assigned missions and is accomplished by exercising operational command over assigned service forces. The questions raised and actions taken in the major studies of the unified and component commands are discussed below.

#### DOD headquarters review

In October 1973, the Secretary of Defense directed that a study be made to determine the impact of 10-, 20-, and 30-percent reductions in headquarters strengths. The Secretary of Defense emphasized that the goal should not be a percentage reduction across the board. Rather, the study should search for the commands, departments, and other organizational elements that contribute only marginally to the ability to command forces and accomplish management tasks. DOD proposals concerning Europe were summarized as follows:

- Realign boundaries of U.S. interests to coincide with NATO boundaries and remove forces not committed to NATO.
- Assign area forces to the U.S. Readiness Command in the United States.
- Make the U.S. contingent to ACE a unified command and eliminate USEUCOM.
- Consolidate remaining U.S. personnel, to the extent possible, with the ACE staff.

A USEUCOM Headquarters study made between March and May 1974 did not support the merging of headquarters as proposed by DOD. The study concluded that the status quo of Headquarters, USEUCOM, should be retained and suggested instead unilateral reductions within the USEUCOM and component headquarters. USEUCOM also held that consolidations would be restricted both by legislation, such as the National Security Act of 1947, and by regulations and directives concerning the unified command plan.

In June 1974 Headquarters, USEUCOM, proposed to JCS a personnel reduction of 17 percent, from the basic strength of 840 to 694. A USEUCOM Headquarters study begun in May 1973 and expanded to include the October 1973 DOD requirements determined that the impact from such a reduction would be limited and could be absorbed without impairing its capability to carry out assigned missions and functions. JCS approved this plan in September 1974. At the same time, DOD directed a 25-percent reduction in Headquarters, USEUCOM, as a part of the unified command plan.

#### Unified command plan review

In September 1974, the Secretary of Defense directed JCS to improve organizational effectiveness of unified commands throughout the world. In Europe, Headquarters, USEUCOM, would be retained but was to be reduced substantially--at least 25 percent by the end of fiscal year 1975--and impact statements and plans were to be prepared for reductions of 50 and 75 percent. Moreover,

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or USAFE, was to be considered, for reductions and savings in support units. The reduced headquarters was to rely to the extent possible upon the staffs and support elements of NATO and component command headquarters.

In December 1974 USEUCOM Headquarters recommended against a 50- or 75-percent reduction because (1) a 50-percent reduction would seriously degrade mission performance and (2) a 75-percent reduction would make mission accomplishment impossible. It also pointed out that the component commands would be required to expand to assume functions lost by Headquarters, USEUCOM. To meet the 25-percent reduction requirement, Headquarters, USEUCOM, expanded its voluntary reduction of 17 percent to include the additional 8-percent reduction.

In June 1976 Headquarters, USEUCOM, reported to JCS that the 25-percent-reduced manning level was insufficient to permit it to effectively carry out its functions, execute crisis management, and simultaneously prepare for the future. It recommended two alternatives: (1) reduce the functions of the headquarters or (2) immediately increase the manpower authorizations by 75 which would be a 16-percent decrease from the 840 base strength and would be compatible with the 17-percent reduction recommended in September 1974. In addition, USEUCOM identified 41 additional spaces which would be required in the near future to expand current functions and to support new functions for the data services center. As of November 1976 no decisions had been made on the USEUCOM recommendations.

Officials stated that if the headquarters is to fill its intended position, the first alternative is not feasible.

- No major functions could be transferred or deleted from the headquarters since all current functions were considered necessary for a unified command.
- The transfer of any functions to component headquarters would only aggravate arrangements since those commands have also undergone personnel reductions.
- To delete or transfer any major functions to agencies outside Headquarters, USEUCOM, would dilute the influence of the unified command below acceptable or desirable standards.

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The alternatives discussed in chapter 5 should be considered in conjunction with this relocation.

#### STREAMLINING THE ARMY COMMAND STRUCTURE IN EUROPE

The Army has reorganized its command structure in Europe many times. Though separate and addressing different aspects, these reorganizations were related in that each attempted to increase the combat-to-support ratio and streamline headquarters activities. Some of the more recent efforts are described below.

#### The FENDER Study

The FENDER Study was a 1971 USAREUR study whose objective was to provide maximum combat potential and adequate support within the limited manpower resources available.

Within the existing structure, USAREUR added two tank battalions, two attack helicopter companies, one Chaparral/Vulcan air defense battalion, one airborne battalion combat team, and two military police battalions. Spaces were made for these additions by eliminating three major headquarters and seven battalion headquarters and by consolidating maintenance and medical units with an accompanying realignment of responsibilities.

#### USAREUR headquarters reductions

In February 1973, the Commander in Chief, USAREUR, announced that the time had come for further reductions of the headquarters staffs in his command. He directed that a study be made, concentrating primarily upon Headquarters, USAREUR, and those of the two corps and U.S. Theater Army Support Command, Europe. Subordinate headquarters were to be queried as to the impact of directed reductions of 5, 10, and 15 percent. A merger of the Headquarters, USAREUR Office of the Engineer with the U.S. Army Engineer Command, Europe, was also to be considered.

Headquarters, USAREUR, and its support elements were reduced 122 spaces, about 5.5 percent, as a result of this study. The subordinate commands indicated there would be little impact in a reduction of 5 percent but a 10-percent reduction would interfere with mission performance in varying degrees. As a result, the Commander in Chief, approved recommendations to (1) effect a standard reduction of 7.5 percent in all subordinate headquarters except that of U.S. Army Southern European Task Force and (2) apply this reduction equally to officers, enlisted personnel, and U.S. and local national civilians. The reduction amounted to 507 spaces from the deleted authorized for the affected headquarters.

#### Project CHASE

During 1972-74 USAREUR and DOD initiated a number of studies directed at streamlining the command structure and improving the combat-to-support ratio. In February 1974 the Commander in Chief USAREUR approved a concept for Project CHASE (Consolidation of Headquarters and Area Support Elements). Project CHASE incorporated much from previous studies and resulted in a plan to decentralize control and operation of base or installation support functions to the commanders of the V and VII Corps and the commander of a reconfigured 1st Support Brigade. Base support was defined as those functions which provide services beyond those needed in combat or in support of the combat mission. Corps were given responsibility and resources in their areas, and the 1st Support Brigade assumed this function in the area west of the Rhine River and in North Germany.

At the local level, USAREUR organized the 747 Federal Republic of Germany barracks and installations grouped around 32 main German cities and called them military communities. Support operations for these communities were placed under command of a community commander. Where applicable, the commander retained his tactical mission responsibilities but also controlled and directed the peacetime base support as well.

