

## DOCUMENT RESUME

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The Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA) is responsible for setting policies for planning the continuity of government in a national emergency and for coordinating plans among 30 Federal agencies. Findings/Conclusions: FPA does not have the necessary resources or organizational structure to adequately fulfill its responsibilities. Efforts at coordination have been ineffective because groups established for this purpose have met infrequently. Planning assumptions and other guidance provided by FPA were outdated. Deficiencies in preparedness plans were not adequately identified in reports submitted by agencies or in FPA reviews. Participation in the National Defense Executive Reserve established to strengthen preparedness has declined. Because of FPA's lack of enforcement capability, the agencies have developed different approaches in developing plans. Some agencies have not identified their essential emergency functions, and guidance in this area has not been adequate. Agencies are required to set up teams of key personnel to carry out essential functions at emergency facilities, but assignment of personnel to teams was incomplete, training was often inadequate, and arrangements for activation of teams was incomplete. Facilities for relocation of teams lack certain basic requirements, and agencies have not made detailed plans for problems that would be encountered in emergencies. FPA's ability to assess damage could be limited because of problems in its resource data system. Recommendations: The Director of FPA should: coordinate emergency planning more effectively by developing more indepth agency reviews, and by putting more emphasis on the National Defense Executive Reserve Program; develop more specific criteria for agencies' use in determining which functions would be essential in an emergency; direct agencies to develop specific plans to deal with the most severe

problems in an emergency; encourage and assist agencies in the use of the resource data system; and, with other agency heads, develop guidance on training emergency team members, determine requirements and develop a system for reviewing the resource data system, and reevaluate the number of alternate headquarters facilities needed. (HTW)

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BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

# Report To The Congress

OF THE UNITED STATES

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## Continuity Of The Federal Government In A Critical National Emergency-- A Neglected Necessity

Problems in continuity of government plans could jeopardize the Nation's survival and recovery in a national emergency, such as a nuclear attack. Current plans are hindered by inadequate direction, emphasis, and coordination. Although plans for the continuity of the Federal Government are only one aspect of civil preparedness, such plans are vitally important.



LCD-78-409  
APRIL 27, 1978



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-167790

To the President of the Senate and the  
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report reviews the Federal Government's plans for continuing essential functions during a national emergency, discusses the need for emphasizing such planning, and makes recommendations for improving planning.

We made this review because of the increasing congressional interest in the Government's preparedness efforts.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

Copies of this report are being sent to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Transportation, and Health, Education, and Welfare; the Administrator of General Services; and the Director, Federal Preparedness Agency.

*Thomas R. Staats*  
Comptroller General  
of the United States

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S  
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

CONTINUITY OF THE FEDERAL  
GOVERNMENT IN A CRITICAL  
NATIONAL EMERGENCY--  
A NEGLECTED NECESSITY

D I G E S T

Problems in planning for continuity of government in a national emergency, such as a nuclear attack, could jeopardize the Nation's survival and recovery. Current planning lacks adequate direction, emphasis, and coordination.

The Federal Preparedness Agency in the General Services Administration sets policies for continuity-of-government plans and coordinates these plans among 30 Federal agencies having emergency responsibilities. For example, the Department of Agriculture is responsible for emergency food resources, while the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is responsible for emergency health resources and personnel.

Currently, the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Governmental Affairs are considering proposed legislation to increase the efficiency and coordination of various aspects of civil emergency preparedness and to clarify congressional policy and intent in these matters. Additionally, the President has directed that a study of Federal preparedness and response to disasters be made. This is expected to be completed by April 1978.

PLANNING GUIDANCE AND COORDINATION

Because of the many activities mandatory to moving the Nation from survival toward recovery after a catastrophe and the many Federal agencies that must carry out those activities, strong direction and coordination of emergency planning are needed. This role has been assigned to the Federal

Preparedness Agency, but it has neither the resources required for this priority mission nor an organizational stature sufficient to do the job.

One area needing much more attention, for example, is that of civilian versus military needs. The Federal Preparedness Agency, however, has not developed specific plans for quickly identifying major bottlenecks to resource allocation or for allocating resources between the military and civilian sectors.

Efforts have been made to coordinate planning in other areas. Interagency coordination groups, for example, have been established. However, the groups seldom meet, and agreements made between them are often outdated and ineffective. In addition, Federal agencies coordinate with State and local governments or the private sector infrequently.

To assist these agencies, the Federal Preparedness Agency develops planning assumptions and provides guidance. Current basic planning assumptions about the types of threats facing the Nation date from 1966 and have not always accurately portrayed the Nation's military posture. The Agency revised the assumptions in 1976. However, they are still under review by the Executive Office of the President. Other Agency guidance was outdated or untimely.

The Agency requires annual reports from Federal departments and agencies and reviews their preparedness plans. However, neither the reports nor the reviews ensure that all deficiencies have been identified and corrective actions taken.

The Federal Government tried to strengthen its preparedness capabilities by establishing the National Defense Executive Reserve, composed of personnel trained to fill executive positions in an emergency. The number

of agencies and people participating in this program has declined in recent years.

### AGENCIES' PREPAREDNESS PLANS

Because the Federal Preparedness Agency lacks enforcement capability, the quality of the other agencies' plans depends essentially on the agencies themselves. They use different approaches in developing plans and the quality varies considerably.

The first step in preparedness planning should be to identify essential emergency functions. Some agencies may not know what their most important functions are. Despite the Agency's attempts at clarifying the concept of essential and uninterruptible functions, Agency guidance and Executive orders still permit wide variations in identifying those functions.

The Federal Preparedness Agency assigns to each agency having essential uninterruptible functions the task of setting up three teams of key personnel to carry out these functions at emergency facilities. However, assignment of personnel to the teams was generally incomplete. Many team members had not received substantive training on their emergency duties, and arrangements for activating the teams and providing for their families were also incomplete.

According to Federal Preparedness Agency guidance, one of the three teams is expected to relocate to the agencies' own alternate facilities outside Washington, D.C. Of 33 agencies required to relocate their teams to such facilities, 6 neither have facilities nor share them with another agency. Also, many of the existing facilities lack such basic requirements as medical and food supplies, decontamination programs, and air filtering systems. As a result, some facilities might be of little use in a nuclear attack.

In addition, the agencies have not made detailed plans for the serious and complex problems that would be encountered in such an emergency. For example, 34 percent of the team members who responded to a GAO questionnaire said that they had a poor understanding of how they would identify and distribute both food supplies and medical resources to areas in greatest need.

#### EMERGENCY INFORMATION

The Federal Preparedness Agency maintains a computerized data system on the Nation's resources in 14 functional areas, such as transportation and agriculture. The data would be needed to predict damages from an emergency and to determine what Government actions are needed. However, the Agency might not be able to accurately assess damage because of problems in the resource data system.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The Administrator of General Services should direct the Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency to coordinate emergency planning more effectively both by developing more indepth agency reviews, including followups, and by putting more emphasis on the National Defense Executive Reserve Program.

The Director should also:

- Develop more specific criteria for other agencies to use in determining which Government functions would be essential and uninterruptible in an emergency.
- Direct Federal agencies to develop reasonably specific plans to deal with the most severe problems likely to result from an emergency.
- Encourage and assist Federal agencies in developing the capability to use the resource data system.

In addition, the Director, together with other agency heads, should:

- Develop comprehensive guidance on training emergency team members.
- Determine requirements for the resource data system and develop a system for reviewing the accuracy and currency of the data.
- Reevaluate the number of alternate headquarters facilities needed, considering funding restraints and minimum facility requirements.

#### AGENCY COMMENTS

GAO discussed this report with responsible agency officials, who said their agencies assign a low priority to emergency preparedness. Many believe that this is exemplified by the low visibility of the entire Federal Government's preparedness effort, in particular, the Federal Preparedness Agency's activities.

Many officials said that the Agency now holds an obscure spot within the General Services Administration compared to its predecessor agency's (the Office of Emergency Preparedness) position within the Executive Office of the President. They believe that this loss of stature has reduced its enforcement capability (for example, having agencies act promptly to correct deficiencies in their preparedness programs).

Several officials stated that the program will only improve if the President and his top advisors direct participation and compliance by all levels of the executive branch. These high level officials should add the weight of their influence by participating directly in the various civil preparedness programs and exercises.

## RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONGRESS

GAO believes that the Congress should enact legislation that would reestablish central control over the emergency preparedness budgets of departments and agencies.

Within the context of this report, the Congress should consider, in its reorganization evaluations, the importance of where the civil preparedness program could best be placed within the Federal structure to give it adequate authority regardless of the level of funding. For example, the Congress may wish to emphasize the importance of emergency preparedness by increasing the visibility and organizational stature of the Federal Preparedness Agency either by elevating its position within the Federal structure or by making it an independent agency.

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**ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>DOD</b>	<b>Department of Defense</b>
<b>FPA</b>	<b>Federal Preparedness Agency</b>
<b>GAO</b>	<b>General Accounting Office</b>

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

To insure that the Nation is prepared for a full range of emergencies, including survival and recovery from nuclear attack, many Federal agencies carry out a broad range of preparedness planning activities. Plans have been made, for example, to protect citizens from radioactive fallout, to manage the Nation's resources, and to make sure that the Federal Government continues to function during and after an emergency. The Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA) in the General Services Administration is responsible for setting broad policies for such preparedness programs and for coordinating the programs throughout the Federal, State, and local governments.


### HISTORY

In 1950 the Office of Defense Mobilization was established in the Executive Office to direct and coordinate all nonmilitary mobilization functions. Also, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (Public Law 81-920) established the Federal Civil Defense Administration as an independent agency to develop protection for the civilian population. These two agencies were combined into the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization in 1958, which remained in the Executive Office until 1961, when the operational civil defense programs were assigned to the Department of Defense (DOD) by Executive Order 10952. Today, the responsibility for population protection planning rests with the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency in DOD.


From 1961 to 1973, the Office of Emergency Preparedness (known as the Office of Emergency Planning from 1961 to 1968) in the Executive Office carried out the preparedness policymaking, coordinating, and planning functions. In 1973, this office was abolished and the Office of Preparedness in the General Services Administration and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration in the Department of Housing and Urban Development were simultaneously established to perform its functions. The Office of Preparedness was renamed the Federal Preparedness Agency in July 1975. (See chart on the following page.)

Executive Order 11490, as amended, assigned to over 30 Federal agencies the responsibility to plan for the continuity of the Federal Government in a national emergency by developing plans for

# EVOLUTION OF CIVIL PREPAREDNESS SINCE 1950



**GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**



- succession to office;
- predelegation of emergency authority;
- safekeeping of essential records;
- emergency relocation sites supported by communications and required services;
- emergency action steps;
- alternate headquarters or command facilities; and
- protection of Government resources, facilities, and personnel.

In addition, the agencies were to attain an appropriate state of readiness and were to be prepared to carry out certain emergency responsibilities.

For example, the Department of the Interior was to develop emergency plans for water; the Department of Agriculture, for food resources; the Department of Labor, for civilian manpower resources; and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, for health services and civilian health personnel.

FPA was made responsible for setting continuity-of-government policies and for coordinating the other agencies' plans.

#### FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY

FPA's budget and staffing levels for fiscal year 1978 are shown in the following table.

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Staff-years</u>	<u>Budget</u>
		(000 omitted)
Conflict preparedness	572	\$ 27,198
Civil crisis preparedness	59	1,056
Research, development, and program coordination	139	4,744
Stockpile acquisition and disposal	67	73,137
Service direction	<u>125</u>	<u>3,567</u>
Total	<u>962</u>	<u>\$110,702</u>

FPA's continuity-of-government program comes under "conflict preparedness," which involves developing and coordinating preparedness measures for nuclear contingencies and conventional war and developing general policy guidance for planning against acts of terrorism. Policy direction and coordination are also provided for the necessary communications systems essential to the continuity-of-government programs.

The other major FPA activities are briefly described below.

- Civil crisis preparedness involves evaluating threats to the U.S. economy caused by resource shortages and dependency on other nations. Policies are developed to accommodate or avoid these dependencies, and guidance is provided to Federal agencies and local governments regarding use of resources during periods of shortages.
- The research and development office provides computer and programing support to FPA and other Federal agencies on a selective, but limited, basis.
- Stockpile acquisition and disposal relates to the stockpile of strategic and critical materials. Responsibilities include data collection and economic analysis of such factors as supply, demand, price, and consumption of stockpile materials. About \$70 million was requested for acquiring strategic and critical materials for the national stockpile during fiscal year 1978.
- Service direction represents FPA's executive staff and administrative support.

#### SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our review included work at FPA headquarters, Washington, D.C., and at the headquarters of the Departments of Agriculture; Defense; Health, Education, and Welfare; Housing and Urban Development (questionnaire only); Labor; and Transportation. We also visited three Federal alternate relocation facilities outside Washington, D.C., to observe their readiness and attended the regional exercise conducted in Atlanta, Georgia, in April 1977.

To gain further insight into Federal continuity-of-government planning, we sent questionnaires to emergency team members of the six departments listed above.

Our review was limited to matters concerned with conflict preparedness and only the Federal headquarters level continuity-of-government emergency preparedness plans and programs.

## CHAPTER 2

### CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT IS

#### ESSENTIAL TO CIVIL PREPAREDNESS

In a previous report 1/ on civil defense, we discussed many of the current plans and programs for helping the Nation survive and recover from a nuclear attack. That report, which provided an overview of civil defense, pointed out problems at all levels of government and called for greater public discussion of the possibilities for surviving nuclear attack and the costs of various survival alternatives.

Although plans for the continuity of the Federal Government in a national emergency are only one aspect of civil preparedness, we believe such plans are vitally important to the Nation's preparedness.