In March 1974 the Commander in Chief, USAREUR, approved the concept to merge Headquarters, Theater Army Support Command, Europe, functions into Headquarters, USAREUR; abolish Headquarters, Army Engineer Command, Europe; and increase the operational role of Headquarters, USAREUR.

The two corps and the 1st Support Brigade staffs were enlarged to accept the new responsibilities. In addition, the U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, was to provide contract construction for the theater.

When Project CHASE was completed in fiscal year 1975, about 723 support spaces were available for combat units. In addition, the Theater Army Support Command support districts and community-level support activities were discontinued, as were the counterpart engineer districts and facilities engineer offices of the Army Engineer Command. The spaces made available by these discontinuances were reallocated to the three region commanders (the two corps and the 1st Support Brigade) to provide the necessary manpower resources for base support functions. Headquarters staff augmentations included 393 spaces for V Corps, 657 for VII Corps, and 288 for the 1st Support Brigade. Spaces for the 32 community staffs included [redacted] deleted for the 8 communities under V Corps, [redacted] deleted for the 16 communities under VII Corps, and [redacted] deleted for the 8 communities under the 1st Support Brigade.

#### The Nunn amendment reduction

An amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975, introduced by Senator Sam Nunn required major reductions in the noncombat strength of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Europe. Specifically, the amendment required that:

"\* \* \* the noncombat component of the total United States Military Strength in Europe authorized as of June 30, 1974, shall be reduced by 18,000. Such reduction shall be completed not later than June 30, 1976, and not less than 6,000 of such reductions shall be completed on or before June 30, 1975; however, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to increase the combat component strength of United States Forces in Europe by the amount of any such reduction made in noncombat personnel."

The Army reported support reductions of 6,550 in fiscal year 1975 and 6,953 in fiscal year 1976. The 13,503 total included 1,328 reductions to offset additional support personnel deployed with two mechanized brigades--a part of the combat increases generated by support reductions.

The Nunn amendment prompted intensive force structure planning, which encompassed prior reorganization studies and actions such as Project CHASE. Credit was given for 2,780 positions reduced from previous reorganizations. Another 1,970 positions were eliminated by converting three engineer construction battalions to combat engineer units. Medical, supply, and maintenance units were prime sources for other reductions. About 2,747 civilians were hired to offset about 25 percent of the military reductions.

The combat increases consisted primarily of the addition of two mechanized brigades [deleted] three combat engineer battalions [deleted] two field artillery battalions [deleted] one attack helicopter company [deleted] and increases in the authorized level of organization of existing combat units [deleted]

#### Modernization of logistics-1977

Modernization of logistics-1977 (MODLOG-77) is a plan to further streamline the logistical structure of USAREUR. It will build on and expedite many previous projects; including realignment and closure of theater depots, increased reliance on direct support from the United States, and increased host nation and contractual support. The emphasis is more on modernizing the logistical support structure than on reducing manpower positions. Although some manpower reductions are expected, the number will depend on the success of such efforts as increased host-nation and contractual support. Any of these savings in manpower will be used for other USAREUR needs, primarily in such support areas as the community organizations. USAREUR expects these transfers to reduce manpower diversions from combat units to the community organizations. The MODLOG-77 effort was still in process as of January 1977.

#### Staff 77

Staff 77 is a study of the organizational structure and functions of Headquarters, USAREUR. Its objective is to decentralize to subordinate commands the operational functions currently centralized at Headquarters. The Commander in Chief, USAREUR, position is that the Headquarters, USAREUR, should be concentrating on the major essential functions of policy, planning, resource management, command and control of assigned units, and readiness and that subordinate units

should perform operational functions. He wants the Headquarters, USAREUR, organized primarily around its wartime mission and secondarily the direction and management of peacetime readiness, to consolidate or eliminate duplicate functions and to reduce levels of review and supervision between action officers and decisionmakers.

The Staff 77 project officer told us that the goal is a 30-percent reduction in Headquarters, USAREUR. The manpower spaces would be transferred with the functions or would be reallocated. He also told us that another benefit of the reduction in the headquarters staff would be the generation of spaces for the planned collocation of the headquarters of the ACE Central Army Group and 4th Allied Tactical Air Force with Headquarters, USAREUR.

STREAMLINING THE AIR FORCE  
COMMAND STRUCTURE IN EUROPE

USAFE has had an ongoing program to reduce headquarters and support elements since 1962. Since then, much of the USAFE support structure has been eliminated. For example, it has eliminated its depots and intermediate supply support structure over the past decade. In 1971, USAFE initiated studies which called for restructuring headquarters and support elements to maximize efficiency and economy and optimize the wartime role. The objective was to greatly reduce peacetime overhead costs within given budget constraints without impairing combat capability, while at the same time more closely integrating USAFE combat forces into the NATO wartime structure.

In fiscal year 1972, USAFE reorganized and reduced the staffs of the three numbered air forces, and the day-to-day management and control of forces were transferred to Headquarters, USAFE. The numbered air forces were designated as field representatives of USAFE to (1) extend USAFE's span of control, (2) evaluate the competency of subordinate commanders, and (3) provide assistance in solving problems. In addition, numbered air force commanders were given single point-of-contact responsibilities with host governments outside the Federal Republic of Germany and with USNAVEUR and USAREUR corps. For the 3d and 16th Air Forces, this responsibility included unique support responsibilities which must be performed in the host countries.

The numbered air forces' staffing was reduced by 444, as shown below. Of this 444, 186 spaces were used to augment

Headquarters, USAFE, and 23 for host base augmentation, leaving a net saving of 235 spaces.

Fiscal Year 1972 Restructuring  
of USAFE Numbered Air Forces

	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>	<u>Reduction</u>
3d Air Force	229	67	162
16th Air Force	186	62	124
17th Air Force	201	43	<u>158</u>
Total			<u>444</u>

In response to the Secretary of Defense's October 1973 direction to determine the impact of 10-, 20-, and 30-percent reductions in headquarters activities, USAFE unilaterally reduced its headquarters and those of the three numbered air forces by 20 percent, or about 490 of the 2,429 spaces authorized for these headquarters. An additional reduction of 154 spaces resulted from program adjustments, such as transferring theater airlift responsibility and manpower spaces to the Military Airlift Command. In fiscal year 1976, USAFE headquarters was reduced another 92 spaces to respond to an Air Force-directed reduction of about 5 percent.

Of the 18,000 support spaces required to be reduced under the Nunn amendment, the DOD applied 4,391 to USAFE. The combat additions consisted primarily of increased tactical fighter crew ratios, additional aircraft squadrons deployed to Europe, and radar units deployed to Northern Germany in the Second Allied Tactical Air Force Area.