#### THE NEED FOR CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT

In the event of a national emergency on the scale of a major nuclear attack, the American societal structure would be radically disrupted and public services now taken for granted would be drastically curtailed. There would be extensive destruction and possibly millions of casualties. But there would also be millions of survivors.

How will the survivors meet their basic immediate needs? How will they obtain food, water, shelter, clothing, medical and rescue services, and information? And how will loss and damage be minimized?

As a first resource, local and State governments would be relied on. However, Federal assistance would be required to meet many of these needs and to provide a rallying point for the surviving populace. The first requirement for continuity of Government, then, is to insure that certain Government functions survive. Since a nuclear attack would cause blast and fire damage, as well as radioactive fallout, prepared sites are needed where essential functions can be carried out in a relatively protected environment. Thus, comprehensive plans are needed to designate key personnel and the facilities for housing them.

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1/"Civil Defense: Are Federal, State, and Local Governments Prepared for Nuclear Attack?" (LCD-76-464, Aug. 8, 1977).

In addition, training is needed to prepare Government personnel for their emergency assignments. Initially, they would be involved in providing the basic services, such as the equitable allocation of surviving resources, to the other survivors. To do this, the Government would need effective emergency communications and transportation capabilities. It would also need to know such things as what resources existed before the catastrophe and how many had been destroyed or damaged; what transportation methods remained in working order; how many personnel in the various industries had survived; and what sections of the country's highways, railroad lines, etc., were still intact. An effective resource management information system thus becomes another essential requirement, as does the cooperation of State and local governments and private industries.

As the Nation's basic services are reconstituted, recovery efforts must begin. Federal, State, and local governments, working with private industry, must help to get the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy moving again. As recovery progresses, more and more Federal agencies and functions must be reactivated and brought into play for reconstruction and rehabilitation.

The increasing complexity of modern American society makes such efforts even more important and difficult. A capable, centralized "manager" must exist to orchestrate the Nation's recovery. This manager should set planning requirements in peacetime and direct and coordinate the actions of all agencies in an emergency.

If a central authority does not exist or is essentially ineffective, the effects of the disaster and the recovery time will be much greater. The chances of anarchy and civil disturbance in an environment without a strong central authority also are greater.

One can consider the New York City blackout and the Johnstown, Pennsylvania, flood and the recent fuel and water shortages to gain a perspective of the problems that could result from a nuclear attack.

To sum up, a workable continuity-of-government program must include the following basic "tools."

--Effective guidance, interest, and involvement from the highest levels of the Federal Government.

- Delineation of authority, clearly understood by all involved.
- Effective planning, both singularly and jointly.
- Coordination of effort at all levels.
- Fully trained cadres at all locations.
- Operating locations that are fully prepared for use at all times.
- Availability at all locations of basic data that is both current and useful.
- A communications system that can operate under even the most difficult conditions.

### THE PROGRAM TODAY

As stated in chapter 1, many Federal agencies have been assigned continuity-of-government responsibilities. The chart on the following page shows the major responsibilities. As can be seen, these responsibilities cut across the entire range of services affecting all aspects of our lifestyle. Although each agency's responsibilities are unique in many ways, interdependence is obviously essential, a fact which points up the need for a central manager.

FPA has been assigned the role of controlling and integrating all these activities, without, we believe, the necessary organizational stature and political backing--which it once has as part of the Executive Office of the President.

FPA effectiveness has been reduced to the point where it seems to have only a minimal impact on civil preparedness. As noted earlier, many roles and functions have been delegated to other agencies, and although FPA is responsible for evaluating other agencies' emergency planning, it has no authority to require agencies to take specific corrective actions--it can only recommend. Further, FPA no longer has any funding authority over other agencies, which it once had to some degree with delegate budget authority. The delegate budget authority gave FPA central control over the emergency preparedness budgets of several departments and agencies that carried out Federal emergency preparedness activities.

**MAJOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ASSIGNMENTS  
OF FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES**

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES		MANPOWER	HEALTH	EDUCATION AND WELFARE	FOOD	FUEL POWER	WATER AND ENVIRONMENT	PRODUCTION	CONSTRUCTION	HOUSING	TELECOMMUNICATIONS	TRANSPORTATION	FINANCE STABILIZATION	FOREIGN AFFAIRS	LAW ENFORCEMENT	CIVIL DEFENSE
Agriculture		S	S	P	S	S					S	S	S	S	S	S
Commerce		S	S	S	S	P	S	P	S	S		S	S	M	S	S
Maritime Administration					S							M		S		
Defense		S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	M
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency											S		S		P	
Corps of Engineers, Civil Works					S	S					M		S		S	S
Health, Education, and Welfare		S	P	P	S	S	S	S	S				S	S	S	S
Housing and Urban Development			S	S		S	M	P	S	S	S	S	S		S	S
Interior			S	S	P	P	M				S	S			S	S
Justice			S										S	S	P	S
Labor		P	S		S		S		S			S	S	S	S	S
State			S	S									S	P	S	S
Transportation		S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	P	S	S	S	S	S
Federal Aviation Administration											S	M	S	S		
Treasury			S	S								S	P	S	S	S
Civil Aeronautics Board					S							M	S	S	S	S
1/ Energy Research and Development Administration			S	S	S	S					S	S	S	S	S	S
Environmental Protection Agency			S	S	S	M	S	S	S			S		S	S	S
Export-Import Bank of the U.S.							S						S	S	S	S
Farm Credit Administration				S									S	S	S	S
Federal Communications Commission											M		S	S	S	S
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.													S	S	S	S
1/ Federal Energy Administration			S		M	S	S	S	S	S		S	S	S	S	S
Federal Home Loan Bank Board			S			S	S	S	S	S		S	S	S	S	S
1/ Federal Power Commission					M	S	S						S	S	S	S
Federal Reserve System													M		S	S
2/ General Services Administration		S			S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Federal Preparedness Agency		O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Interstate Commerce Commission					S							M				S
National Aeronautics and Space Admin.			S		S						S	S				S
National Credit Union Administration			S	S									S			S
National Science Foundation			S	S		S	S									S
Nuclear Regulatory Commission			S		S	S					P	S	S	S		S
Office of Telecommunications Policy												P		S		S
Railroad Retirement Board			S	S												S
Securities and Exchange Commission													S			S
Selective Service System			S	S												S
Small Business Administration			S		S	S	S						S			S
Tennessee Valley Authority			S	S	S	S	S						S			S
U.S. Civil Service Commission		M											S			S
3/ U.S. Information Agency											S		S			S
U.S. Postal Service			S	S								S	S			S
Veterans Administration			S	S									S			S

- 1/ Reorganized as an agency within the Department of Energy.
- 2/ Assignments do not include those of the Federal Preparedness Agency.
- 3/ Name changed to the International Communications Agency.

LEGEND: O -- FPA provides overall guidance for and coordination of all of the assigned activities.  
 P -- Primary Responsibility  
 M -- Major Responsibility  
 S -- Support

Because of this lack of organizational stature and decentralization of responsibilities, the quality of the other agencies' continuity-of-government plans depends essentially on how much emphasis each agency gives the plans, how much interest the agency head shows, and how much funding is devoted to planning. As discussed in the following chapters, there are problems in almost all aspects of continuity-of-government planning. These problems are serious enough, in our judgment, to jeopardize the continuity of the Federal Government and the survival and recovery of the Nation in an emergency.

The planning tasks assigned the various agencies are, it should be noted, decidedly unpleasant. The agencies must convince the Nation that some precautionary steps need to be taken in case of a war or other major disaster. This is an unenviable task, considering that many people, both in and out of Government, believe that (1) a nuclear war will probably not occur and (2) if it does, they most likely will not survive. The agencies must also try to achieve the program's objectives under constraints applied by both the executive branch and the Congress.

#### A CRITICAL ISSUE: CIVILIAN VERSUS MILITARY NEEDS

In the event of a national emergency on the scale of a nuclear attack, one priority would be to support military needs in the defense of the United States. In this respect, DOD would be a major claimant on the Nation's resources. Simultaneously, there will be many other claimants on the limited resources, such as Government agencies, States, and citizens. In this situation, some mechanism must direct the output of resources to various segments of our society.

FPA's predecessor--the Office of Emergency Preparedness--developed a list of activities that will be accorded the highest priority. The list begins with the immediate priority of defense and retaliatory combat operations of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies. Other priorities of equal weight include the maintenance or reestablishment of government authority and control; the production and distribution of essential survival items; the provision of services essential to continued survival and rapid recovery, such as food, water, and housing; and the provision of supplies, equipment, repair parts, essential communications, and transportation needed to support the above activities.

At the discretion of the President, elements of FPA, DOD, and the State Department would help in further refining overall national priorities during an emergency. They would have to know all major national needs, as well as existing resources, and would need a system of priorities and allocations for the various Government and private activities. However, FPA has not developed specific plans describing how it will identify all major bottlenecks to resource allocation or how to allocate scarce resources among the military and civilian sectors.

Our questionnaire results showed that 52 percent of the team members responding thought their departments would have major or some responsibility for resolving conflicts between DOD and other agencies concerning assigned emergency actions. Of the respondents, 30 percent indicated a very poor understanding of their departments' roles in this area, even though they believed they had responsibility. This situation seems unfortunate in view of the many areas of potential conflict between DOD and others. The questionnaire responses demonstrate to us that the priorities of military versus civilian needs have not been well defined or effectively communicated.

#### WAYS TO IMPROVE EMERGENCY PLANNING

Recognizing that the present emergency planning system is not as effective as possible, both the Congress and executive branch have attempted to improve the situation.

Two bills have been introduced in the Senate to correct civil preparedness problems. One bill, resulting from a study by the Joint Committee on Defense Production, would create a new agency by combining the functions currently held by FPA, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. The new agency would be the single contact point for all Federal, State, local, and private preparedness. The other bill would divide the functions of FPA among the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, and DOD.

Our review was not directed at examining the need for a changed organizational structure for managing civil preparedness. However, in our earlier report 1/ we pointed out a number of organizational problems and discussed

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1/See footnote, p. 7.

some options to be considered in restructuring the Nation's approach to civil preparedness. These options, extracted from our earlier report, are presented in appendix II.

In August 1977 the President directed that a major study of civil preparedness be undertaken to define the problems and propose program improvements. Studies are also underway at DOD and the National Security Council. The studies are intended to define the various civil preparedness options and the relationship of civil preparedness to national strategic goals.

In addition, FPA has considered ways to improve emergency planning. In its fiscal year 1976 guidance to Federal agencies, FPA identified five major actions to improve the status of preparedness activities.

--More direct involvement by agency leadership.

--An increased commitment of staff time to preparedness activities.

--A reduced turnover rate in emergency preparedness assignments.

--Provision of definitive guidance to agencies' field representatives concerning their preparedness responsibilities.

--Greater emphasis on making emergency preparedness a part of the agencies' regular functions.

Our questionnaires asked emergency team members for their views on improving emergency preparedness. Of the respondents:

--Thirty-four percent said that agency management needed to place more emphasis on the program.

--Fifty-nine percent said that more briefings and exercises were needed to familiarize personnel with the program.

--Seventy-six percent said that emergency provisions for their families needed to be improved.

We believe many of these actions would improve the program without incurring large costs.

## A PROPOSAL

We believe that the major civil preparedness problems have resulted from inadequate direction, emphasis, and consideration at the highest levels of the Federal Government. The recent efforts by the executive branch and the Congress are significant endeavors to improve the civil emergency preparedness program. Whatever the outcome of these efforts, certain basic questions must be addressed.

- Should we have a civil preparedness program?
- If so, what should it encompass?
- What is the compatibility between preparedness for nuclear war and preparedness for natural or man-made disasters?
- How much preparedness are we willing to pay for, considering our finite resources?
- What is the role of civil preparedness in our national strategic policy, and what effect will it have?
- What are the roles of Federal, State, and local jurisdictions in such a program?
- How will civil preparedness affect individuals and democratic values?
- What options do we have for civil preparedness, and what will they cost in terms of available resources?

Once these questions have been answered, the interdependence of all agencies must be described in detail in order to highlight problem areas, define fragmented management problems, and provide a basis for coordination and understanding. A workable civil preparedness program will not be possible unless it includes an effective mechanism for developing and maintaining cohesiveness among all Federal agencies, State and local governments, and private industry.

### CHAPTER 3

#### THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE

#### FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY IS LIMITED

In view of the various activities that will be necessary to help the Nation survive and recover from an emergency and the many Federal agencies that will be called on to carry out those activities, strong direction, evaluation, and coordination of emergency planning are needed in peacetime. This role has been assigned to FPA. Under Executive Order 11051, FPA is responsible for advising and assisting the President in

- determining policy,
- developing planning assumptions,
- developing broad emergency preparedness objectives,
- developing policies and plans to insure the continuity of essential Federal Government activities, and
- coordinating emergency plans.

In a February 1977 report, the Joint Committee on Defense Production referred to "adequate prior coordination" as the "essence of disaster preparedness." Although the Committee report identified the Federal Government as ideally suited for the role of coordination, it noted that Federal efforts, especially in regard to State and local agencies, were weakened significantly by conflicting national goals and priorities. This resulted partly from the diversified, decentralized, and fragmented efforts of agencies with emergency planning responsibilities. In addition, the responses to our questionnaire showed that nearly half of the team members do not know how their agencies will coordinate with other departments, State and local governments, or the private sector.

#### ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNDING LIMITATIONS

Although FPA has been assigned the preparedness coordinating and policymaking functions, it cannot require other Federal agencies to take specific actions regarding preparedness planning and it does not control the funds for such actions.

Before 1973 the responsibilities now assigned to FPA were carried out in the Executive Office of the President. That Office had central control over the emergency preparedness budgets of some Federal agencies with emergency responsibilities. This control, known as the delegate agency budget, gave emphasis to particular preparedness activities and to the total preparedness program. When emergency preparedness responsibilities were transferred out of the Executive Office, this control ended. FPA now can only provide guidance to agencies; it lacks authority to require agencies to incorporate the guidance into their preparedness programs.

The shift of policy and coordinating responsibilities to a subsidiary agency within the General Services Administration has lowered the visibility of emergency preparedness, according to critics of the move. In its February 1977 report, the Joint Committee on Defense Production concluded that the 1973 reorganization and termination of the delegate budget authority had reduced the effectiveness and responsiveness of emergency preparedness systems by

- removing all central review and control over emergency preparedness programs and budgets;
- fragmenting the capability for coordinating preparedness efforts among Federal, State, local, and private agencies;
- reducing the prominence and authority of preparedness agencies and their directors, making even more difficult their crucial role in obtaining adequate resources for preparedness programs; and
- creating a series of competing and often overlapping preparedness activities.

The Committee also concluded that the reorganization had severely impaired the Federal Government's ability to coordinate its own preparedness plans and programs and those of State and local governments.

#### EFFORTS TO COORDINATE PLANNING

Despite its inability to require other agencies' specific actions, FPA has tried to coordinate preparedness planning through the Interagency Emergency Preparedness Committee. In addition, individual agencies have established coordinating groups and interagency agreements. According to the Joint Committee report, 175 committees and groups

have been organized. However, we found that some groups were inactive or were otherwise unsuccessful in coordinating emergency planning.

For example, the Interagency Emergency Preparedness Committee--sponsored by FPA and composed of representatives from all agencies with emergency responsibilities--should meet at least annually, according to an FPA official. However, at the time of our review, the committee had not met in about 2 years. Also, the committee may not be a realistic planning forum because the Executive Office and the National Security Council are not represented. Moreover, most agencies send emergency coordinators and other representatives rather than high-level officials to committee meetings. We believe higher level officials should also attend because of the management responsibilities they will have in an emergency.

In a 1975 FPA survey of the committee's effectiveness, the Department of Transportation recommended that the committee assume a role that would be more productive than the merely informational role it had taken. This could be achieved, it was suggested, by appointing working groups to study issues and report their findings to the committee. During the same survey, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare said that the committee needed to work toward stated objectives, rather than simply revising existing rules. These and other suggestions made in response to the FPA survey had not been implemented at the time of our review.

Another coordinating group, the Interagency Emergency Transportation Committee, was established by the Department of Transportation in 1968. The committee was expected to meet at least annually. However, at the time of our review, the committee had not met for several years, and in April 1977 the Department decided not to reactivate it.

Coordination of the Federal Government with State and local governments and the private sector is much weaker than coordination among Federal agencies. Several major departments have had little or no formal participation with State or local governments or private organizations. For example, the Departments of Labor and Agriculture did not participate in any such meetings during fiscal year 1976. Although the Departments of Health, Education, and Welfare and Transportation participated in some activities with State and local governments and private organizations, their participation was far below their participation in federally sponsored meetings on civil preparedness issues.

Agreements and memorandums of understanding are more formal methods agencies use to coordinate their planning activities with other Federal agencies and with non-Federal organizations. Although such agreements have been instrumental in more precisely defining emergency responsibilities, many of them are not current, often because of governmental reorganizations.

For example, the Department of Agriculture maintains many interagency agreements, including those with the Departments of the Treasury, the Interior, Commerce, Defense, and Health, Education, and Welfare. Several agreements date from the 1960s. As a further example, Health, Education, and Welfare has agreements with 20 volunteer welfare organizations, such as the Salvation Army. However, 19 of these agreements were negotiated during the early 1960s. According to a Department official, the agreements need updating because of changes in agencies' organizational structures and in legislation and Executive orders relating to emergency preparedness.

Another way in which the Federal Government has attempted to strengthen its preparedness capabilities was by establishing the National Defense Executive Reserve. The reserve is composed of key personnel from industry, government, labor, the professions, and academic communities to be trained for filling executive positions in the Federal Government during an emergency. FPA is responsible for administering and coordinating the executive reserve program.

This program could provide some of the advance planning necessary to coordinate public and private resources in an emergency. For example, when executive reservists participate with Government employees in preparedness training programs, they share ideas and expertise in solving probable emergency situations.

However, this program has not been very effective. The number of reservists--most of whom are from private industry--declined from about 3,500 in 1972 to about 3,000 in 1976, and only nine Federal agencies now participate in the program. Also during this period, the Department of Agriculture phased out its program altogether. More importantly, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and other agencies having functions deemed essential for our national survival have not participated in the program. Furthermore, the Interagency National Defense Executive Reserve Committee, formed to advise the FPA Director on policies, procedures, and activities of the reserve program, has not met since early 1976.

## UNTIMELY ASSUMPTIONS AND GUIDANCE

In carrying out its responsibility for broad emergency preparedness policies and objectives, FPA develops planning assumptions and provides guidance to other Federal agencies. To be useful to the other agencies in making their continuity-of-government plans, such guidance should be realistic and up to date. This has not always been the case.

### Planning assumptions

Underlying FPA's emergency preparedness planning are certain basic assumptions concerning the types of threats the Nation faces. Although world conditions change dramatically and frequently, the assumptions on which FPA planning is based have not been changed for over a decade. The basic planning assumptions define such general threats as international tension, limited war, and general war, as follows:

- A period of increasing international tension could result in small-scale wars and insurgencies requiring some degree of American political, economic, or military involvement. However, the scale of involvement would not require significantly expanded civil response to support military action or maintain assistance to allies.
- A limited war could involve an attack on the continental United States or the deployment of American forces to several areas of the world while simultaneously fulfilling other requirements for foreign assistance and counterinsurgency activity. These conditions could require extensive mobilization measures.
- A general war would involve a full-scale attack upon the United States and would require immediate implementation of comprehensive emergency measures to mobilize the Nation's resources, not only for defeating the enemy, but also for ensuring the survival and eventual recovery of the Nation.

These definitions are further refined with more detailed scenarios that address expected demands for resources and military requirements based on intelligence estimates. These assumptions, prepared in 1966, address the 10-year period through 1976. However, FPA officials acknowledge that the assumptions have not always accurately portrayed the Nation's military posture. An interagency steering group chaired by

the Director of FPA revised the assumptions during 1976. The assumptions were expanded to include, in addition to national security measures, internal security measures, resource emergencies, and peacetime nuclear emergencies. The new assumptions, to provide guidance in emergency plans for 1976-81, were still being reviewed by the Executive Office of the President as of March 1978.

Federal agencies also receive guidance from the National Plan for Emergency Preparedness, which complements the basic assumptions and provides guidance tailored to specific functional areas. Using this plan, agencies are responsible for preparing operational plans. The plan has not been updated since 1964, although FPA was working with other departments to do so at the time of our review.

Another functional plan that agencies can refer to is the classified Federal Emergency Plan D, last updated in 1970. This plan differs from the unclassified national plan in that it contains draft action documents that would activate emergency standby organizations for mobilizing the Nation's resources and stabilizing the economy. FPA and other agencies were revising Plan D; the revisions were to be completed during fiscal year 1977. FPA officials stated that the revisions were completed and sent to the Office of Management and Budget during April 1977 for its review and approval; the review had not been completed at the time of our audit.

### FPA guidance

Circulars and directives prepared by FPA and its predecessor agencies are available to Federal agencies for establishing plans and operating procedures for continuity-of-government planning.

Even though FPA had been established for over 2 years at the time of our review, it had done little to update its directives. For example, during fiscal year 1977, FPA planned to revise and reissue 24 policy guidance directives related to general war planning. However, in late fiscal year 1977, FPA had revised only three of the directives. Other guidance developed by FPA's predecessor remained unchanged at the time of our review--even though it was several years old.

In addition to the general guidance provided by circulars and directives, FPA issues annual guidance to Federal agencies, commenting on emergency preparedness activities needing improvement. The agencies are expected

to use the annual guidance in preparing their programs for the upcoming year. Considering the lack of currency and ongoing revision of much of the other guidance, we believe that the annual guidance becomes more important.

FPA did not issue annual guidance to Federal agencies on a timely basis. Of the agencies we visited, several either had not yet received fiscal year 1977 guidance or had just recently received it--even though the fiscal year was almost over. Therefore, many agencies were not able to use the guidance during the year to which it applied.

#### EVALUATION OF AGENCY PROGRAMS

Under Executive Order 11490, FPA is responsible for evaluating agencies' emergency plans. FPA therefore requires annual reports from the agencies and makes onsite reviews of their preparedness programs. However, neither the reports nor the agency reviews are sufficient to insure that all deficiencies are identified and all necessary corrective actions are taken.

According to FPA officials, FPA reviews the agencies' annual reports and stands ready to help them overcome deficiencies. However, not all deficiencies may be identified in the annual reports, since the reports are the agencies' own evaluations of their preparedness programs. The only independent evaluations of agencies' programs are FPA's agency reviews--made at intervals of a year or more.

FPA evaluates agencies' emergency preparedness programs through a combination of questionnaires and agency visits. The questionnaire is designed to determine whether agencies are meeting requirements set by FPA and its predecessor agencies. Questionnaires completed by the agencies are reviewed by FPA personnel, who later meet with agency officials to discuss their responses and obtain any necessary clarifications. The actual review at the agency lasts 1 day. Later, FPA sends a written report to the agency head, citing deficiencies and recommended corrective actions.

Officials at the agencies we reviewed indicated that FPA's reviews were superficial and did not effectively evaluate their preparedness programs. Consequently, the feedback they received from FPA lacked substance and seldom resulted in improved preparedness programs. For example:

- Recommendations for correcting deficiencies requiring both FPA and agency actions seldom identified specific actions to be taken by each.

--Some recommendations FPA identified as requiring only agency action also required FPA action. For example, FPA often recommended that agency officials make arrangements with local private firms to transport emergency team members to emergency operating facilities. However, FPA did not indicate that these firms would be given special passes to ease their passage during an emergency--which are provided by FPA.

Twenty-three agency reviews have been made since 1974.

### CONCLUSIONS

It is clearly recognized that coordination is at the heart of effective emergency preparedness planning. And, although FPA has been assigned the overall coordinating and reviewing function, it does not have the organizational stature or funding authority to require or enable other Federal agencies to take specific preparedness actions. Despite these limitations, however, we believe that FPA could be more effective.

FPA's planning assumptions and guidance should be updated, and agency reviews should be more indepth and should be followed up periodically. Also, interagency coordinating committees should meet periodically to set objectives. Most importantly, the people who will have roles in actual emergencies need to be fully informed on how their actions will be coordinated with those of other Federal employees and of State and local governments and private industry. Without such information, we believe that in an emergency, there would be confusion in decisionmaking and in taking the actions necessary for the Nation's survival and recovery. (Also see ch. 4.)

### RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Administrator of General Services direct the Director of FPA to more effectively coordinate planning activities by:

- Evaluating the coordinating committees and inter-agency agreements to determine their overall contribution to preparedness planning. Those committees considered important should meet regularly and frequently, and necessary agreements should be kept up to date.
- Suggesting that more agencies having essential functions participate in the National Defense Executive Reserve Program.

--Developing more indepth agency reviews and incorporating periodic followups into the review process.

### AGENCY COMMENTS

We discussed this report with responsible officials of the agencies involved. Their comments were incorporated in the report as appropriate. They stated that their agencies assign a low priority to emergency preparedness. Many believe that this is exemplified by the low visibility of the entire Federal Government preparedness effort, in particular, the Federal Preparedness Agency's activities. Officials often said that the Agency now holds an obscure spot within the General Services Administration compared to its predecessor's (the Office of Emergency Preparedness) position within the Executive Office of the President. They believe this loss of stature has reduced its enforcement capability (for example, its capability to have agencies act promptly to correct deficiencies in their preparedness programs).

Several agency officials stated that the program can be improved only if the President and his highest level advisors and officials direct participation and compliance by all levels of the executive branch. Additionally, these high-level officials should add the weight of their influence by directly participating in the various civil preparedness programs and exercises.

### RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONGRESS

We believe that the Congress should enact legislation that would reestablish delegate agency funding. Such legislation would provide central control over the emergency preparedness budgets of departments and agencies.

Within the context of this report, the Congress should consider, in its reorganization evaluations, the importance of where in the Federal structure the civil preparedness program could best be placed to give it adequate authority regardless of the level of funding. For example, the Congress may wish to emphasize the importance of emergency preparedness by increasing the visibility and organizational stature of the Federal Preparedness Agency either by elevating its position in the Federal structure or by making it an independent agency.

## CHAPTER 4

### AGENCIES' PREPAREDNESS PLANNING

#### SHOULD BE IMPROVED

Adequately planning for continuity of government and survival of the Nation in a national emergency is a formidable challenge for Federal agencies. Using broad guidance from FPA, Federal agencies must develop specific plans geared to their own unique operations--without losing sight of where they fit into the overall Federal structure. This is a complex and demanding task, which can require considerable effort and expenditure, depending on how the agencies interpret FPA guidance and what priority they give to this area. The removal of Executive Office stature has been interpreted as a lowering of priority and emphasis and a minimizing of the importance of emergency preparedness.

Our review of important aspects of six Federal agencies' emergency plans showed that the agencies generally have not:

- Clearly identified their most important emergency functions.
- Adequately identified and trained key emergency personnel or arranged for their ready activation.
- Adequately addressed major problems that are almost certain to occur during a national emergency.

Because of these weaknesses, we believe that the continuity of the Federal Government and survival of the Nation would be seriously jeopardized in a national emergency.

#### IDENTIFICATION OF ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS

During nonemergency periods, Federal agencies perform many functions, some of which would be more important than others during a national emergency. In addition, agencies will be expected to perform other functions during an emergency. Therefore, continuity of the Government depends on clearly identifying essential functions before an emergency, so that personnel will not waste time on less important functions.