STREAMLINING THE NAVY COMMAND  
STRUCTURE IN EUROPE

Since 1973 USNAVEUR has reduced its command structure as follows: Headquarters, by 24 percent; the Fleet Operations Control Center, Europe, a support activity, by 20 percent; and the 6th Fleet, by 10 percent. Most of these reductions were credited toward the Nunn amendment requirements. In addition to these headquarters reductions, USNAVEUR has reduced its support structure over 1,600 spaces to meet the requirements of the Nunn amendment. These reductions eliminated a repair ship and consolidated and eliminated certain shore activities, primarily communications and intelligence. The combat increases consisted of increased manning of the combat ships.

## CHAPTER 4

### POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS

#### IN THE U.S. COMMAND STRUCTURE

Can a NATO command structure which has virtually no control and only minimal oversight in peacetime assume credible authority in war? We doubt it. Unless common or at least compatible logistics, tactics, doctrine, and the like are fully planned, developed, and exercised in peacetime, NATO forces cannot be expected to fight cohesively in wartime. Member nations must start thinking in terms of cooperation and partnership rather than national interests.

Optimally, from a purely military viewpoint, the member nations' and NATO commands in Europe should be organized and aligned so that no functions are duplicated between the various organizations in matters affecting NATO military interests. Carried to the extreme, this could include NATO control of the NATO-committed forces of member nations and their logistics support in peacetime as well as wartime.

Such an extreme arrangement, however, is neither possible nor desirable at this time. Member nations are not likely to be willing to relinquish direct control over their armed forces and establishing their stockage and transportation objectives. Consequently, a compromise structure is necessary that will enable the NATO nations to (1) maintain operational control over their forces in peacetime, (2) manage the logistics support of those forces in both peacetime and wartime, and (3) maintain closely aligned command structures that will facilitate the transition from peacetime to wartime activities.

We believe the NATO and member nation command structures should be integrated at least to the extent that the NATO command is fully knowledgeable, in peacetime, of important military activities of member nations, such as the arrangements for logistics support--arrangements that could affect NATO wartime activities. Presently, integration between NATO and member nation commands is limited to certain senior commanders who are dual-hatted, i.e., with a command position in each structure.

We believe this concept could extend to lower level individuals in member nation commands. Such individuals could then be responsive to both national and NATO direction

and needs. Collectively, they could function as an entity when addressing problems that affect NATO operations; and they could act individually when addressing problems affecting purely national matters. The likelihood of policy decisions and planning being based on a clear understanding of each nation's military capabilities and shortcomings, rather than evolving in the semivacuum that now exists, would be improved.

The U.S. commands need to be reexamined with these objectives in mind. The United States still maintains a command structure which basically parallels the ACE command structure. The Supreme Allied Commander in late 1976 emphasized the need for concerted multinational efforts in such areas as equipment commonality; force interoperability; integration of command, control, and communications; and mutual logistical support as military imperatives in Europe. For these reasons, the United States should determine how its command functions can best be integrated with those of ACE.

Progress has been made in certain areas. For example, operational exercises are becoming more multilateral, as evidenced by the recent Autumn Forge series in which other countries participated. Such exercises in the past have been unilateral--the United States participating alone--even when NATO scenarios were used.

The European commands' increased emphasis on multinational efforts is a move toward strengthening NATO. These efforts not only demonstrate the solidarity and commitment of the member nations but also reveal operational and interoperability problems that need to be addressed to increase overall Allied military effectiveness.

The remainder of this chapter discusses unilateral war and crisis management activities; problems with changing from a peacetime to a wartime posture; and the need for a functional analysis of the U.S. command structure--areas of potential for realigning or reducing the structure and for making it more responsive to its prime purpose for being in Europe.

#### UNILATERAL WAR AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

The major U.S. headquarters in Europe devote some time and effort to unilateral war and contingency planning as

well as crisis management activities outside the NATO environment. These actions may detract from the primary mission of U.S. forces in Europe--support of a NATO war.

#### Unilateral war planning

The Department of Defense has stated that the U.S. military presence in Europe is tied to the NATO commitment and that the most likely military conflict to occur in Europe will be a NATO war. This is emphasized by policy guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense in 1974. The Secretary stated that U.S. headquarters in Europe should not be designed to fight a unilateral war in Europe but should retain a capability for directing U.S. operations in small contingencies and for other U.S. national activities, such as reconnaissance, nuclear matters, disaster relief, and evacuation of U.S. personnel. Therefore, the primary U.S. commitment is to centralized NATO direction of a war in Europe.

U.S. plans, however, contain provisions for the United States to assume centralized direction of U.S. and allied forces should NATO fail to function in wartime. Although the United States might have to temporarily exercise such direction until the NATO members approve military action, that NATO might fail to function at all in wartime appears unlikely. Also, geographic location alone would seem to preclude a U.S. unilateral war in Europe.

The major commands in Europe stated that minimal time and effort are devoted to U.S. unilateral activities--although USAFE estimated that perhaps 25 percent of its planning effort was in this area. Although we recognize the need for U.S. unilateral control over such matters as nuclear weapons and evacuation of U.S. personnel, these other areas of unilateral activity should be examined closely. We question whether any effort should be devoted to a U.S.-directed war in Europe. As pointed out by the Commander in Chief, USAREUR, the United States simply could not fight a land war in Europe without host nation and NATO cooperation and support.

#### Crisis management

Much of the crisis management activity over the past several years has involved contingencies outside NATO--mostly in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Crisis management involves the activation of a "battle staff" to keep abreast of crisis activities and be prepared to take action

when appropriate. Recent U.S. crisis management activities included the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the Cyprus and Lebanon conflicts.

A March 1975 Rand Corporation study concluded that the most sensible way to rationalize the U.S. headquarters structure in Europe and make the most efficient use of existing resources would be to shift most unilateral non-NATO missions, especially those outside the NATO geographical area, to military headquarters in the United States. This would free the U.S. command in Europe to concentrate more fully on its primary mission--support of a NATO war.

The European commands disagree with transferring non-NATO missions to other military organizations in the United States. This subject was discussed during the unified command plan review of 1974, and the decision was for USEUCOM to retain Middle East and other responsibilities outside NATO but in the USEUCOM geographical territory. The rationale behind this decision was that (1) USEUCOM forces would probably be used in any Middle East contingency and (2) any such contingency would likely affect Europe.

Because of (1) the demand on resources to improve both the efficiency of operations and the ratio of combat to support forces and (2) the need to free the U.S. command of as many non-NATO matters as possible, current crisis management and unilateral responsibilities should be studied closely with particular emphasis on alternatives for meeting the need.

One alternative for handling crisis management activities would be to activate and maintain in the United States a small cadre of experts from the United States and European commands to handle individual crises as they arise.

#### PROBLEMS WITH CHANGING FROM A PEACETIME TO A WARTIME POSTURE

The more the U.S. and ACE commands are integrated, the fewer the problems both structures will have in changing from peacetime to wartime operations. A complex command relationship between the United States and ACE is not desirable, nor is it consistent with DOD guidance which states that U.S. and NATO European headquarters should be consolidated as much as possible.

In peacetime, the U.S. structure commands the U.S. forces in Europe, for both operational and support purposes. The

U.S. structure is organized to conduct the full range of military responsibilities, including combat operations. With operational command of U.S. combat forces passing to ACE in a NATO war, the U.S. command structure evolves into a logistics and administrative support organization, including a personnel replacement system responsible for these combat forces.

This evolution will have a major impact on the peacetime U.S. and ACE command structures. USEUCOM will lose operational control over U.S. NATO-committed forces, and ACE will gain this control. USEUCOM and the component commands will retain control over logistical and administrative activities. USEUCOM and component command relationships will remain the same but without combat forces and operational control. Some of the functions, such as transportation, although remaining under U.S. control will in effect be directed by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. One important potential problem is the bilateral support agreements that member nations have negotiated between themselves for such matters as transportation, rear area security, and communications.

NATO commands should be aware of potential logistics problems that could arise in wartime. Some countries may have overextended themselves in agreeing to support other countries in wartime. Without knowledge of this problem, the NATO commands could be planning wartime operations based on inadequate logistics support. One way to alleviate this potential problem is to integrate the member nations and NATO command structures more in peacetime, as NATO will be very dependent on wartime host-nation support obtained through bilateral agreements. More integration in peacetime could lead to a more effective interchange of information and plans among the member nations. Ultimately, it might be feasible for NATO to negotiate such agreements on a multilateral basis rather than have each nation negotiate its own support.

Potential problems also exist in changing from a peacetime to a wartime posture within the U.S. component commands. For example, the Army corps have assumed many peacetime management responsibilities in addition to their combat roles. At a time of emergency, the corps will have to react quickly to fulfill their ACE responsibilities for deploying to the battle areas and engaging the enemy. At the same time they will be wrestling with their responsibilities for such matters as dependent evacuation and disengaging from management of community functions and facilities.

Headquarters, USEUCOM, stated that problems with the corps' transition to wartime mobilization will be minimal

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because (1) at the initiation of hostilities, the corps tactical staff breaks away, and the staff devoted to base support remains in place, and (2) command of these base support staffs passes to the 21st Support Command to supervise the noncombatant evacuation operations and community closeouts. USAREUR stated that the corps support commands will also have a role in dependent evacuation.

Because of the support commands' wartime mission of supporting tactical units and because of a wartime change in command from the corps to the 21st Support Command, we believe that potential problems do exist in changing from a peacetime to a wartime posture.

In our opinion, the U.S. command structure could be improved if it were organized more toward its wartime role. The transition from a peacetime to a wartime organizational structure will take time and effort away from the more important task of fighting a war. The more the structure is oriented toward a wartime posture, the fewer the problems it will encounter.

#### NEED FOR A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. COMMAND STRUCTURE

As discussed in chapter 3, DOD has made considerable progress in reducing headquarters staffing levels in Europe. Most reductions have been across the board, on a horizontal basis--requiring individual headquarters to cut personnel strengths by a certain percentage. Usually the personnel reductions have not been accompanied by corresponding reductions in missions, functions, or workload. There is a definite limit to how far DOD can go with this approach without impairing military effectiveness. Furthermore, the horizontal approach does not adequately address the basic question of the need for the missions and functions themselves.

Such support functions as transportation, supply and maintenance, and intelligence are vitally important in peace and war in maintaining and sustaining combat forces. Thus the need for ACE to have some control over these functions in wartime is important. These functions, however, are the responsibility of each individual nation both in peacetime and wartime. The current U.S. command structure in Europe is multilayered, with each layer responsible for performing or monitoring the performance of these functions in some way. The question that should be asked and examined is: How much overview, control, and monitoring of these

functions is necessary and who should be responsible for their efficiency and effectiveness?

ACE, as the wartime operational command, has a requirement to establish policies and monitor capabilities that will affect its ability to conduct the war. It seems appropriate that U.S. command roles should be reassessed in terms of ACE roles. In addition, realigning the U.S. structure to the single manager concept would not only eliminate layering but would facilitate interrelating with ACE.

We believe that a functional analysis of the command structure on a vertical basis might not only offer potential for additional reductions but also assure that missions and functions are optimally located in the military chain of command. Appendix IV illustrates the degree of functional overlapping in key areas within the U.S. command structure and between the U.S. and NATO commands.

The basic premise of the functional approach is that it should not be necessary for each headquarters to have the capability to monitor every aspect of each subordinate headquarters. Responsibility for and resources to perform a function should be placed in the most optimal location considering the U.S. wartime mission, as well as the ACE commands' roles and functions. Each succeeding level in the command chain, if involved in the function at all, should be involved on a monitoring or exception basis only. This approach may reduce workload and staff at some levels and increase them at other levels with some overall economies of scale.

The following examples illustrate the potential for a functional analysis of the command structure.

#### Transportation

Transportation is an important function requiring close management attention. However, it could be handled under a single-manager concept, with appropriate delegations of authority and responsibility.

In Europe, USEUCOM Headquarters is assigned overall U.S. authority and responsibility for transportation. It has delegated these responsibilities on a geographical basis under a dominant-user concept. In most cases, delegations have been made through several layers; that is, from USEUCOM to USAREUR to the 4th Transportation Brigade for surface transportation in central Europe; and from

USEUCOM to USAFE to the 435th Tactical Airlift Wing's Military Airlift Center, Europe, for airlift. In addition, Headquarters, USEUCOM, has delegated certain transportation responsibilities to its Joint Transportation Management Agency and Joint Transportation Board.

USAREUR directs and monitors the military surface transport system operated in central Europe by its subordinate command, the 4th Transportation Brigade. The brigade provides or arranges transportation through bilateral agreements when transportation requirements cannot be satisfied by individual units from their own resources.

In wartime, the 4th Transportation Brigade activates the Movement Control Agency from elements of its staff and passes USAREUR movement control functions and organizations to that agency. The Movement Control Agency will have deleted deleted movement regions. These movement regions and their subordinate movement offices will collocate with host-nation military movement agencies to monitor the U.S. transportation system, receive and process U.S. movement requests, arrange for transportation services--either by host-nation or U.S. modes--and coordinate movement control and traffic management matters with host-nation authorities.