#### Assigned emergency responsibilities

Executive Order 11490, as amended, requires each agency having essential functions, whether or not expressly

identified in the order, to plan for continuing them in an emergency. The responsibilities described in the order are stated in broad terms, allowing various interpretations to be made about the range of activity intended.

The number of emergency responsibilities that each agency has varies, and the responsibilities are not ranked among or within the agencies in any order of importance. For example:

--DOD is assigned 30 emergency functions, including:  
"Furnish military requirements for all forms of transportation and transportation facilities."

--The Department of Transportation is assigned four planning and coordinating functions, including:  
"Develop systems for the control of the movement of passengers and cargo by all forms--except for those resources under the Department of Defense."

To better define the responsibilities set forth in the Executive order, FPA's predecessor agency issued guidance to agencies in April 1972. The guidance established three categories of emergency responsibilities, as follows:

"Category A. Organizations requiring a capability for uninterrupted emergency operations including the immediate preattack, transattack and immediate post-attack periods.

"Category B. Organizations with a requirement for postattack reconstitution as soon as conditions permit, unless otherwise directed by appropriate authority.

"Category C. Organizations that are to defer reconstitution until directed by appropriate authority."

In response to the guidance, 25 of 36 agencies identified in the Executive order were classified as category A. Ten of the other 11 agencies were classified as category B, except for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which is category C. According to an FPA official, the agencies participated in determining these categorizations. Each agency was also asked to categorize its organizational components as category A, B, or C.

In February 1973 FPA's predecessor issued further guidance to Federal emergency coordinators which called for separating essential functions into those that are

uninterruptible and those that are postponable, either for a certain period or indefinitely. The types of actions required during the immediate preattack period through the immediate postattack period were discussed under four broad categories: national assessment of the situation, communications with the public, support for the President on policy decisions, and survival actions and preparations for recovery.

In May 1974 FPA's predecessor expanded its guidance by stating that essential uninterruptible functions would generally fall into four categories, namely to:

- "Provide the President with continuing and meaningful assessments of the situation."
- "Provide the President with advice as to the content of public instructions and information."
- "Recommend to the President national objectives to the evolving situation."
- "Prepare to bring Federal assistance to bear in support of State and local efforts at the earliest feasible opportunity."

The guidance recognized that interpreting these categories would be difficult.

#### Agencies' approaches

Using the guidance in Executive Order 11490 and FPA guidance, agencies followed different approaches in identifying their emergency functions. At some agencies, it was possible to readily associate the emergency responsibilities defined in the Executive order to the specific emergency functions identified by the agency. For example, the Executive order gave the Department of Agriculture responsibility for rural fire defense, and within the Department, the Forest Service identified the essential function of "estimating the extent and effects of fire in rural areas." In other cases, this kind of association was difficult because specific essential functions were identified by organizational units within the agency without a clear relationship to the responsibilities established by the Executive order.

Despite FPA's repeated attempts to clarify the concept of essential functions, the broad language permits variations in deciding whether functions are essential and uninterruptible. One department said that incorrectly interpreting this guidance could result in overlooking truly essential functions.

Some examples of the different approaches used by agencies we visited follow.

--The Department of Agriculture identified, by organizational component, a total of 32 emergency functions, of which only 8 were considered uninterruptible. One of the essential uninterruptible functions included several subparts, as follows:

"Emergency action on distribution of food; distribution and use of feed, seed, fertilizer, and farm equipment; appraising impact of attack on food and agricultural resources; servicing emergency boards; essential claimancy for input."

In the category of essential but interruptible functions were such actions as inspecting eggs and encouraging research.

--The Department of Transportation identified some uninterruptible functions throughout almost all of its components.

--DOD identified functions as essential or not essential but did not state whether they were interruptible.

Besides using different approaches, some agencies did not fully identify their essential functions, despite FPA's requirements to do so. FPA found in agency reviews in late 1974 and 1975 that many major agencies had not fully complied --at least to FPA's satisfaction. One agency in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare having essential responsibilities had not identified any specific function and had made no preparedness plans.

#### ARRANGEMENTS FOR EMERGENCY PERSONNEL

Once Federal agencies have clearly designated their essential functions, key personnel should be identified to carry out those functions in a national emergency. To act promptly and effectively, these personnel must be thoroughly familiar with their emergency sites and operations.

FPA tasks the agencies having uninterruptible functions to establish at the national level three equally capable emergency teams:

--One to remain at the national headquarters (team A).

--One to relocate to the FPA Special Facility (team B).

--One to relocate to an alternate headquarters site (team C).

FPA provides guidance on notifying team members of an impending emergency and offers training in emergency operations.

### Identifying emergency teams

Although the agencies we reviewed had established emergency teams, they had generally not completed the assignment of personnel to the teams. For example, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had vacancies of 60 percent, 44 percent, and 23 percent respectively, on the three teams. Further, although FPA suggests that agencies designate alternates for the team members, 35 percent of the team members responding to our questionnaire said alternates had not been designated and another 45 percent said they did not know whether alternates had been named.

The established teams differed greatly in size and structure among the agencies. These differences appear to be related to the agencies' different methods of determining essential functions. For example, the Department of Transportation had four teams: the three teams called for in FPA guidance and a fourth team to manage resources at the Department's alternate relocation site. In addition, operating elements in the Department, such as the Federal Railroad Administration, have their own emergency teams. Examples of team positions filled as of July 1977 are shown below.

	<u>Team A</u>	<u>Team B</u>	<u>Team C</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Agency determined authorization</u>
Department of Agriculture	51	24	26	101	110
Department of Labor	22	12	25	59	69
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare	16	25	109	150	226
Department of Housing and Urban Development	56	17	60	133	196
Department of Transportation	63	51	116	a/230	252

a/Excludes 240 positions on the fourth team.

## Training team members

Over 90 percent of the team members responding to our questionnaire said they spend less than 5 percent of their time on emergency preparedness activities. Since their day-to-day work does not involve preparedness, team members must receive formal or informal training on what conditions to expect in an emergency, where to report, what material is needed, and how to operate. The critical importance of such training is addressed in FPA's policy guidance to Federal agencies. FPA also sponsors training programs and invites the agencies to participate. Nevertheless, many team members have not had any substantive training.

FPA conducts annual interagency tests and exercise programs under simulated emergency conditions. Federal agencies are invited to participate in the programs to evaluate the effectiveness of their plans and procedures in a national emergency. However, 3 of 11 major Federal departments did not participate in fiscal year 1975 and 2 did not participate in fiscal year 1976.

Some agencies that did participate sent only a few personnel. For example, the Departments of Agriculture and Labor each sent only six team members to the 1976 national readiness exercise. This low level of participation seems particularly unfortunate since, according to FPA, the general consensus of participating agencies was that the programs were quite beneficial.

In addition to participating in the FPA exercises, agencies can train and test their teams by sending team members to their relocation sites or by giving briefings on emergency operations. However, most team members had not received such training, as shown by their questionnaire responses highlighted below.

--About 64 percent of the respondents had attended a briefing, 44 percent in the past year.

--Forty-six percent had attended an exercise program.

--Forty percent had visited their emergency duty stations.

We believe that insufficient training is accountable for team members' poor understanding of emergency preparedness functions, as evidenced by the following responses to our questionnaire.

- Although 87 percent of the respondents had information on emergency duties, only 25 percent had written information available at both their homes and their offices.
- Twenty-nine percent of the respondents said they had little or no understanding of their agencies' emergency responsibilities.
- Thirty-seven percent said they had little or no understanding of their individual emergency duties.
- Thirty-eight percent said they were unprepared for basic emergency actions, such as traveling to and gaining access to their emergency duty sites.

Some reasons given by FPA for deficiencies in training programs were insufficient involvement by agency leadership and insufficient staff time committed to preparedness activities; the reason usually cited by the agencies was inadequate funding.

#### Activating emergency teams

Certain arrangements must be made to ensure that emergency teams can be readily activated if needed. Arrangements were inadequate in a wide range of areas. For example, two departments did not have written guidance describing the conditions under which succession to top-level offices, if needed, would occur. Also, one department had not distributed lists of emergency team members' telephone numbers to the teams.

In addition to the deficiencies identified during our visits, responses from our questionnaire showed other planning weaknesses, such as:

- Although FPA suggested that team members make emergency provisions for their immediate families, 84 percent had not done so. The Department of Transportation had made some provision.
- Fifty-seven percent of the team members said they had no information on actions to be taken if an emergency happened when they were not readily available, due to travel, annual leave, or a similar reason.
- Despite a General Services Administration requirement for agencies to insure that team members'

home telephones will be in service in the event of an emergency, 77 percent of the team members said this had not been done and an additional 14 percent did not know whether it had been done.

#### PLANS FOR SOLVING MAJOR PROBLEMS

Obviously, a national emergency, such as a nuclear attack, would create an enormous number of serious and complex problems that Federal agencies do not encounter routinely. The problems would involve all facets of life and Federal activities--health, transportation, food, water, shelter, etc. Yet Federal agencies generally have not made detailed plans for these unusually severe problems. Instead, they plan on the premise that they will simply continue their normal functions.

Some officials believed that it was either unnecessary or impractical to have detailed plans for solving these problems. Other reasons for not developing detailed plans included:

--The precise emergency situation that will be faced cannot be foreseen.

--For such planning to be effective, several agencies would have to work jointly, and no one agency is in a clear-cut leadership role.

In our questionnaire we asked team members about their understanding of several basic problems that would arise in an emergency. The percentages of those responding who believed they had a very poor understanding of their role in solving these problems are summarized on the next page.

<u>Area</u>	<u>Percentage with very poor understanding</u>
Identify and distribute food supplies and relocate surplus food to areas of need	34
Identify and direct medical resources to areas of greatest need, establish emergency hospitals, etc.	34
Establish and maintain emergency transportation systems	26
Protect and maintain water supplies or other necessary utilities	36

We believe Federal agency plans should be reasonably specific in regard to dealing with the most severe problems likely to result from an emergency. While we recognize the practical difficulties in making such plans, we believe the difficulties do not justify the present lack of planning.

#### CONCLUSIONS

As a result of the deficiencies in Federal agencies' continuity-of-government plans, key personnel would likely be confused about what to do, how to do it, and where to go in a national emergency. Much more needs to be done to clearly identify essential emergency functions, inform team members of their emergency roles, and plan for the serious problems that can be expected. Emphasis on these areas would improve the effectiveness of Federal plans and help the Nation recover more quickly from an emergency, without incurring large costs.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Administrator of General Services direct the Director of FPA to:

- Develop more specific criteria for other Federal agencies to use in determining which Government functions would be essential and uninterruptible in an emergency.

--Direct Federal agencies to develop reasonably specific plans to deal with the most severe problems likely to result from an emergency.

We also recommend that the Director, in coordination with other Federal agencies, develop comprehensive guidance on training. We believe the guidance should include coordination of all agency training programs with FPA-sponsored programs and should encourage periodic visits to emergency operating facilities by team members.

## CHAPTER 5

### INFORMATION NEEDED TO OPERATE IN AN EMERGENCY MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE

In a national emergency, such as a nuclear attack, the Federal Government would need to have certain information readily available to assess damages and remaining resources. Appropriate emergency actions will depend on a reasonably accurate assessment of the damages inflicted.

FPA's computerized resource data system contains information on existing resources in 14 functional areas, such as transportation, agriculture, and military. The information is provided to FPA primarily by Federal agencies with responsibilities in those areas. For example, files on highways and bridges are the responsibility of the Department of Transportation. In general, the files provided to FPA are extracted from files maintained by the agencies in their routine functions, rather than files especially established for emergency planning. As a result of not being tailored for damage assessment, the files contain both unneeded information and gaps in coverage.

FPA's resource data system does not include all the files and information that would be needed for day-to-day operations of Federal agencies in the postattack period. Rather, it is intended to provide basic information needed to predict damages and help plan initial emergency actions. In the postattack period, other records and files would be needed for Federal agencies to direct the return to normal operations.

In this segment of our review, we focused on FPA's data system rather than on the whole range of information that would be needed to resume full-scale Government operations in the postattack period. We plan to examine the adequacy and security of this broader range of information in our future work.

### NEED FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF INFORMATION REQUIRED

FPA does not systematically study and determine the types of information that would be required for a reasonably accurate assessment of damages incurred during an attack. Rather, the files in the system have been gathered, over time, from various Federal agencies primarily on the basis

of the agencies' individual judgments. In general, FPA has accepted information without independently deciding whether the information is really needed. We believe this could result in some unneeded information being maintained and in some needed information not being maintained--a situation that would create serious problems in an emergency.

In this regard, an FPA official said that all 10 military files included in the system, although used for training, are not needed for damage assessment by FPA. Additionally, information is missing in such areas as availability of skilled labor forces at the local level and numbers of operating trucks. Also according to the official, determining the content of the information in the data base is the responsibility of the other Federal agencies.

#### OUTDATED AND INACCURATE DATA

Once the information needed for damage assessment has been identified, a system should be established to ensure that information submitted is current and accurate. However, FPA does not have a system or the resources for routinely verifying the information.

According to FPA officials, the various Federal agencies are responsible for insuring that information submitted to FPA is accurate and current. Therefore, FPA makes only a limited review of the information, looking only for obvious errors or inconsistencies with information already received. At the same time, though, some of the other agencies also make merely cursory or no reviews of the information.

Certain Federal agencies depend primarily on field offices or State governments for the reliability of some information. For example, the Department of Transportation depends on State governments for information on highway facilities. In such instances, field offices or State governments submit information directly to FPA so the Federal agencies do not have an opportunity to review the information. Since our review, the Federal Highway Administration has issued a new regulation which requires States to forward their data to it. It then reviews the data and forwards the data to FPA.