U.S. forces will coordinate with the movement control centers through corps and lower level movement control organizations. A basic concept in wartime is that services will be provided and controlled at the lowest possible levels and that only unsatisfied requirements or unresolved problems will be passed up the chain. A hierarchy of movement coordination organizations in NATO is supposed to allow resource allocation questions to be passed on, if necessary, to the highest NATO levels.

In wartime, in-theater airlift requirements, both NATO and national, will be managed under a single priority system. USEUCOM may adjust intratheater airlift requirement priorities in coordination with ACE to insure that the most important tasks are satisfied first. As in peacetime, the USAFE staff will coordinate and consolidate requirements and the Military Airlift Center, Europe, will program and perform movements. The Airlift Center, an element of the 435th Tactical Airlift Wing, is under the operational control of USAFE. In wartime, USAFE will manage in-theater airlift in close coordination with allied civil and military elements.

The following chart summarizes the staffing of USEUCOM and the primary Army and Air Force headquarters involved in transportation.

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Authorized staffing (note a)</u>
USEUCOM	10
Joint Transportation Board	<u>b/8</u>
Joint Transportation Board Secretariat	<u>b/10</u>
Joint Transportation Management Agency	deleted
USAREUR	
4th Transportation Brigade	
V Corps	
VII Corps	
USAFE	61
Military Airlift Center, Europe	<u>45</u>
Total	deleted

a/Based on 1975 and 1976 staffing documents.

b/These organizations are composed of staff members of other units who meet periodically on transportation matters. Personnel are included in the staffing of the parent organizations and not in the total shown in the chart.

c/ deleted Joint Transportation Management Agency positions are carried on the 4th Transportation Brigade manning document. The brigade staffing shown in the chart excludes these personnel.

ACE commands also have important transportation responsibilities. In peacetime, they participate in the planning for wartime transportation support. In wartime, they monitor transportation capability and are involved in the allocation of transportation resources.

The United States is very dependent on host-nation transportation support in both peace and war. In fact, almost

deleted

of war will be accomplished by the host nation. The host nation transportation support will be coordinated by U.S. movement control agencies and will be controlled and allocated by NATO transportation agencies such as the authority for the Coordination of Inland Transport in Central Europe. In peacetime, host nation transportation support is handled through bilateral arrangements and coordinated by the responsible U.S. transportation elements.

Because the United States is so dependent on host nation transportation support, especially on the ground and because host nation support will be coordinated in wartime by the U.S. component commands with the allied commands as arbitrators, as required, the need for a multilayered U.S. headquarters structure is questionable. Although delegations have been made within the U.S. command, considerable staffing remains throughout the structure. A functional analysis up and down the U.S. structure, considering the responsibilities of ACE, could lead to more integration with ACE and streamline U.S. management and could provide assurance that the resources to perform this critical function are where they should be.

#### Supply and maintenance

Both USEUCOM and ACE prepare supply and maintenance policy guidance for their subordinate commands. Based on data furnished to them, both monitor the quality and quantity of materiel and equipment used by subordinate forces under their control. These functions are also national service (Army, Air Force, Navy) responsibilities outside the operational chain of command.

Supply and maintenance are essential logistics functions inherent to sustained combat. In peace and war the services are the source for supply and maintenance support. They control these two functions from policy formulation through the distribution of supplies and installation of equipment. The component commands in Europe are the service in-theater managers. They implement service policies and provide staff supervision over the acquisition, storage, and distribution of materiel and the maintenance of equipment.

The Air Force and Navy do not have large logistics organizations in Europe. Air Force logistics support is

concentrated at base level with practically no intermediate supply and maintenance organizations and is dependent on the Army for many support functions. The Navy has a mobile logistics support force--a group of supply ships--which services the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, but has no other significant intermediate supply and maintenance organizations. The Army, on the other hand, has a large supply and maintenance organization in Europe with several command layers and levels of management. In recent years, however, this has been reduced in some areas to the point that U.S. forces are very dependent on host nations for support.

Under the existing USAREUR organizational alignment, the two tactical corps and the 21st Support Command are responsible for logistics support in their areas. As such, these commands are the focal point between USAREUR and the divisions and other units for supply and maintenance. Each division provides for its own direct support. The two corps and the 21st Support Command develop policies and procedures for supply and maintenance within their commands based on general policy guidance from USAREUR and the Department of the Army.

Ultimately, the support operators--corps and division support commands--develop daily operational policies for supply and maintenance systems within their areas. These support commands manage the day-to-day operations of the supply and maintenance system. They set performance standards and periodically evaluate their subordinate elements' performance to assure that established criteria are being adhered to. The support command staffs service unit requests and respond to complaints as they arise.

Superimposed on the component commands' structure in Europe is Headquarters, USEUCOM, which must maintain cognizance of U.S. assets to insure effective operations in the acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, and disposition of materiel. The thrust of USEUCOM management is "by exception." Through JCS, USEUCOM can emphasize component-identified problems.

The NATO commands also maintain cognizance of member nations' assets and capabilities through periodic reports provided by the various national commands. ACE also prescribes certain standards, such as number of days of supply on hand, on which the national commands provide periodic status reports.

With many of the supply and maintenance functions being managed at lower levels and with ACE monitoring the status of these functions for operational considerations, the need for involvement of the many levels of command becomes questionable.

While supply and maintenance remain a national responsibility in wartime, ACE as the operational commander will have to become more involved in setting priorities and allocating resources. More integration of the management of supply and maintenance in peacetime between the U.S. and ACE command structures should provide more assurance that resources are available and properly used in wartime. More integration should also lead to more streamlined management within the U.S. command structure.

#### Intelligence

The military intelligence system in Europe generally follows three routes: (1) the operational chain of command from the components up through Headquarters, USEUCOM, to the Defense Intelligence Agency and JCS, (2) the service chain of command from the component and other service intelligence units to the service departments, and

deleted

Intelligence collection and analysis resources are assigned to and operated by the component commands who direct the collection and production of intelligence to satisfy specific service requirements. The unified command exercises overall management of these efforts to minimize redundancy, satisfy theater requirements, and respond to national needs. Intelligence produced in the theater is exchanged freely between the component commands and the unified command, in accordance with interests and statements of intelligence need. Major emphasis is on the production of timely threat information to support the indications and warning function. As part of the global indications system, the unified command and the three components operate indications and warning centers. The

component indications and warning centers concentrate on those aspects of the enemy threat affecting their commands, and the unified command indications and warning center focuses on situations throughout the theater that may require implementation of unified command plans and serves as the theater point of contact for the National Military Command Center and JCS.