Because there is no system at FPA for reviewing and verifying the resource data, much of the data is old; many files date from the early 1960s and some from the late 1950s. Old data is not necessarily inaccurate, but its age does raise a question about its applicability.

In reviewing selected files on 3 of the 14 functional categories in FPA's resource data system, we found that:

- In the transportation category, files on railroads and civilian airfields needed to be updated.
- In the military category, certain files on installations needed to be updated.
- In the agriculture category, files on cropland harvested and livestock needed to be updated.

The currency of information in these files ranged from 1958 to 1974.

Efforts were underway in some cases to develop more current information. For example, the Department of Transportation railroad file is in the final stages of being revised and updated, and the Department of Agriculture will update its files after receiving more current data from the U.S. Census Bureau.

An FPA official feels that the responsibility for updating files belongs primarily to the agencies, since they should know better what needs to be updated. But the files are generally updated only if there is a need to do so in the agencies' normal operations, and copies are then provided to FPA. FPA does not have a system for ranking the priorities of files that need to be updated, nor has it estimated the cost for keeping the files current. However, FPA officials believe that the cost would be substantial, and funds for such a huge effort have not been available.

#### INFORMATION NOT READILY AVAILABLE

For the FPA resource data system to be effective, the data must be available to and understood by the users. This is not always the case.

The data system is designed so that information needed by agency personnel to perform assigned tasks during an emergency can be obtained from computer terminals located at Federal emergency operating facilities. Federal agencies with essential uninterruptible functions should have computer terminals at their headquarters sites and at their alternate relocation sites; however, only 19 of the 26 agencies that submit resource data have made arrangements to access the system. After our review FPA officials stated that funds were approved for obtaining terminals; the delivery date is unknown.

Also, the responses to our questionnaire showed that 73 percent of the emergency team members do not know if their teams will have access to the data system in a national emergency. This suggests that team members may not be aware of the information that will be available and that they probably cannot personally use the system.

Another problem relates to the format of reports obtained from the system. During a recent FPA exercise, a DOD official pointed out that managers would have trouble effectively using the reports because of their length and the difficulty in reading and understanding them.

FPA officials acknowledged the problems with the present system. A new system, which was being developed at the time of our review, should give agencies better analysis capabilities, more flexible formats, and more timely information.

### CONCLUSIONS

In an emergency, Federal agencies might not be able to accurately assess the damage to the Nation's resources because of the following problems in the present resource data system:

- FPA has not independently determined what information is needed in the system.
- The information provided is not always reviewed at the headquarters level for accuracy and currency.
- Some agencies do not have the capability at emergency sites to access data from the system, and some Federal team members are unaware of its existence or how to obtain and use the information.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Administrator of General Services direct the Director of FPA, together with other Federal agencies, to determine the requirements for the resource data system. Once this has been done, a system should be developed for jointly reviewing the accuracy and currency of the data and for setting priorities on data updating.

We also recommend that the Director encourage and assist Federal agencies in developing the capability to use the FPA information system.

## CHAPTER 6

### EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITIES ARE NOT READY

To reduce the vulnerability of the Government and insure its continuity during a national emergency, team members must operate from protected, well-equipped facilities.

In the event of nuclear attack, team A would be at the regular national headquarters of the department or agency, team B would relocate to the FPA Consolidated Special Facility, and team C would go to its agency's alternate headquarters facility outside Washington, D.C. The C team facilities, scattered in a wide area around Washington, are generally in sections of existing buildings that vary in age and structural design.

Of 33 agencies that are required to relocate their C teams to an alternate facility, 6 neither have a facility nor share one with another agency. In addition, many of the facilities do not meet FPA standards. In a May 1976 summary of readiness reports, FPA concluded that only the Departments of Health, Education, and Welfare; Transportation; and the Treasury have alternate relocation sites that approximate FPA standards. Since that time, six additional agencies have managed to bring their facilities up to FPA standards.

### FPA READINESS REVIEWS

FPA's predecessor provided agencies with specific guidelines for establishing and maintaining C team relocation facilities. The guidelines, dated November 1966, have not been updated since. These guidelines include requirements for:

- Security.
- Radiological protection.
- Logistical support.
- Space per person.
- Food and water.
- Heating and ventilation.
- Health and sanitation.

FPA tries to inspect each relocation facility every 18 months to determine if the facilities meet the requirements. According to an FPA official, the most important requirement is the ability to operate 30 days in a "buttoned up" situation, which means the persons in the facility would not have to leave for any reason.

In reviewing FPA's status reports, we noted that, of 19 facilities,

- 4 did not have adequate water storage capabilities,
- 5 did not have adequate medical supplies,
- 3 did not have adequate fuel supplies for heating,
- 8 did not have decontamination programs,
- 7 did not have enough fuel for power generation,
- 7 did not have air filtering systems,
- 6 did not have adequate food supplies, and
- 6 did not have programs to monitor radiation.

FPA does not inspect the alternate relocation facilities maintained by DOD components and the services. The DOD liaison officer at FPA believes that DOD is prepared and that, "therefore, FPA does not need to formally review DOD sites." The DOD Emergency Coordinator said that, since DOD sites are associated with military functions, they should not be an FPA concern.

#### GAO VISITS TO FACILITIES

We visited several C team facilities to determine if the various deficiencies identified in the FPA reports still existed.

At the Department of Labor site, we found:

1. No showers or changes of clothing that are needed for decontamination.
2. No sleeping facilities.
3. No air filtering system.

4. An inadequate fuel tank for the emergency generator, which could interfere with lighting, communications, and ventilation.

The Department of Transportation site had:

1. No air filtering system.
2. No food.

The Department of Agriculture site had:

1. No sleeping facilities.
2. No food supply.
3. An inadequate water supply.
4. No air filtering system.

We believe that such major deficiencies would render the facilities nonoperational during an emergency. Officials of all three sites agreed that corrective action was needed but cited lack of funding as a major problem. After our review, and while providing oral comments on our proposed draft report, Department of Agriculture and Transportation officials indicated that their departments had ordered the required food.

### CONCLUSIONS

Some agencies required to have alternate headquarters facilities for their C teams do not have such facilities. And many of the existing facilities would be of little or no use in a nuclear attack. Even though the deficiencies are known to FPA and to the other agencies, funds have not been made available to correct them. We believe that a reevaluation is needed to determine how many of these facilities should be maintained in a minimum fashion to permit their use in an unexpected emergency.

### RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the the Administrator of General Services direct Director of FPA, together with other Federal agencies, to reevaluate the number of C team relocation facilities needed to carry out emergency actions. The evaluation should consider funding constraints and should include a review of the minimum requirements for the facilities.

CASE STUDY OF EMERGENCY PLANNING

The Department of Agriculture is required under the Defense Production Act of 1950 to develop preparedness programs to provide for the national defense and security. Pursuant to this act, Executive Order 11490, as amended, assigns emergency preparedness responsibilities to the Secretary of Agriculture. Based on this authority, Agriculture has prepared national emergency plans and programs covering:

- Food resources, farm equipment, fertilizer, and food resource facilities.
- Lands under the jurisdiction of the Secretary.
- Rural fire control.
- Defense against biological and chemical warfare and guidance on radiological fallout in relation to agriculture.
- Rural defense information and education.

During a wartime emergency, Agriculture will be responsible for implementing the plans developed. For example, Agriculture will be responsible for determining the standards of distribution of available supplies for civilian, military, agricultural production, and other purposes. Agriculture maintains standby food claimancy procedures and related documents that will help channel food resources.

Agriculture's emergency preparedness is funded and carried out by its constituent agencies. Fiscal year 1976 defense preparedness activities amounted to about \$596,000 and were performed by about 20 full-time employees and other employees who have defense assignments in addition to their regular duties.

Defense preparedness programs are developed in coordination with other Federal agencies, with State and local governments, and with food and agribusiness industries. In this respect, Agriculture has prepared memorandums of agreement to define responsibilities in areas that involve other Government agencies. For example, such memorandums exist between Agriculture and all the States on Federal-State division of postattack responsibilities in food processing, storage, and distribution.

In addition, Agriculture participates in numerous Federal interagency committees related to preparedness functions. However, during fiscal year 1976, Agriculture did not participate in any committees organized between the Federal Government and State and local governments or between the Government and private organizations.

In addition to Federal preparedness planning, Agriculture has 10 regional emergency staffs and many State and county emergency boards that are involved to a much lesser extent in preparedness activities.

During a national emergency, Agriculture predicts staff strength as the following:

National (three executive teams)	101
Regional (10 staffs)	40
Personnel involved in agricultural activities at the State, county, and local levels	55,400

In January 1975, FPA conducted an agency review of Agriculture. The following problems noted during the onsite review were not corrected at the time of our review.

- Agriculture has not designated alternates for executive team members.
- Most Agriculture team members have not visited their alternate facilities.

OPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION PRESENTEDIN OUR PRIOR REPORT 1/

In the previous report, we discussed the civil defense program as it stands today. The current program appears to be a compromise between advocates and opponents--a low-profile program which insures that some planning for protecting civilians exists, but which does not require much funding or effort. Although the funding level is relatively low, the benefits to be obtained from a civil defense program in the event of an attack may be enormous. The Government has already recognized that viable programs can be developed within the present funding constraints. For example, crisis relocation planning was chosen as an alternative to the costly construction of blast shelters.

In our 1971 report we suggested that broad policy decisions on basic civil defense planning were needed. Pending any decisions made as a result of the policy debate we suggested in chapter 2, certain options can be considered to improve the civil defense posture. Most of these options would require new legislation. Many of the options do not involve large expenditures; instead, they call for good Federal planning and support.

FEDERALIZE CIVIL DEFENSE

If the entire civil defense program were made a Federal responsibility, rather than a Federal, State, and local one, national priorities could more easily be accomplished. Many State and local officials would agree that civil defense is properly a Federal responsibility. The matching funds, previously used to support State and local civil preparedness organizations, could be redirected toward readiness in high-risk and densely populated areas. Emergency operating centers could be built and upgraded on a priority basis, and shelters could be constructed with Federal funds in areas that have shelter deficits.

However, this option has its drawbacks; without State and local involvement in nuclear preparedness, emergency plans might not be as quickly and effectively carried out. In addition, it would result in the loss of State and local government matching funds and would, therefore, increase the Federal cost for civil preparedness.

1/"Civil Defense: Are Federal, State, and Local Governments Prepared for Nuclear Attack?" (LCD-76-464, Aug. 8, 1977).

MAKE CIVIL DEFENSE PART  
OF MILITARY DEFENSE

If the civil defense program were made strictly a Federal responsibility, it could be more closely tied to military defense. For example, the National Guard and/or the Reserves could be relied on as a cost-effective bridge between peacetime and wartime readiness. They could be trained to operate key State and local emergency operating centers and radiological defense equipment, and they could take the place of State and local civil preparedness personnel in coordinating emergency plans. Most Guard and Reserve units already have the resources and the training for emergency operations, and are often the first on the scene of natural disasters. Although this option would probably involve the least cost, it might present problems to the States and communities that have developed their own emergency organizations and could conflict with the contingency military deployments of the Guard and the Reserves.

By making civil defense part of military defense, closer consideration might be given to the locations of defense installations. We believe that in future base and depot closure or transfer decisions, DOD could try to disperse its industries and give more consideration to the civil defense characteristics of the populations affected.

INVOLVE PRIVATE INDUSTRY

As discussed in chapter 2, the Government presently has no programs or incentives to insure the survival of private industry. Since the Nation's recovery depends on industrial survival, this area needs more emphasis. At the very least the survival and dispersal characteristics of critical industries could be studied, and a dialogue between the Government and the private sector begun.

Survival characteristics, important to civil defense, can be compatible with other national goals. For example, it is possible that below-ground factories, in whole or in part, may be desirable from both civil defense and energy conservation viewpoints.

Certain measures could also be taken in existing above-ground factories to improve their chances of survival. For example, subject to further study, deflecting devices made of soil could be built outside factories to protect them from some types of blast effects.

Other protective methods, based on Soviet civil defense manuals, have been tested by the Boeing Aerospace Company on its own machines. These methods included (1) packing machines in sandbags or earth, (2) covering machines with crushable material, such as plastic foam or metal chips, and then covering this material with soil or sandbags, and (3) greasing machines to prevent corrosion and then submerging or flooding them in water. The tests showed that even large machines, if properly protected, could survive if they were a few hundred feet from a 40-kiloton nuclear blast or 2,000 feet from a 1-metaton blast.

Boeing has estimated that nationwide planning costs for 10 essential industries would be \$20 to \$40 million and stockpile costs would be \$200 to \$300 million for measures offering protection against blast pressures of 40 to 80 pounds per square inch. For protection against 200 to 300 pounds per square inch, however, Boeing estimates the cost from \$2.5 billion to \$3 billion.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND AGENCY COMMENTS

These are not the only alternatives for improving the civil defense position. The Government should study these and other options to determine which ones offer the greatest benefits and what tradeoffs must be made to incorporate new lines of thinking into the civil defense program. Although each option has potential for improving the program, we believe that none will be effective unless national civil defense policy is clarified.

In their comments, DOD officials agreed that the Government should study these and other options, and develop positive program policy and direction that will provide the best possibilities within funding limitations.

As we indicated in this report, improvements can be made even within the scope of the limited civil defense program funded in recent years. A better definition of both the role of civil defense in the U.S. defense posture and the best way to accomplish such a role is needed. This can be accomplished through a Federal, a combined Federal-State-local, or private industry program.

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

SURVEY OF FEDERAL AGENCY  
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

**I. RESPONDENT INFORMATION**

Please answer each of the following questions as frankly and completely as possible.