From a national perspective, all U.S. intelligence is funneled directly into the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department, as well as U.S.-based consumers. These organizations distribute information worldwide to other organizations having a requirement for it. Theater consumers also receive information directly from field collection activities of these organizations. In-theater intelligence organizations also generate intelligence to support the tactical commander in his mission.

Sanitized intelligence is routinely distributed to various NATO commands by U.S.-based agencies as well as Headquarters, USEUCOM, and the component commands. The volume of information provided to NATO has increased appreciably as working relationships have evolved. In peacetime, ACE has no intelligence collection capability and has to depend on intelligence support by the member nations. In wartime, ACE gains some collection capability but still is primarily a consumer of data provided from national sources. As such, there appears to be little potential for integrating the intelligence function with ACE without a buildup of ACE's intelligence function.

The following chart showing the authorized staffing of some of these organizations illustrates the size of the U.S. military intelligence system in Europe.

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Staffing</u> <u>(note a)</u>
Headquarters, USEUCOM	deleted
USEUCOM Defense Analysis Center	
Headquarters, USAREUR	
66th Military Intelligence Group	
Headquarters, V Corps	
Headquarters, 3d Armored Division	
Headquarters, USAFE	
49th Reconnaissance Technical Group	256
7113th Special Activities Squadron	157
7450th Tactical Intelligence Squadron	104
17th Air Force	1
36th Tactical Fighter Wing	20
Headquarters, USNAVEUR	45
Headquarters, 6th Fleet	5
Ocean Surveillance Information Facility	17

a/Based on 1975-76 staffing documents.

USEUCOM recognizes the duplication and overlap in the intelligence functions in Europe. The Director of Intelligence at USEUCOM informed us that a study is underway with the basic objective of formulating a master plan of intelligence. He said that this study will include not only the identification of equipment needs but also the analysis of missions, functions, and staffing of the intelligence function throughout USEUCOM--in essence, a functional analysis on a vertical basis. This analysis will include placing the functions at the appropriate level in the command structure, as well as staffing the functions as needed. We believe this analysis is a step in the right direction and should produce fruitful results.

Other functional areas

Similar to the transportation, supply and maintenance, and intelligence functions described above, a vertical analysis of other functional areas may yield streamlining within the command structure. The following chart shows the authorized staffing level of certain functional areas at different command levels.

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Function</u>		
	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Plans and operations</u>	<u>Logistics (note a)</u>
USEUCOM			
USAREUR Military Personnel Center, Europe V Corps 3d Armored Division		deleted	
USAFE	200	356	302
17th Air Force	8	16	11
USNAVEUR	19	46	44
6th Fleet (officers only)	5	16	3

Note: Based on 1975 and 1976 staffing documents.

a/Logistics staffing includes transportation staffing shown previously.

### CONCLUSIONS

The U.S. presence in Europe is tied to the NATO commitment. The U.S. command structure is organized to exercise command and control of assigned U.S. forces in both peace and war and to meet national support responsibilities once the command of NATO-committed forces has been transferred to NATO. ACE will be the operational command in wartime. As ACE will be responsible for conducting the war, it follows that ACE should control, or at least supervise, all critical elements in both peace and war. It does gain direct control of combat forces, but support remains under national control. ACE should also have control of support functions to the extent possible. These functions are critical in wartime, and only the operational commander will be in a position to effectively manage them.

In addition, many functions, such as transportation, are to be handled through bilateral agreements. There is need for a single manager to assure that support will be sufficient and that no country has overextended itself. Here again, ACE seems to be the most logical place to put this responsibility.

The more involved ACE becomes, the less need there is for USEUCOM and the component commands as they are now

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structured, although the United States will always have a need for a command structure separate from NATO to manage certain unilateral activities. However, with greater ACE involvement in peacetime logistics support, the smaller the U.S. structure can be. Alternatives to the present U.S. command structure and a strengthened NATO command structure are discussed in chapter 5.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS, ALTERNATIVES, AND

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The increasing interdependence of the members of NATO underscores the need for a NATO command that can respond quickly in the event of an attack by Warsaw Pact forces, particularly an attack with little or no advance warning. Transition from a peacetime to a wartime structure should require minimal changes. The only practical way to accomplish this is through the close integration of the command structures of the member forces with the NATO command structure.

Integration of command is a key factor that must be achieved if NATO is to be capable of effective coalition warfare. An integrated command structure could be a first step in achieving greater NATO interoperability, standardization of weapons, improved communications facilities, and increased NATO responsibility for management of logistics support. A true partnership should start with the top management team that can function well in peacetime and wartime in achieving mutual goals.

Consequently, the United States should take a leadership role in encouraging a multilateral study to identify ways in which closer integration of the command structures of the NATO member forces with the NATO command structure can be achieved. Moreover, such a study should be initiated without delay to establish a sound basis for planning future outlays of funds. For example, plans have now been approved to deleted Substantial funds will undoubtedly be necessary to accomplish this move. Without long-range plans that address the organizational structure necessary to accomplish the long-term objectives set forth in this report and the objectives for concerted multinational efforts emphasized by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (see p. 28), funds may be spent unwisely. This applies not only deleted but to other future facility and communications systems acquisitions.

There are also alternatives which the United States can initiate on its own, which not only would support the longer term objective of closer integration but also could strengthen the U.S. structure.

ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO  
THE UNITED STATES

The foremost consideration in determining the optimum U.S. command structure in Europe is how best, and by whom, the following objectives can be accomplished.

- Transition of U.S. forces to an operational role in the NATO command structure.
- Management of logistics support for U.S. forces in peacetime and wartime.
- Management of other U.S. unilateral responsibilities, actual or potential, in the event of a war in Europe.

The most practical and effective way to accomplish these objectives is to delegate responsibility for these functions to the lowest feasible level and to eliminate redundant planning for and monitoring of those functions by each higher level in the management hierarchy. Even if there is no precise duplication in the management activities at each level, a single manager with one principal overview level has been shown in past GAO reviews to be a better, more efficient, and less costly way of managing.

DOD has made progress in reducing headquarters levels in Europe. Most reductions have been across the board, on a horizontal basis. The horizontal approach does not analyze the need for the missions and functions themselves.

We believe that a functional analysis of the command structure, on a vertical basis, may offer potential for additional reductions, as well as assure that missions and functions are optimally located in the military chain of command. Responsibility for, and resources to perform a function should be placed in the most optimal location considering the U.S. wartime mission, as well as the ACE commands' roles and functions. At least two alternatives which come to mind should be considered in such an analysis--alternatives that could improve U.S. participation in the NATO command structure and reduce the management layering that now exists in the U.S. command structure--without impairing the capability of the United States to meet its unilateral responsibilities.

Integrate USEUCOM with SHAPE

One way would be to integrate USEUCOM with SHAPE, both in peacetime and wartime, retaining a small nucleus of U.S.

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personnel to plan and manage those responsibilities that are peculiar to the United States, such as control over nuclear weapons. Such an alignment would be oriented more to the planning for and prosecution of a NATO war and would facilitate the transition of U.S. combat forces from U.S. command in peacetime to NATO command in wartime.

If European Command personnel were integrated into SHAPE as discussed on page 27, there would be a potential for reductions in the U.S. personnel now assigned solely to SHAPE. For example, there would be no need to have separate groups of personnel doing war planning for both, as is now the case, because the function of war planning would be consolidated.

Under such an arrangement the service component commands would continue to have the responsibility they now have, both in peacetime and wartime, for logistics support of their troops.

The U.S. unified command would no longer monitor the logistics support activities of the components, leaving this task, resource allocation, and priority setting to the service departments and ACE. Crisis management could be handled by augmenting the small nucleus of U.S. personnel retained to manage U.S. unilateral responsibilities with personnel drawn from the service components to create a battle staff.

#### Integrate component commands and USEUCOM

Another way to organize the U.S. command structure in Europe would be to eliminate or reduce the service component command headquarters, with the Headquarters, USEUCOM, assuming primary responsibility for management of logistics support functions, in both peacetime and wartime. This seems particularly appropriate in the case of USAREUR since the two Army corps in Europe are essentially self-sufficient and capable of attending to their own needs.

In wartime most levels of the component commands go over to NATO control whereas the component command headquarters themselves do not. In peacetime most support activities are handled under a direct support system from the United States. Other peacetime activities pertaining primarily to wartime preparation, such as troop training and war planning, are also handled at lower levels and reviewed or monitored by Headquarters, USEUCOM; the service component commands; and NATO. Since responsibility for managing and performing these

functions has been delegated to levels below the component command headquarters, it seems that one monitoring level could be established rather than the several levels that now exist. Such an arrangement would not preclude also integrating Headquarters, USEUCOM, with the service component commands, as discussed in the prior alternatives.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense reexamine the U.S. command structure in Europe and make changes as necessary to insure that the structure is optimally organized to perform its primary wartime mission. The examination could include evaluation of the potential benefits--both to U.S. staffing and a strengthened NATO--of taking the leadership in giving NATO greater authority and control over peacetime logistics support, to facilitate the transition to and effectiveness of wartime activities.

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense also take a leadership role in encouraging a multilateral study to identify ways in which closer integration of the command structures of the NATO member forces with the NATO command structure can be achieved.

#### AGENCY COMMENTS

The Secretary of Defense was given an opportunity to comment on our classified report. However, the classified report was issued without Department of Defense comments because they did not respond in time. Subsequently, however, the Department furnished us comments and supported our general conclusion that closer integration between the U.S. and NATO command structures is needed. An unclassified version of the Department's comments is included as appendix V.

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I


U.S. ARMY EUROPEAN HEADQUARTERS STAFFING  
THROUGH BRIGADE LEVEL (note a)

<u>Description</u>	<u>Authorized personnel</u>	<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>Total</u>
Management headquarters identified by DOD: Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe Southern European Task Force 5th Signal Command Total (3)			
Other headquarters meeting DOD management headquarters criteria (note b): V Corps VII Corps 21st Support Command 4th Transportation Brigade Total (4)			
Operational headquarters through brigade level: V Corps: 41st Field Artillery Group 42d Field Artillery Group 3d Armored Division 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division 2d Brigade, 3d Armored Division 3d Brigade, 3d Armored Division 3d Armored Division Field Artillery 3d Armored Division Support Command 8th Mechanized Infantry Division 1st Brigade, 8th Infantry Division 2d Brigade, 8th Infantry Division 3d Brigade, 8th Infantry Division 8th Mechanized Infantry Division Field Artillery 8th Mechanized Infantry Division Support Command Brigade 76 3d Support Command 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Total V Corps (17)		deleted	

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I


<u>Description</u>	<u>Authorized personnel</u>	<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>Total</u>
Operational headquarters:			
VII Corps:			
72d Artillery Group			
210th Artillery Group			
1st Armored Division			
1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division			
2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division			
3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division			
1st Armored Division Field Artillery			
1st Armored Division Support Command			
1st Infantry Division (Forward) Brigade 75		-	
3d Mechanized Infantry Division			
1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division			
2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division			
3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division			
3d Mechanized Infantry Division Field Artillery			
3d Mechanized Infantry Division Support Command			
2d Support Command			
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment			
Total VII Corps (18)			
Berlin Brigade			
32d Army Air Defense Command			
10th Air Defense Artillery Group			
69th Air Defense Artillery Group			
94th Air Defense Artillery Group			
108th Air Defense Artillery Group			
56th Field Artillery Brigade			
11th Aviation Group			
10th Special Forces Group			
Total non-Corps units (9)			
Total (44)			



APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I

<u>Description</u>	<u>Authorized personnel</u>	<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>Total</u>
Support headquarters:			
59th Ordnance Group			
U.S. Army Commander, Berlin			
U.S. Army Medical Command, Europe			
U.S. Army, Europe Materiel Management Center			
7th Signal Brigade			
24th Engineer Group			
66th Military Intelligence Group			
Military Personnel Center, Europe			
502d Army Security Agency Group			
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe			
60th Ordnance Group			
Total (11)			
Total (62)			



Note: The staffing levels of these organizations are based on 1975/1976 manning documents. This was as close to fiscal year 1975 staffing level as possible. The staffing includes military, civilian, and local national positions.

a/This list does not include group headquarters which are subordinate to brigade or the Southern European Task Force.

b/These headquarters, in GAOs opinion, meet the criteria for being classified as management headquarters. This was the subject of a letter to the Secretary of Defense dated July 11, 1977.

MAJOR U.S. NAVY EUROPEANHEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Authorized personnel (note a)</u>
Headquarters, U.S.		
Naval Forces, Europe	London, England	<u>b/344</u>
Fleet Air Mediterranean	Naples, Italy	<u>c/61</u>
Middle East Force	<u>d/Bahrain Island</u>	<u>e/63</u>
6th Fleet	<u>d/Greta, Italy</u>	<u>e/142</u>
Task Force 60	<u>d/Mediterranean Sea</u>	<u>f/45</u>
Task Force 61	<u>d/Mediterranean Sea</u>	<u>f/26</u>
Task Force 62	<u>d/Mediterranean Sea</u>	<u>f/61</u>
Task Force 63	<u>d/Mediterranean Sea</u>	<u>f/62</u>
Task Force 64/69	<u>d/Mediterranean Sea</u>	<u>f/65</u>
Task Force 67	<u>d/Mediterranean Sea</u>	<u>e/62</u>

931

a/Includes military, civilian, and local national positions.

b/As of September 1976 and including the Fleet Operations Control Center, Europe (116 positions), a DOD-designated management headquarters support activity.

c/As of December 1975.

d/Afloat headquarters. The flagships of the Middle East Force and the 6th Fleet are homeported at the above locations.

e/As of September 1976.

f/As of June 1976.