There is space at the end of the questionnaire for any comments you may wish to make concerning the questionnaire, or any other related topics.

The questionnaire is numbered only to permit us to delete your name from our list when we receive your completed questionnaire and thus avoid sending you an unnecessary follow up request. All responses will be treated as confidential.

Throughout this questionnaire, there are numbers printed within parentheses to assist our keypunchers in coding responses for computer analysis. Please disregard these numbers. If you have any questions, please call Mr. Thomas F. O'Connor or Ms. Janis Combs at 557-2151.

NOTE: For the purposes of this questionnaire we will define a national emergency as any situation, such as a massive attack, that threatens the continuity of the Federal Government.

OPTIONAL INFORMATION	
NAME:	_____
TITLE:	_____
TELEPHONE: (     )	_____
(Area Code)	(Number)

1. Approximately how long have you been a member of the emergency preparedness team to which you are presently assigned? (Check one.)
- 1. Less than 6 months (7)
  - 2. 6 - 12 months
  - 3. 13 - 24 months
  - 4. More than 24 months
  - 5. Not applicable--no longer assigned to an emergency team--(Please complete the questionnaire based on your past experience.)

2. Since having been assigned to an emergency team, approximately what percent of your working hours have been spent on emergency preparedness activities related to your functions as a team member? (Check one.)

- 1. Less than 5% (8)
- 2. 5 - 10%
- 3. 11 - 25%
- 4. 26 - 50%
- 5. 51 - 75%
- 6. More than 75%

3. Did you volunteer or were you assigned to be a member of an emergency preparedness team? (Check one.)

- 1. Volunteered (9)
- 2. Was asked and willingly agreed
- 3. Was asked and agreed
- 4. Was assigned and agreed
- 5. Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

4. Has an alternate team member been designated for your position? (Check one.)

- 1. Yes (10)
- 2. No
- 3. Don't know

APPENDIX III

II. RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES:

5. Has your department informed you (orally or in writing) of what its essential functions would be in the event of a national emergency? (Check one.)

(11)

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. Don't remember

6. To what degree do you understand your department's essential national emergency functions? (Check one.)

(12)

- 1. Totally, or almost totally
- 2. To a large degree
- 3. To a moderate degree
- 4. To a small degree
- 5. A little or not at all

7. Has your department informed you (orally or in writing) of what your primary responsibilities would be in the event of a national emergency? (Check one.)

(13)

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. Don't remember

8. To what degree do you understand your primary national emergency responsibilities? (Check one.)

(14)

- 1. Totally, or almost totally
- 2. To a large degree
- 3. To a moderate degree
- 4. To a small degree
- 5. Little or not at all

APPENDIX III

9. How much responsibility have you been assigned in each of the areas listed below in the event of a national emergency? (Check one box for each row.)

	Sole responsibility Major responsibility Moderate responsibility Minor responsibility No responsibility					
	1	2	3	4	5	
1. Inform co-workers of the emergency situation						(15)
2. Prepare relocation site						(16)
3. Assist in relocation of other personnel						(17)
4. Working with essential records						(18)
5. Safeguard government resources						(19)
6. Coordinate activities with DOD						(20)
7. Coordinate activities with other Federal agencies						(21)
8. Coordinate activities with state/local government						(22)
9. Carry out responsibilities as assigned						(23)
10. Other (Please specify) _____						(24)

10. Have any emergency provisions been made for your immediate family? (Check one.)

(25)

- 1. Yes
- 2. No -- skip to question 13
- 3. Not applicable -- no immediate family living in area -- skip to question 13

11. Who made emergency provisions for your family? (Check one.)

(26)

- 1. My department or subgroup of department
- 2. The Federal Preparedness Agency
- 3. Another Federal agency, Department or Office
- 4. I made emergency provisions myself
- 5. Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

12. Where have emergency provisions been made to house your family? (Check one.)

(27)

- 1. At home
- 2. At a Civil Defense facility
- 3. At or near relocation site (but not a Civil Defense Facility)
- 4. At some other location away from home
- 5. Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

13. Have you been given information that explains what actions you should take if you are not available (out of town, etc.) when a national emergency occurs? (Check one.)

(28)

- 1. Yes
  - 2. No
  - 3. Don't remember
- } -- If No, or Don't remember, skip to question 15.

14. How adequate was the information provided? (Check one.)

(29)

- 1. More than adequate
- 2. Adequate
- 3. As adequate as not
- 4. Inadequate
- 5. Very inadequate

15. Consider these conditions:

- 1) National emergency situation develops,
- 2) You are at work,
- 3) You are requested to report to your emergency duty station, and
- 4) You are not injured, ill, or otherwise incapacitated.

What is the probability that you will report to your emergency duty station? (Check one.)

(30)

- 1. Highly certain to report
- 2. Would probably report
- 3. As likely to report as not
- 4. Would probably not report
- 5. Highly certain not to report

16. Consider the same conditions listed in question 15, except that you are at home. What is the probability that you will report to your emergency duty station? (Check one.)

(31)

- 1. Highly certain to report
- 2. Would probably report
- 3. As likely to report as not
- 4. Would probably not report
- 5. Highly certain not to report

17. Which, if any, of the following actions would significantly increase the probability that more team members would report if notified? (Check the more significant boxes.)

- 1. Improve emergency provisions for family (32)
- 2. Develop more effective transportation procedures (33)
- 3. Conduct more briefings and exercises to familiarize personnel with program (34)
- 4. More emphasis placed on importance of participating in program by agency management (35)
- 5. More public awareness of the benefits of the program (36)
- 6. Improve facilities at the relocation site (37)
- 7. Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_ (38)  
\_\_\_\_\_

27. Apart from the areas of responsibility that you identified in questions 24 through 26, how clear an understanding do you have of the role that other agencies will have in each of the following areas? (Check degree of understanding for each area that you indicated in question 24 as an area that your agency has no responsibility. Use the "not applicable" column for areas in question 24 identified as "major responsibility" or "some responsibility".)

	Not applicable	Very Good understanding	Modest understanding	Very Poor understanding	
	1	2	3	4	
1. Identify and distribute emergency food supplies and relocate surplus to areas of need					(34)
2. Identify and direct medical resources to areas of greatest need, establish emergency field hospitals, etc.					(35)
3. Insure that survivors are housed in temporary shelters					(36)
4. Participate in resolving conflicts between DOD and civilian agencies concerning the priority of assigned emergency actions					(37)
5. Establish and maintain emergency communications networks					(38)
6. Establish and maintain emergency transportation systems					(39)
7. Conduct or assist civilian law enforcement activities					(40)
8. Protect and maintain water supplies or other necessary utilities					(41)
9. Other (Please specify) _____ _____ _____ _____					(42)

III. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES

28. What types of information have you received explaining your role as an emergency team member? (Check all that apply.)

- 1. Written guidelines (43)
- 2. Individual briefings (44)
- 3. Team briefings (45)
- 4. Tests or exercises (46)
- 5. Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_ (47)
- 6. Received no information - skip to question 32 (48)

29. If you received any written information, where is it presently stored? (Check one.)

- 1. Not applicable--have not received written information--skip to question 31 (49)
- 2. Home
- 3. Office
- 4. Both home and office
- 5. Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

30. Approximately, how recently did you last receive written information? (Check one.)

- 1. Less than 1 month ago (50)
- 2. 1 - 6 months ago
- 3. 7 - 12 months ago
- 4. 13 - 24 months ago
- 5. More than 24 months ago

31. Have you attended any briefings concerning individual, team or department emergency responsibilities? (Check one.)

- 1. Yes (51)
- 2. No--skip to question 36

32. Approximately, how long ago was the most recent briefing? (Check one.)

- 1. Less than 1 month ago (52)
- 2. 1 - 6 months ago
- 3. 7 - 12 months ago
- 4. 13 - 24 months ago
- 5. More than 24 months ago

33. Approximately how many briefings on emergency procedures have you attended within the last two years? (Check one.)

- 1. 1 Briefing (53)
- 2. 2 - 3 Briefings
- 3. 4 - 5 Briefings
- 4. 6 - 7 Briefings
- 5. More than 7 Briefings

34. Which of the following content areas were covered in the written information that you have been given and the briefings that you have attended? (Check all that apply.)

- 01. Department emergency responsibilities (54-55)
- 02. Team emergency responsibilities (56-57)
- 03. Individual emergency responsibilities (58-59)
- 04. Procedures for updating individual availability (60-61)
- 05. Lists of team members assigned and telephone numbers (62-63)
- 06. Procedures for alerting team members if an emergency occurs during working hours (64-65)
- 07. Procedures for alerting team members if an emergency occurs during off-duty hours (66-67)
- 08. Personal items to bring to emergency duty station (68-69)
- 09. Instructions on how to get to your emergency duty station (70-71)
- 10. Instructions on how to gain access to your emergency duty station (72-73)
- 11. Explanation of your emergency responsibilities in relationship to other team members responsibilities (74-75)
- 12. Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ (76-77)

35. To what extent has attendance at briefings increased your OVERALL emergency readiness? (Check one.)

- 1. Very large extent (7)
- 2. Major extent
- 3. Moderate extent
- 4. Minor extent
- 5. Minimally or not at all

36. Have you ever visited your emergency duty station? (Check one.) (8)

- 1. Yes
- 2. No--skip to question 38

37. In terms of your emergency preparedness, how useful was your visit? (Check one.) (9)

- 1. Very useful
- 2. Moderately useful
- 3. As useful as not
- 4. Minimally useful
- 5. Little or no use

IV. EXERCISES

38. Have you participated in any emergency exercises? (Check one.) (10)

- 1. Yes
- 2. No--skip to question 46

39. Approximately how recently did you last participate in any emergency preparedness exercise? (Check one.) (11)

- 1. Less than 1 month ago
- 2. 1 - 6 months ago
- 3. 7 - 12 months ago
- 4. 13 - 24 months ago
- 5. More than 24 months ago

18. How do you notify your department when you will be unavailable to report (on leave, travel, etc.)? (Check the primary method of notification.)

- 1. Notify someone on our department clerical staff (39)
- 2. Notify immediate supervisor
- 3. Notify another team member
- 4. Notify department's emergency planner
- 5. Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- 6. Don't know

19. How adequate is the method of notifying your department of your availability? (Check one.)

- 1. More than adequate (40)
- 2. Adequate
- 3. As adequate as not
- 4. Inadequate
- 5. Very inadequate

20. Have any special provisions been made to ensure that your home telephone will be in service in the event of a national emergency? (Check one.)

- 1. Yes (41)
- 2. No
- 3. Don't remember or don't know

21. Will your team have access to the Federal Preparedness Agency's (FPA) resource data information system in the event of a national emergency? (Check one.)

- 1. Yes (42)
  - 2. No
  - 3. Don't know
- Skip to question 24

22. Should a national emergency arise how useful would FPA's resource data information system be for your team's needs? (Check one.)

- 1. Extremely useful--could not function without it (43)
- 2. Very useful
- 3. Moderately useful
- 4. Not very useful
- 5. Little or no use

23. If you were at your emergency duty station right now could you personally access FPA's resource data information system? (Check one.)

- 1. Not applicable, not my responsibility (44)
- 2. Yes
- 3. No

24. Listed below are several basic areas that would require immediate attention in the event of a national emergency. How much responsibility would your agency have in each area? (Check one box for each row.)

	Responsibility			
	Major	Some	No	
	1	2	3	
1. Identify and distribute emergency food supplies and relocate surplus to areas of need				(45)
2. Identify and direct medical resources to areas of greatest need, establish emergency field hospitals, etc.				(46)
3. Insure that survivors are housed in temporary shelters				(47)
4. Participate in resolving conflicts between DOD and civilian agencies concerning the priority of assigned emergency actions				(48)
5. Establish and maintain emergency communication networks				(49)
6. Establish and maintain emergency transportation systems				(50)
7. Conduct or assist civilian law enforcement activities				(51)
8. Protect and maintain water supplies or other necessary utilities				(52)
9. Other (Please specify) _____				(53)

25. How clear an understanding do you have of the role that your agency will have in each of the following areas? (Check degree of understanding for each area that you identified in question 24 as an area in which your agency has "major responsibility" or "some responsibility". Use the "not applicable" column for areas in question 24 identified as "no responsibility".)

	Understanding				
	1	2	3	4	
1. Identify and distribute emergency food supplies and relocate surplus to areas of need					(54)
2. Identify and direct medical resources to areas of greatest need, establish emergency field hospitals, etc.					(55)
3. Insure that survivors are housed in temporary shelters					(56)
4. Participate in resolving conflicts between DOD and civilian agencies concerning the priority of assigned emergency actions					(57)
5. Establish and maintain emergency communication networks					(58)
6. Establish and maintain emergency transportation systems					(59)
7. Conduct or assist civilian law enforcement activities					(60)
8. Protect and maintain water supplies or other necessary utilities					(61)
9. Other (Please specify) _____					(62)

26. For your department's areas of responsibility identified in question 24 that require coordination with A) other Federal agencies, B) State or local governments, or C) elements of the private sector, how adequate or inadequate are present arrangements to assure effective coordination? (Check degree of adequacy for each area of responsibility that you identified in question 24.)

	OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES					STATE OR LOCAL GOV'T					PRIVATE SECTOR					
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	
1. Identify and distribute emergency food supplies and relocate surplus to areas of need																(7-9)
2. Identify and direct medical resources to areas of greatest need, establish emergency field hospitals, etc.																(10-12)
3. Insure that survivors are housed in temporary shelters																(13-15)
4. Participate in resolving conflicts between DOD and civilian agencies concerning the priority of assigned emergency actions																(16-18)
5. Establish and maintain emergency communication networks																(19-21)
6. Establish and maintain emergency transportation systems																(22-24)
7. Conduct or assist civilian law enforcement activities																(25-27)
8. Protect and maintain water supplies or other necessary utilities																(28-30)
9. Other (Please specify) _____																(31-33)

APPENDIX III

APPENDIX III

V. CONCLUSION

47. If you have any additional comments on any of the questions or related points or topics not covered, please write your comments in the space below. Your views are greatly appreciated. Thank you. (28)

46. From your total experience to date, in the event of a national emergency, how prepared are you to perform each of the actions listed below? (Check one box for each row.)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	
	Not applicable Very Prepared Prepared As prepared as not Unprepared Very unprepared						
1. Travel from work to your emergency duty station							(18)
2. Travel from home to your duty station							(19)
3. Report your inability to travel to your emergency duty station							(20)
4. Alert other team members of the emergency							(21)
5. Bring necessary personal items to emergency duty station							(22)
6. Gain access to emergency duty station							(23)
7. Perform your emergency functions							(24)
8. Coordinate your activities with other team members from your agency							(25)
9. Coordinate your activities with other government agencies							(26)
10. Coordinate your activities with state/local government							(27)

40. Approximately how many emergency exercises have you participated in within the last two years? (Check one.)

- (12)
1. 1 Exercise
2. 2 - 3 Exercises
3. 4 - 5 Exercises
4. 6 - 7 Exercises
5. More than 7 Exercises

41. To what extent has participation in emergency exercises increased your overall emergency readiness? (Check one.)

- (13)
1. Very large extent
2. Major extent
3. Moderate extent
4. Minor extent
5. Minimally or not at all

42. What was the average length of the exercises you participated in? (Check one.)

- (14)
1. Less than 4 hours
2. 4 - 8 hours
3. 9 - 12 hours
4. 13 - 24 hours
5. 25 - 48 hours
6. More than 48 hours

43. How realistic were the emergency exercises in which you participated? (Check one.)

- (15)
1. Very realistic
2. Realistic
3. As realistic as not
4. Unrealistic
5. Very unrealistic

44. How adequate were the communications networks used during emergency exercises? (Check one.)

- (16)
1. Not applicable--no communications network used
2. Very adequate
3. Adequate
4. As adequate as not
5. Inadequate
6. Very inadequate

45. Overall, how committed were others participating in the emergency exercises?

- (17)
1. Very committed
2. Committed
3. As committed as not
4. Uncommitted
5. Very uncommitted

ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTSINTRODUCTION

As part of our review of the Federal Preparedness Agency's coordination of emergency preparedness planning among Federal departments and agencies, we made a survey of members of emergency teams in the Washington, D.C., headquarters of six Federal departments. The survey was made to learn firsthand the extent to which emergency team members (1) are aware of the responsibilities their departments and they, themselves, are expected to assume in a national emergency, (2) are involved in activities related to their roles as emergency team members, and (3) believe that they are prepared to perform their emergency team functions. It was designed so that in total the survey results would provide indicative measures of the status of the emergency preparedness program in the six departments.

Questionnaires were mailed in July 1977 to 655 emergency team members. We received completed questionnaires from 534 team members, or 82 percent of those contacted. Our response rate was at least 75 percent at each of the six departments.

The following table shows the number of team members to which questionnaires were sent and the number completing the questionnaires at each department.

Table I  
Response Rate by Department

<u>Department</u>	<u>Questionnaires</u>		<u>Response rate</u>
	<u>Sent</u>	<u>Returned</u>	
Department of Agriculture (USDA)	73	65	89.0%
Department of Defense (DOD)	77	58	75.3
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)	102	91	89.2
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)	132	109	82.6
Department of Labor (DOL)	50	42	84.0
Department of Transportation (DOT)	<u>221</u>	<u>169</u>	76.5
All departments	<u>a/655</u>	<u>534</u>	81.5

a/In total there are 996 team members, 240 of whom are in DOT but not assigned to an A, B, or C team. We excluded those members, as well as some of the highest ranking team members (general officers in DOD and those at or above the Assistant Secretary level in all departments), from our survey.

PROFILE OF EMERGENCY TEAMS

Federal departments and agencies have been instructed by FPA to establish three equally capable emergency teams:

- One to remain at the national headquarters (team A).
- One to relocate to the FPA Special Facility (team B).
- One to relocate to an alternate headquarters site (team C).

The following table shows the percentage of survey respondents on each of the three teams at each department.

Table IIComposition of Department Emergency Team Members

<u>Department</u>	<u>Percent of team members on:</u>		
	<u>Team A</u>	<u>Team B</u>	<u>Team C</u>
USDA	47.6	26.2	26.2
HUD	41.3	12.8	45.9
DOL	31.0	14.3	54.7
DOD	29.3	36.2	34.5
DOT	26.6	23.1	50.3
HEW	16.5	19.8	63.7
All departments	31.1	21.5	47.4

In completing our questionnaire, the emergency team members participating in our survey provided some background information that gives a profile of themselves and thus, to a great degree, of the emergency teams in the six departments.

About 60 percent of the emergency team members surveyed have been serving as team members for longer than 2 years. About 10 percent had been designated as emergency team members within the 6 months immediately preceding our survey. The following table shows the distribution of survey participants in terms of length of time they had been assigned to their emergency team at the time of the survey.

Table III  
Distribution of Department Team Members  
by Length of Time on Team

<u>Department</u>	<u>Percent serving as team member for:</u>		
	<u>1 year or less</u>	<u>Between 1 and 2 years</u>	<u>More than 2 years</u>
HEW	5.2	13.0	81.8
HUD	8.4	18.7	72.9
USDA	20.6	17.5	61.9
DOT	23.9	21.6	54.5
DOD	30.3	17.9	51.8
DOL	76.2	-	23.8
All departments	22.5	17.0	60.5

For the overwhelming majority of emergency team members, their activities as team members make up a very small part of their working hours. Ninety-two percent of the survey participants reported that less than 5 percent of their working hours are devoted to emergency preparedness activities. Only a small segment of those surveyed, less than 2 percent, reported that more than 75 percent of their working hours are spent on such activities.

A similarly high proportion of the respondents reported that they had been chosen as emergency team members rather than volunteering. Only 2 percent reported that they had volunteered for the assignment.

#### Awareness of responsibilities

Probably the most fundamental requirement for ensuring that a team member functions effectively in an emergency is that the individual be informed as to what his or her responsibilities will be. Thus, informing the team member of his or her primary responsibilities in an emergency would seem to be an essential part of any emergency preparedness program. In our survey we found that team members are not being so informed to the extent that would seem appropriate. Only 56 percent of the team members surveyed reported having been informed by their department of what their

primary responsibilities would be in a national emergency. Thirty-nine percent said that they had not been informed of their primary responsibilities, and 5 percent could not remember if they had been so informed. DOD had the highest percentage of team members who had been informed of their emergency responsibilities, while HUD had the lowest. This distribution by department is shown in the following table.

Table IV

Ranking of Departments by Proportion of  
Team Members Who Have Been Informed  
of Their Individual Responsibilities

<u>Department</u>	<u>Percent (note a)</u>
DOD	78.9
HEW	67.4
USDA	67.2
DOL	61.9
DOT	51.9
HUD	46.7
All departments	59.2

a/These percentages are based on those who remember whether or not they had been informed of their responsibilities. As stated above, 56 percent reported having been informed of their responsibilities.

Of perhaps less importance, but nonetheless of value to an emergency team member, is being informed as to what his or her department's essential functions would be in an emergency. Our survey results indicate that team members have not been informed to the extent that might be considered appropriate. When asked if their department has informed them of what its essential functions would be in a national emergency, about 71 percent responded affirmatively. Twenty-three percent said that they had not been so informed, and 6 percent reported that they could not remember whether or not they had been informed.

DOL had the highest percentage of team members who were informed of their department's responsibilities, while HUD had the lowest. The agency distribution is shown in the following table.

Table V

Ranking of Departments by Proportion of Team Members Who Have Been Informed of Their Department Responsibilities

<u>Department</u>	<u>Percent (note a)</u>
DOL	92.7
DOD	84.2
HEW	79.8
DOT	73.5
USDA	73.0
HUD	64.1
All departments	75.4

a/This percentage is based on those who remember whether or not they had been informed. As stated above, 71 percent reported having been informed of their department responsibilities.

We also asked team members how well they understood their individual emergency responsibilities and those of their department. Their responses indicate that many do not have a good understanding of these responsibilities.

Sixty-three percent of the team members assessed themselves as having a good understanding of their responsibilities. <sup>1/</sup> A slightly higher proportion, 73 percent, reported a good understanding of their department's responsibilities.

Concerning individual and departmental responsibilities, DOD had the highest proportion of team members having a good

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<sup>1/</sup>Team members having a good understanding are defined as those who assessed their degree of understanding as either moderate, large, or total.

understanding, while HUD had the lowest. The agency distribution is shown in the following table.

Table VI

Proportion of Team Members Having  
a Good Understanding of Their Individual  
and Their Department's Responsibilities

<u>Department</u>	<u>Percent of team members having a good understanding of their:</u>	
	<u>Individual responsibilities</u>	<u>Department's responsibilities</u>
DOD	87.7	91.4
USDA	73.8	76.9
DOL	66.7	80.9
HEW	64.8	77.8
DOT	55.9	66.2
HUD	49.5	65.7
All departments	62.7	73.3

INVOLVEMENT WITH PROGRAM

Another area examined in our survey is that of the communications and activities involving team members taking place in the six departments. We asked a series of questions designed to provide a description of the extent to which there is an ongoing emergency preparedness "program" in the departments. We focused on the following program elements: written guidelines, briefings, exercises, and visits to the emergency duty station. Since some individuals might not have been team members long enough to have had contact with all these elements, we considered only the responses of those who had been team members for longer than 1 year at the time of the survey. This group represents about three-fourths of the team members surveyed.

Seventy-five percent of the team members reported having been furnished some written guidelines concerning their role as an emergency team member. Sixty-five percent reported that they had received some such material within the 1-year period immediately preceding the survey.

About 64 percent of the team members have attended at least one briefing concerning individual, team, or

department emergency responsibilities. Only 44 percent of the team members had attended a briefing within the preceding year, however. As shown in the following table, most team members who had attended briefings attended between one and three briefings during the preceding 2-year period.

<u>Number of briefings attended</u>	<u>Percent of respondents</u>
One	54.7
Two or three	31.5
Four or more	13.8

To obtain a more complete understanding of the nature of the emergency preparedness programs in the six departments, we asked team members who had received any information through either written guidelines or briefings to indicate from a list of possible subjects those that had been included in either the written material or the briefings. All of the subjects we listed were reported by some team members as having been included in the information they had received. The most frequently cited subjects were lists of team members and telephone numbers (75 percent), the department's emergency responsibilities (73 percent), procedures for alerting team members if an emergency occurs during working hours (67 percent), and team emergency responsibilities (66 percent). The following table shows the percentage of team members citing each subject as having been covered.

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Percent of team members (note a)</u>
Department emergency responsibilities	73
Team emergency responsibilities	66
Individual emergency responsibilities	45
Procedures for updating individual availability	20
Lists of team members assigned and telephone numbers	75
Procedures for alerting team members if an emergency occurs during working hours	67
Procedures for alerting team members if an emergency occurs during off-duty hours	58
Personal items to bring to emergency duty station	28
Instructions on how to get to your emergency duty station	57
Instructions on how to gain access to your emergency duty station	40
Explanation of your emergency responsibilities in relationship to other team members' responsibilities	31

a/These percentages are based on only those team members who reported having received some information through written guidelines or briefings.

Forty-six percent of the emergency team members said that they have participated in at least one emergency exercise. About half of these individuals had participated in an exercise within the 12 months preceding the survey.

Familiarization with the emergency duty station does not appear to be a major part of the program in the departments we surveyed. Only 40 percent of the survey participants remembered ever having visited their station. DOD had

the highest proportion of team members who had visited their emergency duty station, while DOT had the lowest. The agency distribution is shown in the following table.

Table VII

Ranking of Departments by Proportion of Team Members Who Had Visited Their Duty Stations

<u>Department</u>	<u>Percent</u>
DOD	66.7
HEW	55.7
DOL	50.0
USDA	39.6
HUD	35.5
DOT	27.0
All departments	40.4

Team members' assessments of program value

We also sought to obtain the views of team members on the effectiveness of some of the program elements to which they had been exposed. We defined effectiveness, in this instance, as the extent of improvement achieved in the team member's readiness to meet his or her national emergency responsibilities.

Eighty-five percent of those who had visited their duty station felt that such a visit was useful in improving their emergency preparedness. Regarding briefings and exercises they had attended, team members felt that neither contributed much to improving their preparedness.

The exercises were assessed as realistic by only about 30 percent of those who participated. When asked about the quality of the communications networks used during the exercises, however, team members responded that they were adequate. Concerning the degree of commitment of team members in these exercises, only a small proportion of those responding indicated that their fellow participants had not seemed committed to the exercises.

Specific provisions for emergencies

In addition to determining the extent of ongoing program involvement of the team members, we examined the extent to which specific provisions involving team members have been made in anticipation of a national emergency. We asked team members about such matters as (1) whether alternates have been designated for them, (2) whether any special provisions have been made to ensure that their home telephones will be in service in an emergency, (3) whether they have been informed of what action they should take if they are out of town or otherwise unavailable when an emergency occurs, and (4) whether any emergency provisions have been made for their immediate families.

Nearly half of the team members were not aware of whether or not an alternate had been designated for their emergency team position. Of those who did know, only about 36 percent reported that an alternate had been designated. Thus, only about 20 percent of those surveyed were sure that an alternate had been designated for their emergency team position.