**PEACETIME AND WARTIME RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COMPARABLE HEADQUARTERS**

FUNCTIONAL AREA -- SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE	Prepares plans, policies, and procedures		Coordinates plans, policies, and procedures		Maintains data base -- disseminates information		Identifies Requirements		Directs and supervises resource utilization		Monitors achievements and policies		Provides guidance		Evaluates systems and progress		Recommends systems improvements		
	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	
P - PEACE W - WAR																			
ALLIED FORCES CENTRAL EUROPE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USEUCOM	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CENTRAL ARMY GROUP	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USAREUR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CORPS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Allied Air Forces Central Europe/ 4th Allied Tactical Air Force	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USAFE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USNAVEUR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*6TH FLEET/STRIKEFORSSOUTH																			

\* - 6th Fleet becomes STRIKEFORSSOUTH in wartime

**PEACETIME AND WARTIME RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COMPARABLE HEADQUARTERS**

FUNCTIONAL AREA -- TRANSPORTATION	Prepares plans, policies, and procedures		Coordinates plans, policies, and procedures		Maintains data base -- disseminates information		Identifies Requirements		Directs and supervises resource utilization		Monitors achievements and policies		Provides guidance		Evaluates systems and progress		Recommends systems improvements		
	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	
P - PEACE																			
W - WAR																			
ALLIED FORCES CENTRAL EUROPE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USEUCOM	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CENTRAL ARMY GROUP	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USAREUR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CORPS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Allied Air Forces Central Europe/ 4th Allied Tactical Air Force	X	U	X	U	X	U	X	U	X	X	X	X	U	X	X	U	X	U	U
USAFE	X		X						X				X						
USNAVEUR	X	X	X	X								X	X				X	X	X
*6TH FLEET/STRIKEFORSSOUTH												X					X	X	X

U - Data not available

\* - 6th Fleet becomes STRIKEFORSSOUTH in wartime

**PEACETIME AND WARTIME RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COMPARABLE HEADQUARTERS**

FUNCTIONAL AREA -- INTELLIGENCE	Prepares plans, policies, and procedures		Coordinates plans, policies, and procedures		Maintains data base -- disseminates information		Identifies Requirements		Directs and supervises resource utilization		Monitors achievements and policies		Provides guidance		Evaluates systems and progress		Recommends systems improvements		
	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	
P - PEACE																			
W - WAR																			
ALLIED FORCES CENTRAL EUROPE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USEUCOM	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CENTRAL ARMY GROUP	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USAREUR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CORPS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Allied Air Forces Central Europe/ 4th Allied Tactical Air Force	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USAFE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USNAVEUR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*6TH FLEET/STRIKEFORSSOUTH	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

\* - 6th Fleet becomes STRIKEFORSSOUTH in wartime

**PEACETIME AND WARTIME RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COMPARABLE HEADQUARTERS**

FUNCTIONAL AREA -- COMMUNICATIONS	Prepares plans, policies, and procedures		Coordinates plans, policies, and procedures		Maintains data base -- disseminates information		Identifies Requirements		Directs and supervises resource utilization		Monitors achievements and policies		Provides guidance		Evaluates systems and progress		Recommends systems improvements		
	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	P	W	
P - PEACE																			
W - WAR																			
ALLIED FORCES CENTRAL EUROPE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USEUCOM	X	X	X	X															
CENTRAL ARMY GROUP	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
USAREUR 1/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CORPS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Allied Air Forces Central Europe/ 4th Allied Tactical Air Force	X	U	X	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
USAFE	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
USNAVEUR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*6TH FLEET/STRIKEFOR SOUTH	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

O -- Data not obtained \* - 6th Fleet becomes STRIKEFOR SOUTH in wartime

U -- Data not available 1/Dual hatred as Commander 5th Signal Command and DCS C-E, USAREUR



MANPOWER,  
RESERVE AFFAIRS  
AND LOGISTICS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON D C 20301

8 9 AUG 1977

Mr. Fred Shafer  
Director, Logistics & Communications Division  
United States General Accounting Office  
Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Shafer:

As requested, we have reviewed your draft report, "US and NATO Military Command Structures - An Analysis of Alternatives." The study provides an adequate description of the current relationships between US and NATO command structures. (OSD Case #4613)

We support the report's general conclusion that greater integration of national and NATO headquarters could facilitate peacetime command and control while improving NATO's ability to convert to wartime operations.

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The Department has been studying additional ways to further integrate the US wartime and peacetime component command structure with appropriate NATO headquarters to insure that those who must work together in war are also working together in peacetime.

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An implicit assumption in the report is that headquarters integration alone will improve transition to war. I agree; however, there is also an underlying need for greater functional integration among NATO nations in such areas as logistics, intelligence, and communications. Increased peacetime planning and resource management in these functions is vital to NATO's ability to convert efficiently to wartime operations.

As a result of US initiatives at the May 1977 NATO Summit and Defense Planning Committee (DPC) Ministerial meetings, NATO is undertaking both long and short-term defense programs in areas where collective action is urgently required. These programs will require all NATO Allies to coordinate more effectively on programs such as logistics and communications. Both President Carter and Secretary Brown have made the success of these programs top national defense priorities.

Sincerely,

JOHN P. WHITE

Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Manpower Reserve Affairs & Logistics)

Classified by OASD (MRA&L). Subj to  
GDS of E.O. 11652. Automatically  
downgraded at two year intervals.  
Declass on 31 December 83.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR  
ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
<u>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE</u>		
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: Harold Brown	Jan. 1977	Present
<u>JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF</u>		
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: General George S. Brown	July 1974	Present
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EUROPEAN COMMAND: General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.	Oct. 1974	Present
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: Clifford L. Alexander	Jan. 1977	Present
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. ARMY, EUROPE: General George S. Blanchard	July 1975	Present
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY: W. Graham Claytor, Jr.	Feb. 1977	Present
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. NAVY, EUROPE: Admiral David H. Bagley	May 1975	Present
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE: John C. Stetson	Apr. 1977	Present
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. AIR FORCE, EUROPE: General William J. Evans	Aug. 1977	Present
<u>NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION</u>		
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE: General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.	Dec. 1974	Present