Despite the fact that the General Services Administration requires that departments make such provisions, only about 9 percent of those surveyed reported that special provisions had been made to ensure that their home telephone will be in service during an emergency. Fourteen percent did not know whether or not such provisions had been made, while 77 percent were sure that such provisions had not been made. When we looked at the agency distribution of those who knew whether or not such provisions had been made we found that no DOD team member was aware of such provisions having been made. This is shown in the following table.

Table VIII

Ranking of Departments by Proportion  
of Team Members Who Have Stated That Provisions  
Had Been Made for Their Home Telephone  
to be in Service in an Emergency

<u>Department</u>	<u>Percent</u> (note a)
HEW	21.8
USDA	16.4
DOT	12.8
HUD	5.2
DOL	2.9
DOD	-
All departments	11.0

a/These percentages are based on those who knew whether or not such provisions had been made.

Concerning the question of what a team member should do if he or she is out of town or otherwise unavailable when an emergency occurs, our survey found that only 30 percent remembered being provided information on this subject. Thirteen percent did not remember if they had been told what action to take, while over half said that they had not been given any information. As seen below, DOD had the highest proportion of team members possessing this information, while HUD had the lowest.

Table IX

Ranking of Departments by Proportion of Team  
Members Who Have Been Given Information Explaining  
What Actions To Take if Unavailable in Emergency

<u>Department</u>	<u>Percent (note a)</u>
DOD	52.8
HEW	43.4
USDA	42.1
DOL	39.5
DOT	28.5
HUD	19.1
All departments	34.5

a/These percentages are based on those who remember whether or not they received this information.

FPA has suggested that team members make emergency provisions for their immediate families. We asked the participants in our survey whether such provisions have been made. Only about 11 percent of those answering the question responded affirmatively. Eighty-four percent said that no such provisions have been made, while 5 percent said that the question was not applicable since they have no immediate family in the Washington, D.C., area.

Likelihood of reporting to  
one's emergency duty station

We asked the team members how probable it was that they would report to their emergency duty station under each of two circumstances: first, under the assumption that the team member is home when notified to report to the emergency duty station, and second, assuming that the team member is at work when so notified.

Not surprisingly, respondents to these questions generally thought that they would be more likely to report if they were at work than if they were at home. Even in the latter case, however, nearly 80 percent said that they would probably report. When asked about the likelihood of reporting if at work, 87 percent responded that they

would probably report. Thus, the team members surveyed appear to be highly motivated to carry out their mission in a national emergency.

When asked what actions would significantly increase their probability of reporting, respondents said that the most effective would be improving emergency provisions for their family. The actions that team members believe would significantly increase reportability are shown in the following table.

Table X

Actions Believed Likely to  
Significantly Increase Reportability  
to Emergency Duty Station

<u>Action</u>	<u>Percent of team members</u>
Improve emergency provisions for family	76
Conduct more briefings and exercises to familiarize personnel with program	59
Develop more effective transportation procedures	39
Place more emphasis on importance of participation in program by agency management	34
Achieve more public awareness of the benefits of the program	15
Improve facilities at the relocation site	8

PREPAREDNESS

The third major issue with which our survey was concerned was that of how well prepared team members believe themselves to be to carry out the duties they may be called upon to perform in a national emergency. Our survey questionnaire asked the team members to indicate how well prepared they felt themselves to be to perform a variety of activities probably required in an emergency. These ranged

from activities required of all team members, such as traveling to their emergency duty stations, to such less universally applicable activities as coordinating their activities with State and local governments. Almost uniformly, most respondents characterized themselves as not being prepared to carry out these activities. In the case of probably the most fundamental activity, performing their emergency functions, only 44 percent of the team members considered themselves prepared. Thirty-eight percent said that they felt unprepared, and the other 18 percent reported feeling neither prepared nor unprepared. The following table shows the percentage of respondents that felt themselves prepared to perform each of the eight activities that seem generally applicable to all team members.

Table XI

Proportion of Team Members That Feel Prepared to Perform Probable Emergency Actions

<u>Emergency action</u>	<u>Percent that feel prepared</u>
Travel from work to emergency duty station	43.9
Travel from home to emergency duty station	47.2
Report inability to travel to emergency duty station	43.6
Alert other team members of the emergency	48.3
Bring necessary personal items to emergency duty station	39.0
Gain access to duty station	37.4
Perform emergency functions	44.3
Coordinate activities with other team members from same agency	44.3

Of the emergency actions listed above, we consider two to be critically important: (1) traveling to one's emergency duty station and (2) performing emergency functions. If a team member is unable to reach the station,

it matters little how well prepared he or she is to perform his or her emergency function. Also, to be effective, a team member arriving at the emergency duty station should be ready to assume his or her emergency duties.

We categorized team members as being "able to travel to their duty station" if they felt prepared to travel to there from both work and home. Only 40 percent of the responding team members met this requirement. The distribution, by department, of those whom we categorized as able to travel to their duty station is shown in the following table.

Table XII

Ranking of Departments by Proportion of  
Team Members Who Feel Prepared to Travel  
to Their Emergency Duty Station

<u>Department</u>	<u>Percent</u>
DOD	62.1
DOL	44.7
HEW	41.9
USDA	40.7
DOT	36.4
HUD	30.4
All departments	40.2

The following table shows the distribution, by department, of team members who feel prepared to perform their emergency functions.

Table XIII

Ranking of Departments by Proportion  
of Team Members Who Feel Prepared  
to Perform Their Emergency Functions

<u>Department</u>	<u>Percent</u>
DOD	79.3
DOL	48.7
USDA	44.1
HEW	41.9
DOT	38.6
HUD	34.0
All departments	44.3

As stated previously, we believe a team member, at the very least, should be able to reach the assigned emergency duty station and perform assigned emergency functions. Fewer than one-third of the survey participants, however, felt prepared to do both. The agency distribution is given in the following table.

Table XIV

Ranking of Departments by Proportion of  
Team Members Who Feel Prepared to  
Both Travel to Their Duty Station  
and Perform Their Emergency Function

<u>Department</u>	<u>Percent</u>
DOD	55.2
DOL	34.2
USDA	33.3
DOT	27.4
HEW	27.4
HUD	22.8
All departments	30.9

A CLOSER LOOK AT THOSE WHO FEEL PREPARED

Since the major objective of our survey was to determine how well prepared team members consider themselves to be to perform their emergency duties, we looked into the differences between the "prepared" and "unprepared" groups. As stated previously, 44 percent of the responding team members surveyed felt unprepared, 38 percent felt prepared, and the other 18 percent felt neither prepared nor unprepared. We compared the responses of the "prepared" and "unprepared" groups to a variety of questions in an attempt to identify differences in characteristics between the two groups. We hoped that in this way we might come up with possible explanations for the difference between their assessments of their own preparedness.

In examining differences between these groups, we were also largely comparing those feeling prepared to reach their emergency duty station and those who do not, since those who felt prepared to reach the emergency duty station are essentially the same group as those who felt prepared to perform emergency functions. For example, 76 percent of those who feel prepared to travel to their station also felt prepared to perform their emergency duty functions, and 78 percent of those who felt unprepared to travel to their duty station also felt unprepared to perform their emergency functions.

Distinguishing characteristics

Those who felt prepared to perform their emergency functions:

1. Have a better understanding of their personal or individual emergency responsibilities.
2. Have a better understanding of their department's emergency responsibilities.
3. Were more likely to have visited their emergency duty station.

A table showing how the prepared and unprepared team members compare on these questions follows.

Table XV

Crosstabulation of Preparedness of Team Members  
to Perform Their Emergency Functions  
by Distinguishing Characteristics

<u>State of preparedness</u>	<u>Percent that have:</u>		
	<u>Good understand- ing of personal emergency responsibilities (note a)</u>	<u>Good understanding of their agency's emergency respon- sibilities (note a)</u>	<u>Visited their duty station</u>
Prepared	93	95	59
Unprepared	29	50	12

a/As stated previously, team members having a good understanding are defined as those who assessed their degree of understanding as either moderate, large, or total.

Understanding individual  
emergency responsibilities

As the table above shows, of the three factors on which the prepared and unprepared groups differ, the one that best distinguishes between the two groups is the degree of understanding of personal emergency responsibilities. Of those who felt prepared to perform their emergency functions, 93 percent stated that they had a good understanding of their responsibilities, while only 29 percent of the unprepared group reported having a good understanding of those responsibilities.

When we investigated further, we found that the degree of understanding team members had of their individual responsibilities seemed to depend on whether or not their department had informed them of their responsibilities. As the following table shows, 86 percent of those reporting a good understanding of their responsibilities said that they had been informed of those responsibilities, while only 10 percent of those having a poor understanding said that they had been so informed.

Table XVICrosstabulation of Team Members' Understanding of Emergency Responsibilities with Receipt of Information Concerning These Responsibilities

<u>Degree of understanding</u>	<u>Percent of team members who were:</u>	
	<u>Informed of emergency responsibilities</u>	<u>Not informed of emergency responsibilities</u>
Good	86	14
Poor (note a)	10	90

a/Team members having a poor understanding are defined as those who assessed their degree of understanding as small, little, or none.

A similar situation exists concerning the degree of understanding each team member has of his or her agency's emergency responsibilities. About 90 percent of those having a good understanding of their agency's responsibilities had been informed of these responsibilities, while almost two-thirds of those having a poor understanding stated that they had never been so informed.

We do not mean to imply that team members who have a poor understanding of their individual emergency responsibilities had not been informed at all regarding the preparedness program. Seventy-two percent of those who considered themselves to have a poor understanding of their individual emergency responsibilities had been given information about their role as a team member in the emergency preparedness program. This information was in the form of written guidelines, briefings, tests, or exercises.

Thus, team members' understanding of their emergency responsibilities seems not to depend on whether or not they were given any information, but rather on whether or not they were told specifically of their individual responsibilities.

SUMMARY

We made a survey of members of the emergency preparedness teams in six Federal departments to determine (1) the understanding they have of their agency's and their own responsibilities in a national emergency, (2) their level

of activity in the program, and (3) their present state of readiness. Survey results indicate a somewhat disappointing showing in each of the above categories.

Overall, only about three-fourths reported having a good understanding of their agency's emergency responsibilities. A smaller proportion, 63 percent, felt they had a good understanding of their individual emergency responsibilities.

When we looked at team members' activity in key program elements, we found a low level of participation. For those who have been team members for more than 1 year, about one-third have never attended a briefing, three-fifths have never visited their emergency duty station, and one-half have never participated in any emergency exercises.

When those team members who had participated in the program activities mentioned above were asked how useful such activities had been in contributing to their overall emergency preparedness, most felt that a visit to their duty station had been useful. Their assessments of briefings and exercises were considerably less favorable, however.

The most disappointing result of the survey was in an area that is probably the most important--preparedness to perform assigned duties in a national emergency. More than half the team members do not feel prepared to perform actions that will probably be required of them in an emergency. More than two-thirds do not feel prepared to perform what we believe is absolutely basic and vital: being able to travel to one's duty station and, once there, carry out one's emergency responsibilities.

When we compared those team members who feel prepared to perform their emergency functions with those who feel unprepared, we found that the prepared group:

1. Have a better understanding of their personal emergency responsibilities.
2. Have a better understanding of their agency's emergency responsibilities.
3. Are more likely to have visited their emergency duty stations.

In view of the unprecedented nature and size of the emergencies to which the team members are expected to respond, it is doubtful that they could ever be said to be fully prepared to meet all demands that might be placed upon them in such an emergency. Nonetheless, the assessments of many team members that they do feel prepared to perform their emergency functions and the high degree of motivation evidenced by the team members surveyed, in our opinion, argue persuasively that the readiness of the team members can be greatly improved. Further, we believe that the survey responses indicate some means by which such an improvement might be brought about. There is a considerable disparity in extent of individual involvement with the preparedness program between those team members who feel themselves to be prepared for their emergency responsibilities and those who do not. This seems to strongly suggest that an increased effort to provide such personal involvement to all team members would result in an emergency team force that, at least in its own eyes, would be much more prepared to meet its responsibilities in a major national emergency than it is now.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALSRESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING ACTIVITIESDISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
<u>DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE</u>		
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE:		
Robert Bergland	Jan. 1977	Present
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE:		
John C. White	Jan. 1977	Present
<u>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE</u>		
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:		
Dr. Harold Brown	Jan. 1977	Present
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:		
Charles W. Duncan	Jan. 1977	Present
<u>GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION</u>		
ADMINISTRATOR:		
Joel W. Solomon	Apr. 1977	Present
Robert T. Griffin (acting)	Feb. 1977	Apr. 1977
Jack Eckerd	Nov. 1975	Feb. 1977
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR:		
Robert T. Griffin	May 1977	Present
Vacant	Feb. 1977	May 1977
Wallace H. Robinson, Jr. (acting)	Dec. 1976	Feb. 1977
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY:		
Joseph A. Mitchell	Oct. 1977	Present
Dalimil Kybal (acting)	Apr. 1977	Oct. 1977
<u>DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE</u>		
SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE:		
Joseph Califano	Jan. 1977	Present
UNDER SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE:		
Hale Champion	Jan. 1977	Present

<u>Tenure of office</u>	
<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

## SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT:

Patricia Roberts Harris	Jan. 1977	Present
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## UNDER SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT:

Jay Janis	Mar. 1977	Present
Vacant	Jan. 1977	Mar. 1977
John B. Rhinelanders	Sept. 1975	Jan. 1977

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

## SECRETARY OF LABOR:

Ray Marshall	Jan. 1977	Present
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## UNDER SECRETARY OF LABOR:

Robert J. Brown	Mar. 1977	Present
Vacant	Jan. 1977	Mar. 1977

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

## SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION:

Brock Adams	Jan. 1977	Present
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## DEPUTY SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION:

Alan Butchman	Feb. 1977	Present
John Barnum	May 1973	Jan. 1977